File No. 861.00/1246
Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long)
Mr. Sookine, formerly Secretary at the Russian Embassy, called this afternoon. He said that he had come at the urgent request of [Page 62] his Ambassador who could not come himself because he had gone to New York to lay the same matter before Colonel House.
He opposed the sole intervention by Japan in Siberia on the grounds—
- (1)
- That it would alienate the people of Siberia and Russia in general, and the population of the districts which were occupied by Japanese in particular, from the Allied cause;
- (2)
- That the distrust which the people of Russia felt for Japan was greater than the antipathy which they had towards Germany.
He stated that it would facilitate the German economic and political control of Russia—
- (a)
- By inducing the people to accept German organization and control rather than Japanese;
- (b)
- By offering an argument for Germany to use against the Allied cause and Japan by holding up the specter of Japanese control of Siberia and, possibly, Russia.
He advocated a military political expedition into Russia to be composed of two Japanese armed corps and such fragmentary military units as the United States, France and England could send, even if the British contingent was composed of Indian troops and the French contingent composed of such soldiers as may now be in Cochin China. He advocated a political head of this expedition to be a committee of the Allies, or an American diplomatic representative, especially designated, which, or who, would be in control of the expedition.
He argued that, while the better element of the Russian people were still opposed to Germany, he feared that Germany would diplomatically proceed in her entrance into Russia by restoring order and by bringing about organization, upon which she would predicate the argument that she desired peace, that she wanted cooperation with Russia, that she desired peaceful economic and industrial intercourse and development and could say that the only objection and obstacle to peace was the ambition of the military powers opposing Germany on the western front. He said that he feared that the Russian people might be seduced into accepting the situation and that he believed, from his interpretation of Hertling’s most recent speech, that that would be the German policy.
He argued that Germany’s policy in Russia would be not only military but a diplomatic endeavor to influence and control the [Page 63] social, economic and industrial elements of the country. He argued that the way to offset and counteract the success of this movement would be to establish a political base as close to the eastern side of the Ural Mountains as possible and to conduct from such a base, supported by the military expedition, a campaign against the German campaign of diplomacy and propaganda.
He realized the physical difficulties preventing any military cooperation on the part of the United States and fully realized the danger consequent to the arming, releasing and organizing of the German and Austrian prisoners near Irkutsk and in Trans-Baikal, particularly with regard to destroying the railroad, or sections of the railroad, or bridges. There is one bridge right near the border of Manchuria which is one of the longest and highest bridges in the world and which, if destroyed, would break completely the line of communication and which it would take two years to rebuild.
The impression which I received from him was that he and Mr. Bakhmeteff feared the intervention of Japan as the mandatory of the Allies but were slowly coming to realize the imminence and the necessity for that particular kind of intervention but that they were endeavoring to do everything in their power to subordinate Japan to the actual supervision and control of the Allies while Japan should be in Siberia. Irrespective of this interpretation, there is considerable force to his argument and a great deal of merit in the suggestion that a political base be established in western Siberia or in eastern Russia to combat, as far as possible, the diplomatic and commercial intrigues and the propaganda of Germany. Of course, this political base would have to be supported by a large military force, much greater than two army corps, which should stretch along, protect, guard and hold the only line of communications to the eastward, which is the Trans-Siberian Railroad.