Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

280. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, October 8, 1959—8 p.m.

1015. For Murphy and Parsons from Smith. From recent telegrams,² it appears to me that British, US and French policies on Laos are divergent to extent they threaten to place US in position where if political and military situation Laos were to deteriorate seriously, US might (A) fail receive helpful British-French support (material, moral or political) for our policies, or even (B) be strongly criticized by them for programs and policies which are not palatable to them but which they are either unwilling or unable to replace with adequate programs of their own. If this situation is not brought to a head and discussed fully and frankly with British and French now, I believe we face the probability that if situation in Laos deteriorates markedly in the next few months we could find ourselves by ourselves in unduly exposed position. I therefore urge that in any top-level discussions with the British and the French, we be especially careful to avoid reaching only a surface agreement which could conceal basic differences in view-point that would rise to surface and handicap cooperation at any time as the situation worsens.

British and French positions appear recognize, as do all other SEATO members and many other UN members, free world need to preserve Laos from Communist domination. Many of them seem quite positive some sort “peaceful” permanent UN presence should now be established here to save Laos from being overwhelmed. But British and French dwell heavily on “over-Americanization” or “too large American presence” as being unnecessarily provocative and in their insistence that problem is essentially political and economic rather than military seem convinced that if RLG would just be less severe on NLHX and kinder to tribespeople whole problem would fade away. They regard as of little significance and as bit beside the point what we regard as basic—obvious need for improvement’s in FAL military effectiveness. They also appear unimpressed even with all-out RLG endeavor increase rural self-help program and our stepped-up road and economic support programs. Both Sir Robert Scott and French Ambassador Clarac asked me why we could not channel much or all of our aid through a UN agency. There even seems to be doubt whether British and French will stand by the full spirit of their SEATO commitments to Laos, unless to exaggerate “invasion in full uniform with VM epaulettes and battle flags at points observable from British and French MILATTs’ armchairs Vientiane not made.” Even in face of present situation British and French continue object or at least disapprove our bringing in here numbers of social, economic and military advisers we find essential to insure Lao necessary know-how to use our support effectively and insure by adequate end-use checks that American congressional support will have possibility of continuation in magnitude and time required.

Without the 100% backing from at least French and British for our policies and programs in Laos, our chances of retaining effective cooperation of RLG and accomplishing the task within the magnitude of aid so far contemplated will be reduced to a point where US objectives could well be defeated despite anything that I and the Country Team can do here locally.

In view this situation, I recommend we propose to British and French our readiness reduce sharply our present principal responsibility for saving Laos, calling on then and/or on UN to share overall burden we now carrying. I harbor little illusion that this offer likely be accepted, but the act alone of making it would seem likely have the benefit of (1) presenting constructive proposal along lines British and French imply desirable, which they would then have responsibility of thinking through and accepting or alternatively coming up with more practicable programs their own or else be forced accept without present reservations need to support wholeheartedly, at least in diplomatic area, our programs here; (2) dramatizing to British and French (and eventually to neutrals if proposal went so far as to reach UN stage) that we definitely not interested in Americanizing or militarizing Laos but only in keeping it free and out of Communist hands; and (3) making clear, in detailed consideration, that UN is not in position furnish kind of comprehensive security and economic programs which would provide satisfactory substitute for ours.

This démarche would possibly also present useful opportunity make clear to British and French what we regard as some of basic points on which we would need expect their understanding and support, if they choose to decline accept our turnover offer, and where we would have to form common front vis-à-vis RLG. Such clearing of air particularly necessary now when change in Commie tactics from battle of ballots to one including bullets, if not to bullets alone, will require even greater free world assistance and advice to RLG, which may have to continue over prolonged period if indeterminate hit-run guerrilla tactics become long-range Commie program. Another new factor, making even more essential parallel allied Ambassadorial level approaches to Laos, is recent transformation of Crown Prince into Prince Regent which has resulted in his strong and stubborn will and only intermittently available presence being interjected as powerful influence upon policymaking function RLG at very highest levels.

Following are some major points on which during next year we will need, as I see it, this tripartite agreement:

1. UN subcommittee presence be continued as long as possible. If it lapses for any reason we should urge that it be quickly replaced by some other form of UN presence—such as an observer (but only if exclusively for Laos). To provide further moral support and evidence of international interest in preserving Laos, suggest through appropriate measures that specialized UN agencies be encouraged establish in Laos at least some form of supplementary support.

2. Remaining SEATO governments to be most strongly encouraged to establish permanent representation in Vientiane so that in case the military situation were to deteriorate member governments could, even without UN observers’ assessment, be in position act quickly on basis up to date information.

3. Free world efforts to save Laos must no longer be inhibited by limitations or controls on sovereign actions Laos or of right Laos to request aid and support from any friendly nation, although of course, Laos will continue undertake remain neutral and will act in full accordance with spirit principles peaceful coexistence expressed in Geneva Accords.

4. Relatively large US Laos temporarily unavoidable as part collective free world effort to keep country from falling under Commie domination (such acceptance would permit us place technical advisors and trainers in appropriate ministries and if necessary at regional military headquarters, who would be able provide effective pre-audit advice and carry out end-use checks on our military and economic programs. This absolutely vital if Congress is to be persuaded continue provide aid to Laos at necessary levels and if Lao are to be trained to do for themselves within reasonable period.

5. As corollary, if military situation further deteriorates may be necessary extend presence PEO personnel down to battalion level. In absence other feasible arrangements, where local situation requires, British and French should be prepared on ad hoc basis allow to pass without public comment such unusual activities as US advice FAL re combat operations in order assure most effective defense against VM–PL attack). At field team level American-French cooperation already closest possible and we here would welcome greatest possible French-British-American cooperation this area.

6. No pressure on RLG for negotiations with and/or acceptance into Cabinet of NLHX leaders but rather full support of Phoui Sananikone as best possible Prime Minister, certainly now in absence suitable alternates with his experience and moderating influence, and proven ability effuse and exploit effectively and constructively energies of CDNI and Army group but with leeway to improve Cabinet by replacing Pan, Tan and Liep with Chao Nith, Somsanith and Leuam Insienxiengmay. We must insist on continuation reasonable balance LHL, CDNI and Army representation in Cabinet and avoidance resort unconstitutional methods to establish military or other type dictatorship. Extension of this principle should provide for end to idea that RLG owes it to DRV to be “nice” to NLHX and former PL beyond minimum legal requirements.

7. As life present Assembly runs out, we should back moves authorize and encourage Prince Regent extend its life for another year, and to then continue Phoui government full powers for another year, with next elections to be held in December 1960.

Chances for pulling Laos through have never been, since we entered picture here, really very bright except possibly during first few months 1959. At relatively low cost, we have managed to date not only prop up RLG but make it look as if it might be able take few halting steps forward on its own. Change in Commie tactics now seriously imperils that painful progress and can even bring down RLG superstructure, which now standing shakily above Lao morass on four legs—LHL, CDNI, Army and Prince Regent. Just as their continued close cooperation is necessary to keep structure from falling, so is it necessary for three major Western powers with most persuasive influence here to stand clearly together on all basic essentials. If British and French leave us or fail to make parallel moves at crucial moments, we will be faced with much more costly task if not with almost inevitable failure (affecting them as well as us). Merit of proposal contained herein appears to me to be that while hardly possible of adoption by British and French,³ it might have tonic effect of putting whole question future of Laos on frank and forthright plane which could lead to more constructive and greater allied unity re Laos not only here but in UN, SEATO and in major capitals.

Smith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–859. Top Secret; Niact. Also sent to CINCPAC for POLAD and repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, and London.
2. Such as telegrams 955 from Vientiane, October 3, 928 from Bangkok, October 7, and 1000 from Vientiane, October 7. (ibid., 751J.00/10–559, 751J.00/10–759, and 751J.00/10–759, respectively)
3. In telegram 1689 from Paris, the Embassy endorsed many of the proposals in telegram 1015 from Vientiane, but “would recommend against basing US courses of action on supposition GOF would be unwilling consider taking on some new burdens in Laos.” The Embassy in Paris believed that greater French effort in Laos would be to U.S. advantage and therefore should be sought. (ibid., 751J.00/10–1659; included in the microfiche supplement)