From conversations with various members of the Disarmament Section, I am
furthermore able to report the following respecting the status of these
memoranda and concerning the data embodied therein.
M. Aghnides has left Geneva for a leave of absence of approximately one
month. He has requested that during his absence the members of his
Section make a critical study of the memorandum of June 22 with a view
to its possible revision.
It appears to be understood in the Section that M. Aghnides’ policy is
that the Third Committee of the Assembly be reconstituted during the
forthcoming Assembly for the consideration of the situation respecting
disarmament. The Department will recall that the Third Committee has not
met during recent years. I am told that in discussing this with members
of his Section M. Aghnides made clear that the Third Committee was not
competent to discuss disarmament per se, which is
a function of the General Conference, and that it was envisaged that the
Committee would concern itself only with procedure. M. Aghnides
emphasized this point by stating that the reason the
[Page 2]
Third Committee should not impinge on the
functions of the Conference was that certain states members of the
Conference were not represented on the Committee.
Certain members of the Disarmament Section tell me that they believe that
M. Aghnides would not have spoken so positively concerning the prospects
of a meeting of the Assembly Third Committee had not some political
arrangements been worked out to that end. These arrangements are
considered as presumably centering in Paris in view of the French
Government’s preoccupations concerning an international consideration of
the question of private manufacture (see Consulate’s despatch No. 1737
Political, June 17, 19362).
Indeed, this whole effort is seen as primarily a French move.
I encounter greatly differing views among the officials of the
Disarmament Section respecting the policy for action which the
memorandum implies. The French member, for example, speaks favorably
respecting the resumption of disarmament activities; while the British
member characterizes such an effort as entirely apart from reality. The
British member in particular in speaking to me objected to any extension
of the London naval discussions in Geneva, an element upon which the
memorandum touches. In respect of the views expressed by these
officials, it may be presumed that to a rather definite degree they
reflect the positions of their respective governments.
Among certain other members of the Disarmament Section, grave
difficulties are seen in carrying out the projects envisaged in the
memorandum as well as serious objections to such attempts. In the first
place, possibly more harm than good to the general cause of disarmament
is seen to lie in a resumption of disarmament efforts under
circumstances which would appear to render a successful issue so
questionable. In the second place, in the present delicate posture of
European affairs, it is felt that the discussions which might take place
in the Third Assembly Committee and in any subsequent meeting of a
Conference body might serve only to sharpen European political issues.
Indeed the apprehension is felt that certain states might employ such an
opportunity as a platform for the advancement of their political aims,
which might indeed be directed with disturbing results against such an
absentee state as Germany. In view of these differences of opinion, it
is very difficult to see at present how these matters may eventuate.
As germane to the foregoing and also of more general interest, I desire
to report that strong rumors have been current here for some days to the
effect that the convocation of the Assembly, now set for September 21,
will be adjourned to some date in November. These rumors appear to
originate with functionaries of the League Secretariat
[Page 3]
who assert that correspondence indicating such
a postponement has taken place between the Secretary-General and certain
governments.
I may say that the natural presumption is that such a deferment of the
meeting of the Assembly would be in order that the Assembly might take
place subsequent to the five-power discussions3 which, from
information here, are now tentatively set for some date in October. The
thought in this respect is that the results of such a five-power
conference might constitute something tangible to present to the
Assembly in respect of a European settlement upon which the project for
League reform on the Assembly agenda directly depends. A further view is
that a deferment of the Assembly would avoid possibly unfortunate public
discussions of certain political questions which might create an
atmosphere disturbing to the projected five-power conference. It is
alleged here that London is favorable to an Assembly adjournment. In
this connection, I refer specifically to the final paragraph of my
telegram No. 267, June 20 [30], 2 p.m.4
On the other hand, as the Department is aware, such a five-power
conference—concerning which the date and even the fact of its meeting I
have recently heard questioned—is supposed to be only preliminary to a
European conference wider in scope. Thus the whole scheme for
conferences of this nature seems not only not to be a settled matter but
also that its success or duration can by no means be foretold. With
respect to the Assembly, it is almost technically necessary in League
affairs for an Assembly to be held each year. Moreover, to omit an
Assembly in any one year would doubtless be most injurious to League
morale.
One would thus be inclined to believe that wisdom will suggest that the
Assembly not run the risk of a deferment of date which might not only be
fruitless but might lead to greater complications. Those who hold this
latter opinion believe that every effort should be made that the
Assembly be as short as possible, that it be restricted to the greatest
possible degree to technical questions, and above all that contentious
political discussions be avoided.
In a recent conversation with my German colleague here, he told me that
Berlin would be opposed to any postponement of the Assembly to the
extent that such a deferment was related to the five-power discussions.
He stated that Berlin would resent even the aspect being presented that
such discussions were preliminary to, or subject to review by, the
League Assembly. I may say that this whole matter may
[Page 4]
indeed already have been settled among the
great power capitals. From Geneva, however, I can only report the
currents in the situation which are in evidence here.
[Subenclosure]
Resumption of the Disarmament Conference
A. Present status of the
Conference.
At its last meeting on November 20th, 1934,5 the Bureau
of the Conference adopted the President’s suggestion that the
programme of the Conference, approved at the last meeting of the
General Commission on June 8th, 1934,* should be modified in view of the trend of
political events by endeavouring, without necessarily awaiting the
completion of an entire Convention, to embody in separate agreements
such questions as were considered ripe for solution—notably the
Regulation of the Trade in and Private and State Manufacture of Arms
and Implements of War, Publicity of National Defence Expenditure,
and the Permanent Disarmament Commission.
During the following months, meetings took place of the Special
Committee for the Regulation of the Trade in and Private and State
Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War (referred to hereafter as
the Special Committee), the Technical Committee of the National
Defence Expenditure Commission (referred to hereafter as the
Technical Committee) and of the Committee on Miscellaneous
Provisions. The Special Committee, on April 13th, 1935, adopted a
report, containing certain draft texts, which was forwarded to the
Governments (Conf. D./C. G. 168). The Technical Committee, on
January 14th, 1935, issued a complementary report in which it
incorporated the final draft of the Convention on Publicity of
National Defence Expenditure. This report was also forwarded to
Governments
[Page 6]
(Conf. D./C. G.
160 (1), also Conf. D. 158). Vol.
III.†
The Committee on Miscellaneous Provisions decided to adjourn the
discussion of the Soviet proposal for a Permanent Peace Conference,
which the Bureau had referred to it, and assisted the Special
Committee in preparing the texts relating to the setting up of the
Permanent Disarmament Commission. No meetings of the Bureau, General
Commission or other bodies of the Conference have taken place since
April 1935.
The Sixteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly did not deal with
Disarmament. However, in view of the death on October 20th, 1935, of
the President of the Conference, the Council, during its ninetieth
session, decided (January 22nd, 1936) that circumstances were still
unpropitious for the resumption of the work of the Conference, but
that as soon as a proposal for the convening of the Conference is
made, either by the Council’s Rapporteur on
Disarmament questions (M. Buys Guinazú) or by a Member or Members,
the Council could empower the Secretary-General to consult the
Bureau of the Conference on the question of summoning the
Conference, and that the latter would then begin by electing a
President and proceed to consider the general situation‡ (Conf. D. 172).
B. Future of the Conference.
It would seem that circumstances continue unpropitious for a
resumption of the full Conference. It may be, however, that the time
has arrived when renewed consideration should be given to the
possibility, suggested by Mr. Henderson and approved by the Bureau
in November 1934, of the conclusion of separate agreements covering
particular aspects of the disarmament problem which may be ripe for
solution. In addition to the Regulation of the Trade in and Private
and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War, Publicity of
National Defense Expenditure and the Permanent Disarmament
Commission—already envisaged by Mr. Henderson—a partial solution of
the problem of naval armaments appears practicable as a result of
the conclusion of the London Naval Treaty of 1936.6
In view of the limited programme and in order not to arouse
exaggerated hopes, it seems preferable not to convene the Plenary
Conference or the General Commission until final agreements have
been
[Page 7]
completed. A feasible
procedure might be for the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the
Assembly to reconvene its Third Committee which might note the
possibility of achieving progress in certain specified fields and
submit a resolution to the Assembly asking the Council to call a
meeting of the Bureau within the near future for the purpose of
preparing a new programme of work along the lines suggested. The
Bureau might then convene
- (a)
- the Special Committee with instructions to reexamine the
texts elaborated in April 1935 in the light of the
observations from the Governments and to prepare a final
draft Convention;
- (b)
- the National Defence Expenditure Commission with
instructions to consider, in the light of the observations
from the Governments, the draft Convention on Publicity of
National Defence Expenditure elaborated by the Technical
Committee and to prepare a final text;
- (c)
- the Committee on Miscellaneous Provisions with
instructions to consider, in the light of the observations
from the Governments, Chapter IV of the Draft Texts prepared
by the Special Committee (Conf. D. 168, pages 21–31) and to
prepare a final text in the form of a separate
Convention;
- (d)
- the Naval Commission, with instructions to consider the
London Naval Treaty 1936, in the light of the observations
from the Governments,§ and prepare a final text of a
Convention embodying the principles and provisions of this
Treaty.
In view of the interrelationship of the subjects to be dealt with, it
is desirable that the four Committees and Commissions be in session
simultaneously in order that they may co-ordinate their work and
mutually assist each other.
The reports of these Committees and Commissions would be submitted to
the Bureau which would convene the General Commission, either upon
receipt of each separate report or upon receipt of all four reports,
with a view to the final consideration and adoption of each
Convention and the possible preparation of a Protocol of Signature,
or Final Act, linking all four Conventions. Thereafter a Plenary
session of the Conference could be called for the purpose of signing
the instruments adopted by the General Commission.
The participation of delegates of States not at present represented
in the Conference might be invited at each successive stage, and all
States could in any event be invited to attend the final session for
the purpose of signing the agreements arrived at. These agreements
would presumably remain open to the accession of all
non-Signatories.
[Page 8]
The question of whether some or all of the agreements should be
conditioned upon their coming into force simultaneously could be
left to the decision of the General Commission.
C. Regulation of the Trade in and
Private and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of
War.
The report (Conf. D. 168) adopted by the Special Committee on April
13th, 1935, and forwarded to the Governments contains:
- (a)
- texts unanimously adopted;
- (b)
- texts proposed by the Committee, but subject to
reservations or to alternative proposals submitted by
certain delegations, and
- (c)
- alternative texts proposed by these delegations.
The Special Committee emphasised that the texts in no way bound the
Governments represented in respect to their final attitude and
pointed out that the final success of its task depended on the
solution of certain questions of principle. In general, the texts
unanimously adopted envisage a system of licenses for the
manufacture and permits for the export or import of certain
categories of arms and implements of war, and a system of publicity
through the Permanent Disarmament Commission which would also watch
over the execution of the obligations of the Convention. The
Committee did not achieve unanimity with regard to the extent of
publicity and the degree of control to be exercised through the
Permanent Disarmament Commission (see also Section E below). The
question of transit was left unsolved in the absence of adequate
instructions on the part of some delegations.
D. Publicity of National Defence
Expenditure.
The Conference originally considered budgetary publicity in
conjunction with a general scheme of budgetary limitation. Agreement
on such limitation having proved impossible, the General Commission,
on June 8th, 1933, decided that the first general Convention for the
Reduction and Limitation of Armaments should contain provisions for
the application of the principle of Publicity of National Defence
Expenditure, subject to international supervision, and instructed
the Technical Committee to prepare the necessary texts (Minutes of
the General Commission, page 629). On December 11th, 1933, the
Technical Committee unanimously adopted a draft containing a series
of articles to be incorporated in the Convention, with five Annexes
conveying the necessary instructions. (Conf. D./C. G. 160).
The draft was reconsidered by the Technical Committee in the autumn
of 1934 in the light of additional documentary material received
[Page 9]
from the Governments, and a
few minor changes were made in the text which was now issued as a
final draft Convention (Conf. D./C.G.160 (1)).
In the words of the President, “No particular difficulties were
encountered in the field of Publicity, and the relevant articles of
the draft Convention, with their Annexes, are available for
immediate application” (Conf. C. 171, page 158).
The final draft provides for a system of publicity, through the
Permanent Disarmament Commission, of all national defence
expenditure, including draft budgets, budgets, closed accounts,
statements of changes, etc. It should be noted that the texts
prepared by the Special Committee also include provisions for
publicity of expenditure on manufacture and purchase of arms and
implements of war (Article 7, C (b)).
E. The Permanent Disarmament
Commission.
The draft articles relating to the Permanent Disarmament Commission
are now included in Chapter IV of the texts prepared by the Special
Committee. The functions of the Commission as defined in this
chapter relate primarily to the execution of the obligations
regarding manufacture of and trade in arms and implements of war.
The texts, nevertheless, are capable of adaptation in such manner as
to permit of their incorporation in a separate instrument which
would cover the functions of the Commission with respect also to
such other fields as to which agreement may be attained.
Alternatively, the particular functions of the Commission in each
field might be dealt with in the respective Conventions, so that the
special Convention dealing with the Commission per
se could be confined to its setting up, composition, rules
of procedure, etc.
On certain fundamental questions of principle, especially as to a
system of continuous and automatic examination and supervision on
the spot—complete agreement has yet to be arrived at. Unanimous
approval was, nevertheless, achieved in the Special Committee to the
effect that a Permanent Disarmament Commission should be set up at
the seat of the League, composed of one representative of each
Contracting Party and to be entrusted with the duty of watching over
the execution of the Convention; this Commission should meet in
ordinary session at least once a year and in extraordinary session
in accordance with the requirements of the Convention and whenever
its Bureau should so decide either on its own motion or at the
request of one of the Contracting Parties or of the Council of the
League. It was also unanimously agreed that, in addition to the
information
[Page 10]
specifically
called for by the Convention, the Contracting Parties should be
required to furnish any supplementary particulars or observations
the Commission might request.
F. Extension of the principles of
the London Naval Treaty 1936.
The London Naval Treaty 1936, intended to come into force upon the
expiration at the end of the current year—1936—of the Washington
Naval Treaty of 19227 and the
London Naval Treaty of 1930,8 and to
remain in effect for six years until the end of 1942, was signed on
behalf of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations (with
the exception of the Irish Free State and South Africa), by France
and by the United States of America, and is open to the accession of
Italy and Japan as co-signatories of the London Treaty of 1930.
While abandoning quantitative limitation, the Treaty perpetuates,
elaborates, and in some instances reduces the qualitative limit of
the earlier Treaties, thus eliminating competition in types of
ships. It continues in more comprehensive form the exchange of
information as to naval construction called for by the older
Treaties and adds a new system of advance notification of annual
building programmes, thereby removing, in the quantitative field
also, those elements of secrecy, uncertainty, and surprise which in
the past have recognisedly been important factors in naval
competition. A six-year holiday in the building of 8 inch gun
cruisers and of cruisers exceeding 8,000 tons has been established.
Finally, the continuity of the naval disarmament effort has been
assured by providing for consultation in 1940 with a view to a new
conference in 1941 and to a possible reduction in unit tonnage and
in caliber of guns of capital ships.
Negotiations for the extension of the principles of this Treaty to
other naval Powers, by means of bilateral agreements with the United
Kingdom,9 have to date been undertaken by the
United Kingdom Government with the Governments of Germany, Poland,
and the U. S. S. R. Moreover, the Secretary-General, at the
suggestion of the President of the London Naval Conference, Mr.
Anthony Eden, has invited the non-Signatory Governments (to which he
has previously circulated the text of the Treaty and its two
Protocols) to communicate, through his agency, any observations they
might wish to offer on the text to the United Kingdom Government,
which latter would be glad to furnish any explanations it might be
in their power to give (Circular letter of May 6th, 1936, C. L.
74.1936.IX).
It will be necessary, before reaching a decision as to the inclusion
of the naval question in the future programme of the Conference, to
[Page 11]
determine whether the
method now being pursued of bilateral negotiations should be
continued, or a general treaty under the auspices of the Disarmament
Conference be sought which would incorporate—with such modifications
as circumstances might require—the provisions of the London Treaty.
The question of whether such general Treaty would be open to the
signature of all Powers or only to the States not signatories to the
London Naval Treaty 1936, or, alternatively, only to the States not
signatories to the London Naval Treaty 1930, would also have to be
considered.
