Office of the Historian

279. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Secretary of State1

Washington, October 6, 1959.

SUBJECT

  • Continuing UN Presence in Southeast Asia

I believe that, on balance, Mr. Hammarskjold’s proposal for the establishment of a continuing UN presence in Southeast Asia is one we should not oppose and I therefore recommend that you sign the attached letter.2 While the merits of his proposal are self-evident it involves a decision, if not exactly a precedent, for continuing UN activity of a regional nature. There are also certain problems, the seriousness of which cannot be gauged at this time. For example: [Page 636]

1.
The Soviets are likely to protest that any continuing UN presence is an effort to replace the Geneva Accords; and this in turn might cause the Secretary General, as well as the British and French, to seek to offset Soviet concern by restating the validity of the Geneva Accords and of the machinery established under the Accords. This could give rise to difficulties with the Lao Government.
2.
It is not clear whether the UN presence in Southeast Asia would be extended to include South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam. Though neither is a member of the UN, it might be important on occasion to have representatives visit South Viet-Nam (as for example in performing good offices in one of the recurring disputes between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam). On the other hand, such a development might generate undesirable pressures for the UN to perform similar good offices between Laos and North Viet-Nam.
3.
It is possible that a UN presence in Southeast Asian countries could limit our freedom of action there, especially in our military training and equipment programs. In the last analysis, the security of the free countries of Southeast Asia depends upon the United States and there could be occasions when bloc pressures upon the Secretary General or the divergent views and interests of even our French and British allies could have a deleterious effect on the attitudes of a future UN area representative towards U.S. or SEATO policies. We do not know who will replace Mr. Hammarskjold and he himself has exhibited at times serious misgivings as to U.S. activities in Southeast Asia.
4.
Whereas the Lao and other governments may, under current circumstances, be prepared to welcome a continuing UN physical presence in Southeast Asia, they may find such a presence galling and irritating in the years ahead.

In view of the above difficulties and dangers, the attached draft letter seeks to leave our position reasonably flexible and it stresses that the initiative for any continuing UN presence in Southeast Asia should come from the countries of that area.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/10–659. Secret. Drafted by Green.↩
  2. The letter was sent on October 8. (ibid., PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Laos 1951–1961; included in the microfiche supplement)↩