Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

238. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands¹

Washington, June 21, 1957—7:05 p.m.

2128. Department seriously disturbed by report first para Embtel 1914² that Blaisse and parliamentary leaders proceeding on basis separate ratification EURATOM and Common Market Treaties to meet so-called US “parliamentary timetable.” Our views this subject as follows:

1. Overriding objective from US viewpoint is ratification and entry into force both treaties soon as feasible. Any step which carries risk jeopardizing this objective should be strongly but discreetly opposed.

2. Evident, especially in light Paris Embtel 6468³ (rptd The Hague unnumbered) and Colux 268⁴ (rptd The Hague 135) that action along lines suggested by Patijn and Blaisse would entail serious risk. Common Market Treaty is one on which probably margin in French parliament is narrow and pro-Treaty elements have evidently concluded Common Market has better chance if coupled with EURATOM. Any talk of splitting them can only play into hands elements in France who would prefer delay on Common Market and could we assume seriously jeopardize chances favorable final action.

3. Seems clear if Blaisse pursues his plan and obtains approval parliamentary leaders in Netherlands, plan will become public knowledge rapidly and much of damage in France will be done.

4. Re US interest EURATOM timing we would of course like be in position begin negotiate with EURATOM Commission on an agreement soon as feasible; however we have never considered possibility dissociation ratification EURATOM and Common Market Treaties and we are firmly opposed to such dissociation in present circumstances. Essential there be no misunderstanding in anyone’s mind which could lead to false impression Blaisse–Patijn suggestion has US support or is even consistent US desires.

5. Further but subordinate point is that as result French and Italian crises and other developments (including second and third paras The Hague’s reftel) now appears Dutch on present schedule will not be last to ratify. As no indication that splitting consideration of Treaties would have other than harmful effect in other countries seems clear Blaisse–Patijn move could in any case have no effect in terms expediting entry into force even EURATOM Treaty.

You should bring above points attention FonOff and also in your discretion appropriate parliamentary leaders with view heading off Blaisse’s plans and in any case insuring that such plans are not presented as justified by US “considerations”

No action this subject to be taken by other addressee posts.⁵

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 440.002/6–1957. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Cleveland and approved by Elbrick. Repeated for information to Brussels, Luxembourg, Rome, Paris, Bonn, and London. Paris was instructed to pass to USRO for information; the Luxembourg message was for the Embassy and Butterworth.

2. The first paragraph of telegram 1914, June 19, reads as follows:

   “June 17 Blaisse, Foreign Affairs specialist, Catholic Party, Second Chamber, and Chairman Second Chamber Committee for Rome Treaties, said Parliamentary leaders were well-advanced in making plans for separate and prior ratification Euratom Treaty, hoping thus to make contribution solution problem United States legislative timetable within which completion Euratom–United States arrangements must fit. Blaisse did not mention coordination with other countries of community or any other contingent aspects of plan, but quoted Luns as saying French and German ratification a certainty.” (Ibid.)

3. In telegram 6468, June 18, the Embassy pointed out that the separation of the EURATOM and Common Market treaties was a subject which should not be broached before the French had taken action on these treaties due to the delicate political situation in France. The present government in France, the Embassy noted, was “pro-European”, but was “essentially minority one of fragile and perhaps transitory nature.” The present majority in Parliament in favor of ratification of the treaties could diminish rapidly, the Embassy cautioned, if time was lost or if France’s financial position deteriorated further. (Ibid., 440.002/6–1857)
4. In Colux 268, June 18, Ambassador Butterworth stated that the suggestion made by Dutch parliamentary leader C.L. Patijin “that US should make representations to end that BENELUX countries and Italy would separate common market treaty from Euratom treaty and accelerate ratification of latter at expense of former is, in light of past developments and present circumstances, a rare combination of dangerous nonsense and unmitigated folly. I trust we will do nothing of kind and that we even refrain from discussing such suggestion as possibility.” (Ibid.)

5. Telegram 2185 to The Hague, June 28, reads as follows:

   “Department position explained informally Patijn. He said had not felt that procedure he suggested would involve danger for Common Market ratification. However, he appeared convinced following talk that very real danger existed and said he would not pursue suggestion. He described it as having been in any case very tentative idea which he had wished try out on Luns and US before acting upon. He did not however acknowledge awareness of any action by other parliamentarians (e.g., Blaisse) along same lines.” (Ibid., 1440.002/6–2757)