Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

267. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 10, 1959¹

Washington, September 10, 1959

SUBJECT

• Meeting on Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• The Acting Secretary, Mr. C. Douglas Dillon
• Mr. Robert Murphy, Under Secretary
• Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Assistant Secretary, INR
• Mr. Woodruff Wallner, Deputy Assistant Secretary, IO
• Mr. John O. Bell, Special Assistant, W/MSC
• Mr. William I. Cargo, Director, UNP
• Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary, FE
• Mr. Marshall Green, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE
• Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, III, FE/SEATO
• Mr. Daniel V. Anderson, Director, SEA

1. Mr. Dillon opened the meeting by saying that the recent JCS proposals² (including establishment of a MAAG in Laos and removal of all cover from our military personnel there) had not come up at the NSC meeting this morning.³ However, he expected that these questions would be raised this afternoon at a meeting with the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Irwin and Generals Lemnitzer and Twining. He would invite Mr. McElroy to present his case at the outset.

2. Mr. Dillon noted that at the NSC meeting Mr. Allen Dulles had mentioned that a continued presence of the UN Subcommittee in Laos would be desirable even after the principals had left. Although the Subcommittee would not find much evidence of Communist complicity, it should be able to report on the extravagant charges made against the RLG and ourselves.

3. Mr. Murphy mentioned a news item regarding a new attack in Phong Saly Province.

4. Mr. Dillon referred to an item in today’s briefing that the Viet Minh had been shuttle flying a plane from Dong Hoi and dropping supplies “somewhere”. (DCI had said the plane was probably going to Tchepone.) Some doubt was expressed as to the probable destination but it was agreed that the flying time and estimated speed of the plane (150 mph.) would make it possible for these drops to have been made inside Laos.

5. Mr. Dillon then asked Mr. Parsons to explain our position regarding the military arrangement with the French. Mr. Parsons went into this subject in some detail, referring to the fact that the training agreement had been negotiated after considerable difficulty, that we had taken particular pains to obtain a benevolent attitude on the part of the British and Canadians as well as the Indians, and that we had heard nothing about the inadequacies of the plan, which had only begun to be put into effect at the end of August.

6. There was then a discussion of Ambassador Smith’s telegram— Vientiane’s 518 of September 3⁵—which was mentioned in the JCS paper and which dealt with such subjects as DRV capabilities, the significance of Sam Neua Province and the recommended issuance of a warning by the U.S. Government.

7. Mr. Parsons observed that any intervention in Laos should have SEATO cover. In contrast, the JCS paper was proposing that we “go it alone”. Mr. Murphy agreed that this was the purport of the paper. Mr. Dillon said that acceptance of the JCS proposals would be tantamount to agreeing to no control by the State Department. He agreed that with the importance of our relationships in this matter, particularly with such countries as the UK and India.

8. Mr. Cumming pointed out that he did not agree entirely with the information used in the JCS paper. If the Viet Minh wished to press ahead, it would be impossible to strengthen the RLG sufficiently to meet the onslaught with success.

9. Mr. Murphy asked about the proposed creation of a MAAG. Mr. Parsons said it could not be reconciled with the Geneva Agreement, and Mr. Dillon agreed.

10. Mr. Dillon asked what steps should be taken after the UN Subcommittee submits its report. Mr. Wallner said that would depend on what they reported; that it would be desirable to keep the matter in the SC until it gets to the GA. Mr. Dillon observed that we might have to go to the UNGA on the basis of “preserving the peace”.

11. Mr. Cargo said that our action would depend on the character of the report. We might want to start consideration of it in the SC. It would be desirable to keep the group in the area for some time. While we would have to rely on SEATO, we should have GA action at least simultaneously.

12. Mr. Murphy discussed the SYG’s note and considered a draft telegram prepared by IO.⁶ Mr. Dillon said that Ambassador Lodge had commented that he had never seen the SYG operate less responsibly than he had in this crisis. Mr. Murphy observed that the SYG’s message reflects unfavorably on us.

13. Mr. Dillon inquired about logistic support for the UN Subcommittee. Mr. Cargo said we had told members that the US was ready to provide support but that none had been requested thus far. He felt that the group should arrange their own transport and logistics as far as possible.

14. In a discussion of the use of helicopters, Mr. Murphy said it would be better to wait until the Subcommittee arrives in Laos and sees what it needs. However, Mr. Dillon recommended that we should be prepared to move in rapidly with helicopters if requested. It was agreed that about a week or so would be needed to fly them from the carrier Thetis Bay, which might be brought in close to Bangkok.

15. In reply to a question, Mr. Parsons estimated that the Subcommittee would consist of about 60 to 80 members. He expressed the hope that it would be able to find evidence of continuing “something or other” so it could remain in Laos. Mr. Dillon suggested that the Subcommittee have a look at the Tchepone area which was occupied sometime ago by the Viet Minh.

16. Mr. Murphy observed that the group would need a lot of equipment, and Mr. Green mentioned aviation gas and helicopters.

17. Mr. Cargo said that the RLG should tell the Subcommittee what it should look at. However, it must have independence to find the facts. Mr. Parsons pointed out that the real reason for the operation was to deter aggression.

18. In a discussion of the attitude of the SYG, Mr. Parsons said that the SYG had come back from his last trip to the area with an unfavorable impression of US activities. We don’t know where he got such an impression.

19. Mr. Cargo observed that the SYG wanted to be sure that the Subcommittee would act within the procedural concept. It seemed he had some right on his side but had gone a bit too far. Mr. Murphy observed that the SYG feels it his duty “to guide and superintend.”

20. Referring to ways and means of obtaining information on Viet Minh activities, Mr. Parsons suggested that it would seem sensible to add several members to the staff of our Army Attaché. These officers could, of course, serve in uniform. Mr. Cumming said he could not agree to the JCS proposal to put uniforms on the members of the PEO and training teams.

21. Mr. Dillon then asked Mr. Parsons about the number of Americans in Laos in various categories and noted that there was a need to get an up-to-date statistical picture, including the timing of recent additions.

22. Mr. Parsons then observed that if we took away the civilian cover from our PEO and training teams we would be hurt on a very broad front. Mr. Cumming noted that for the very first time the USSR had taken a “neutral” position on the India-China issue. Some might interpret this as indicating a favorable trend of Soviet policy.

23. Mr. Anderson observed, that, in his opinion, the Viet Minh had the capability to apply much more pressure than they had so far; they could turn the heat on and off as suited their purposes.

24. Finally, Mr. Dillon commented favorably on a paper⁷ prepared some ten days ago by Mr. Green, who said that this paper reflected the general thinking of the State–Defense–JCS–CIA working group on Laos, of which he was chairman. This paper stressed the importance of graduated deterrence and of the fact that this was a politico-military thrust by the Communists and not just a military challenge. Mr. Green said that his group was now working on a contingency paper⁸ relating to “cranking up” SEATO and anticipating precisely what steps the U.S. should take were military intervention under SEATO required.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/9–1059. Secret. Drafted by Anderson and approved by Parsons and Murphy.
2. See Document 254.
3. See supra.
5. Document 253.

6. In his note, September 9, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld suggested that since the Laos U.N. subcommittee was operating under Article 29 of the Charter, it had a limited procedural function and should not take on substantive tasks. The text of the note was transmitted in telegram 341 from USUN, September 9; and Hammarskjöld’s explanation of its significance is in telegram 340 from USUN, also September 9. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–959)

   In the draft of telegram 209 to USUN, September 10, the Department of State asked the Mission to inform the Secretary-General that, while it agreed that the subcommittee had a limited function, its job was to get the facts efficiently; conclusions would then be obvious. (ibid.) All three documents are included in the microfiche supplement.

7. Apparent reference to Tab B to Document 251.
8. Apparent reference to a paper entitled “Draft Contingency Plan for SEATO Operations in Relation to Laos,” 2d revision, September 11. (Department of State, EA (Laos) Files: Lot 68 D 77, Laos 1959)