268. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 10, 19591
SUBJECT
- 1. Improved Training of Lao Army
- 2. Improved Intelligence in Laos
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. C. Douglas Dillon
- Mr. Robert Murphy
- Mr. J. Graham Parsons
- Mr. Francis O. Wilcox
- Mr. Woodruff Wallner
- Mr. Marshall Green
- Mr. Neil McElroy
- General N. F. Twining
- General L.L. Lemnitzer
- Mr. John N. Irwin II
Mr. McElroy opened the discussions by stating that he felt the time had come for mapping out our policies and actions with regard to holding on to Laos. He felt that there was no clear understanding as to just what our intentions were with regard to that country.
Mr. Dillon replied that we had, of course, kept in close touch with the President regarding all decisions taken during the past eventful week and our decisions have been in accordance with basic NSC policies.
Mr. McElroy replied that he agreed that NSC policies provided general guidance but that when a crisis like this arises then we must, with Presidential approval, decide on the particular course of action to be pursued. If the President thinks we must hold on to Laos, then that decision in itself entails great responsibilities for Defense and a great deal of careful advance planning and deployments. The second issue which Defense would like to raise with State today, he added, related to the training and equipment of the Royal Lao Army. He felt that we should give as rapid training to that Army as possible in guerrilla fighting and provide the Army with equipment and other supplies needed therefor. Mr. McElroy continued that the Defense Department appreciated U.S. obligations to the French in this respect but since the training agreement was signed there has been a change in the climate, [Page 617] justifying changes in the training program in our common interest. It is possible that the French would welcome the U.S. doing more under the current training program. Certainly it would be better from our point of view to have U.S. participation in the tactical training. Mr. McElroy also pointed out that his Department recognized the new situation created by the decision taken at the Security Council in New York last week-end, but this very action of the UN, which seems to be dampening down the Communist aggression, provides us with time and opportunity to move ahead with the kind of improvements in Lao training his Department had in mind.
Mr. Dillon agreed that it would be most advisable to have a talk about this matter with the President. He emphasized that this was a complex political-military problem; that as far as the UN is concerned we hope the fact-finding group will find evidence of aggression and will act as a continuing deterrent. One of our first steps in this crisis was to crank up SEATO; and although the initial response of the SEATO countries to the growing threat in Laos was apathetic, marked by a disposition to turn the whole problem over to the UN, there has been far better recognition in the past few days on the part of the SEATO countries of the need to get into a better position to act, if necessary. SEATO countries are now increasing their capabilities to assess developments in Laos. We do not propose to act unilaterally were military action to become necessary; we must maintain SEATO as a potentially active force in this situation and one within which any U.S. efforts to save Laos can be undertaken. Any actions we now take must bear in mind the sensitivities and interests of fellow SEATO countries and agreements concluded with the French, for which we had had to gain UK acquiescence as well as the understanding of the Canadians and others. Right along we have acted in a manner generally consistent with the Geneva Accords. Furthermore, we have made a lot of statements about no U.S. military bases and other U.S. military activities in Laos, and shortly the UN fact-finders are to arrive on the scene.
Mr. Dillon concluded that the State Department would nevertheless be prepared to consider any specific ideas Defense might have which were generally compatible with the requirements of the situation as outlined above, particularly the importance of not acting unilaterally.
General Lemnitzer, at Mr. McElroy’s suggestion, outlined certain reasons why he thought we were in fact entitled to a broadened U.S. responsibility under the current training agreement. Such a broadened responsibility had really been envisaged at the time the agreements were signed, and since then both General Heintges and Ambassador Smith had reported that the French were unsatisfactorily carrying out their side of the agreement. On top of this, we had moved into a [Page 618] “hotter” situation where there was an urgent need for action. He added that, quite frankly, our military don’t think much of French training, although recognizing the importance of keeping our lines straight with the French.
Mr. Dillon replied that we cannot act in such a way as to expose ourselves to the United Nations, particularly in the absence of clear evidence of aggression. If a new situation arises requiring more drastic measures, then we can revise our training responsibilities and programs in Laos. But right now it would appear that the Viet-Minh may be pulling back or at least not pressing forward and this creates a difficult setting for taking the kind of steps the Defense Department appears to have in mind.
Mr. Irwin stressed that it was due to the very fact that the situation was easing off that we should make the best use of an unexpected period of grace to revise the training program by increased U.S. responsibilities for tactical training and by having more U.S. personnel on the job. He also stressed the Defense Department’s appreciation of the importance of observing the spirit of the Geneva Accords, yet by improving the Lao Army we might spare ourselves later on the uninviting task of U.S. military action in Laos. Besides, there would seem to be considerable latitude for improvement under the Geneva Accords: for example, the French have only 500 military personnel in Laos although they could have some 5,000 under the Accords. Thus what the Defense Department has in mind is not to change the Geneva “device” but to make better use of that “device.”
Mr. Parsons said that we would look into any practical scheme for enhancing our training potential.
The ensuing discussion turned on how many Americans there are now in Laos and in what categories, with General Lemnitzer pointing out that the Defense Department’s plan for improving training contemplated only about 350 U.S. personnel in Laos.
Mr. Murphy suggested the training might be done outside Laos. Mr. Irwin thought that the current military challenge was such that the RLG could not spare the departure of any considerable groups for training abroad. Mr. Parsons proposed that it might be possible to have the training job done just across the Mekong in Thailand.
There was approval of this idea by Mr. McElroy, General Lemnitzer and Mr. Dillon.
Mr. Parsons went on to point out this idea had already been put to the Thai by the RLG but in rather inconclusive terms. Mr. McElroy thought that acceptance of this idea should be without prejudice to General Lemnitzer’s proposal about training of the RLG in Laos. Mr. Dillon thought it inadvisable for the United States, unless a new situation arose, to start training RLG units in forward areas.
[Page 619]Mr. Murphy agreed, adding that we are assuming that there will be time enough, what with the dampening effect of UN fact-finders on the scene, to proceed with less risky and exposable measures.
General Lemnitzer pointed out that a minimum of three months would be required for training a battalion and that the Lao Army was in varying stages of training.
Mr. Dillon agreed with Mr. Murphy that we should get State and Defense working levels together and agree on a training proposal which we might be able to sell to the French. We would point out to the French that this might be a far less costly way of doing things than having to save Laos through SEATO action. However, Mr. Dillon recognized that the French would shy away from any measures they thought might undercut the UN program and that might by their lights be unduly provocative.
Mr. Wilcox described in some detail what might be the outcome of the UN fact-finding mission. Conceivably it might result in no UN decision except to keep the item on the agenda. On the other hand its report (or developments themselves) might require that the issue be taken to the General Assembly. Until we have completed this UN operation, Mr. Wilcox observed, we must be most careful not to forfeit the kind of support we might need in the General Assembly.
Mr. Dillon turned to the problem of getting better evidence of Communist aggression. He pointed out why the State Department is opposed to PEO’s proposal for setting up some ten 6-man teams drawn from PEO. Alternatively, he suggested that Defense might add two or three “G–2 types” to the Army Attaché office in Vientiane. In that capacity, the U.S. investigators could be in uniform and could go to forward areas for investigations. This proposal was endorsed but it was left unclear as to how many new “G–2 types” should be assigned.
Mr. Parsons warned against converting PEO personnel for this new “G–2” task and it was agreed that any new ARMA assistants would be brought from elsewhere, possibly Viet-Nam.
Summing up, Mr. Dillon urged that we get ahead with:
- 1.
- Studying the two proposals for improving training (outside Laos and inside Laos);
- 2.
- The sending of new Assistant Attachés to Vientiane (this could be done right away); and
- 3.
- Mr. McElroy and Mr. Dillon talking this general problem over with the President at the earliest opportunity.2