Memorandum to the Russian Embassy.
Washington, February 8, 1910.
In view of an apparent misunderstanding by the Imperial Russian Government of the nature of the proposal made by the United States for the neutralization of the railways in Manchuria and the relation of this to the project for the construction of a railway from Chinchow to Aigun, it seems proper to recount briefly the steps taken by this [Page 258] Government in preparing and presenting to various powers the recent memorandum on those subjects.
On October 2, after some weeks of negotiation, an agreement was signed at Mukden by the Chinese viceroy on the one part and representatives of a firm of British contractors and a group of American capitalists on the other part for the construction by British and American capital of a railway from Chinchow to Tsitsihar and Aigun. This agreement has since been ratified by a Chinese imperial edict.
The United States was asked to give diplomatic support to this project and was inclined to do so, provided (1) that similar support should be given by Great Britain, since the line was to be built by British contractors and in part with British capital, and (2) that other interested powers pledged to the policy of “equal opportunity” should be invited to participate.
It is pertinent to recall at this point that during the month of October the Russian Government inquired, apropos of the then negotiations for the Hukuang loan, whether the United States would be disposed to welcome Russian cooperation in future railway loans in China. Just as this inquiry was naturally taken to indicate a favorable disposition on the part of Russia to loans like those involved in the propositions under discussion, so the reply of the United States was a very clear expression of a disposition entirely favorable to cordial cooperation in such cases between Russia and the United States.
Previous to these events, however, the Department of State had learned of the discussions in 1908 and 1909 between certain officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway Co. and certain American interests with a view to the possible purchase by the latter of the railway just mentioned. Moreover, while the plan for the Chinchow-Aigun line was under consideration several reports appeared in the press to the effect that Russia was considering the sale of this railway and had made overtures to China looking to the purchase of the line by the latter or by an international syndicate. Similar reports reached the department through the embassy at St. Petersburg.
These reports led the American Government to believe that it might be possible to avoid any question of a conflict of interests by suggesting a more economical arrangement whereby, through an international loan to China, all the existing railways in Manchuria, and such other lines as were in future found necessary, might be combined into one system. When, therefore, the British Government had intimated its willingness to give diplomatic support to the Chinchow-Aigun project, the united States Government on November 6 prepared a memorandum setting forth the advantages of the alternative plan and stating that the success of the plan would require the cooperation of Russia, Japan, and China, the concessionaires and the reversionary, respectively, of the existing Manchurian railways, as well as that of Great Britain and the United States, whose special, in contradistinction to their general commercial, interests rested upon the contract already signed for the Chinchow-Aigun Railway. It was believed, and so stated, that such an arrangement would be advantageous to the interests of all powers concerned, and to Russia and Japan certainly no less than others.
[Page 259]Owing to the fact that a British company had contracted to build the Chinchow-Aigun line, the alternative plan was presented first of all to the Government of Great Britain and was approved in principle by that Government. In the meantime, however, the department learned that the outlines of the plans were being publicly discussed in Europe and the Orient, and in order to avert the misunderstanding that might result from such uninformed discussion the American Government notified the British foreign office on December 14 that it seemed highly important, as a matter of international consideration, to lay the plan before the Governments of the other interested powers without delay, and that the American representatives would be instructed to do so. Accordingly, on the same day, December 14, the American ambassadors at St. Petersburg and Tokyo were instructed by cable in like terms to communicate formally to the Russian and Japanese Governments the memorandum previously sent to them for their information, taking care to set forth fully the ideas contained therein.
Previous to this, however, the ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to ascertain the truth of the reports that Russia was considering the advisability of selling the Chinese Eastern Railway and had been given liberty to make informal use of the facts relative to the Manchurian project, which were then in his possession for his information. Next to the Government of Great Britain, therefore, the Imperial Government of Russia was the first to which any communication of the plan was made, and it will appear that the United States Government from the first realized the importance of securing the cooperation of Russia.
In the original instructions to the American ambassadors reference was made to an unpublished edict which the Government of the United States had been informed had been issued by the Chinese Government ratifying the Chinchow-Aigun Railway agreement, and all the ambassadors were alike instructed, as a matter of propriety, to withhold any reference to such edict. This instruction was unfortunately misunderstood by the American ambassador at St. Petersburg, who regarded it as directing him to withhold any reference to the Chinchow-Aigun Railway agreement as a whole. This mistake on the part of the ambassador was, however, promptly corrected by the Department of State so soon as it became known to the American Government and was explained by the ambassador to the Russian Government.
The Government of the United States could naturally not suppose that any friendly power would fail to interpret correctly its purposes in proposing a plan which it believed was in the best interests of all concerned and which was presented for consideration solely upon such merits as it might disclose. Nor did it occur to the American Government that in view of Its consistent policy for many years past it should hesitate to bring to the attention of its associates any measures that might appear to further the policies to which all alike were solemnly committed.
On January 20 last, before the Imperial Russian Government had made its very prompt reply to the proposal of the United States for the internationalization of the Manchurian railways, the American ambassador at St. Petersburg was telegraphically instructed to [Page 260] inform the Russian minister for foreign affairs that the American Government would greatly regret to have the decision of the Imperial Russian Government, when ultimately reached, influenced by any misunderstanding as to the nature of the proposal or the motive in making it and would appreciate an opportunity of presenting a fuller explanation of certain matters directly bearing upon the question. The explanation to which the telegram referred is that contained in the statement made above.