793.94 Commission/656: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Edge) to the Secretary of State
720. From Davis. I have received a long personal letter from Simon written for the expressed purpose of explaining to us fully and confidentially his views and the policy and procedure which he thinks should be followed in the Sino-Japanese controversy. In substance he insists that there is no difference in principle between us and if there is any difference at all it is only a slight one as to procedure and that above all we must stand together and pursue the same policy. It is therefore with a view to avoiding any misunderstanding and of [Page 421] reaching a complete meeting of minds that he endeavored hurriedly and under great pressure to write me fully and he proposes upon his return to London to read this letter to the Cabinet.
The first part of his letter is devoted to explaining and quoting from his speech before the Assembly to prove that his position has been misunderstood and misrepresented. The balance of his letter is textually as follows:
[“]3. Now as to the future my own view is that it is very necessary to distinguish between the League’s duty to effect a settlement by conciliation and the League’s duty if conciliation fails to pronounce judgment. These two duties are prescribed in this order in separate paragraphs of article XV of the Covenant. Nothing but confusion can arise if conciliation is conducted in an atmosphere of denunciation. This is the view of every sober judgment at Geneva, small states not less than big, e.g., the very distinguished representative of Switzerland. I, therefore, want to give every chance to settlement by conciliation for peace in the Far East may depend upon it. But this does not in the least mean that I should not be prepared to see judgment pronounced if a fair and adequate opportunity has been given for conciliation, and conciliation fails. What I object to is poisoning the atmosphere of conciliation before the effort to make it starts.
4. But there are two dominant matters upon which a basis for conciliation should rest as to which I have no hesitation in stating my view. First, we must proceed upon the basis of the Lytton report (I said so quite clearly in my speech as the above quotation shows) and we must make plain throughout that we are standing by League doctrine and principle and by every declaration which the League has made in the past. This includes the declaration of March 11th when I repeated and adopted for myself the formula which we discussed together about nonrecognition.
5. Now I wish to say a word about this formula. As I have already told you I regard any question of recognition in the diplomatic sense of the State of Manchukuo as entirely academic and the British Government contemplates nothing of the sort. I understand that you have so reported to Mr. Stimson. We desire in this matter to act if possible with the United States and we should like to be assured of their intentions. There are, I believe, American Consuls in various towns in Manchuria just as we have British Consuls and I presume that these representatives of the United States discharge their duty of protecting American interests in relation to the de facto authorities. Our Consuls do the same. And I see no reason why this situation should not continue. It would, of course, be a foolish misconception of the formula to which Mr. Stimson and I have both given our adhesion to regard it as binding the executive[s] of our respective countries 100 years hence to have no diplomatic relations with an area as big as France and Germany combined. The formula means and was intended to be understood as meaning I apprehend that we neither of us intend to approve or support or countenance or admit as valid a change of circumstances which has been brought about by means contrary to the duties and the rights defined by treaties which we and others are bound to uphold. I have not chosen my words with pedantic [Page 422] care for you know that I am writing under pressure of time in circumstances which justify a personal communication.
6. Let me say in conclusion how glad I was to hear from you that there might be a prospect of securing under proper conditions the aid of a United States representative of the standing of General McCoy. I am for my part convinced that the only body fit for the work will be a small one staffed by men who know the subject matter in the sort of way that he does. That was the way in which your people and ours got things straightened out at Shanghai and though no doubt the effort to bring China and Japan together about Manchuria must be made in Geneva everything will depend upon a wise choice of personnel.
Once again let me say what a pleasure it has been to work side by side with you during all these months and I look forward to much effective cooperation in the future.”
The above letter was written as the result of 2 hours’ conversations yesterday with a view to summarizing his position but it is in somewhat more guarded terms than his talk with me. My judgment is that he is somewhat hampered by the Cabinet and that while the Cabinet is practically unanimous in wanting to keep in complete accord with us some of the influential members including MacDonald want in every way to avoid forcing the issue to the point of bringing article XVI into play. They have not yet realized that there would be no basis for conciliation and that in fact conciliation would be made impracticable without previous acceptance of at least the first eight chapters of the report and a resolution of nonrecognition of Manchukuo or of any settlement contrary to the Covenant and Peace Pact and perhaps the Nine-Power Treaty.
Without attempting to answer his letter in detail I propose to write him today calling his attention to the fact that since the March 11th resolution endorsed the principle of nonrecognition of a change of status arising from an action taken in violation of a [the?] Covenant or the Peace Pact it would be necessary now to translate this into specific terms in the light of the Lytton report and the setting up of the Manchukuo regime. I may state further that this together with the question of time which he raises with regard to the withholding of recognition is a matter of phraseology. [Davis.]
- Telegram in five sections.↩