Office of the Historian

237. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 26, 1957, 11:30 a.m.1

Washington, May 26, 1957, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • European integration

PARTICIPANTS

  • German Side
    • Chancellor Adenauer
    • Foreign Minister von Brentano
    • Ambassador Krekeler
    • Dr. Grewe, Foreign Office
  • US Side
    • Secretary Dulles
    • Mr. Murphy
    • Mr. Dillon
    • Ambassador Bruce
    • Mr. Elbrick
    • Mr. Bowie
    • Mr. Berding
    • Mr. von Eckhardt
    • Mr. von Hase
    • Mr. von Baudissin
    • Mr. von Lilienfeld
    • Mr. Limbourg
    • Mr. Schnippenkoetter
    • Mr. Irwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
    • Col. Heasty, Defense Department
    • Mr. Timmons
    • Mr. Reinstein
    • Mr. Walmsley
    • Mr. Creel

The Secretary asked the Chancellor to speak on the fifth Agenda item, owing to his great interest in the subject and all that he had done on behalf of European integration.2

The Chancellor said there would be no difficulty as far as Germany was concerned and he was confident that EURATOM and the Common Markets would be ratified by the Bundestag in July before the summer recess. He was, however, concerned by the situation in Italy and France. In France, in particular, a prolongation of the government crisis could cause difficulties. No one could change this, however, and we must await developments. There was one case in which he felt the United States could help, namely, that of the Netherlands. The Dutch were planning to take up the ratification question only after the summer recess, and there was a danger that other countries might also wait for action of the Netherlands. If the Dutch could move faster it would benefit all of us. The Chancellor again affirmed that in Germany there was no problem and he was sure that the agreements would be ratified by a large majority.

The Secretary said he had found the statement on this subject in the communiqué on the Macmillan talks3 very good and that it represented an advance over the position taken by the British earlier. He [Page 558] was a bit surprised, however, over the Chancellor’s concern regarding Italy. He inquired if this was because of the governmental crisis.

The Chancellor asked Foreign Minister von Brentano to comment on this point. Brentano said that as regards Italy he believed the new Italian government4 if confirmed in office would try to secure ratification with the support of parties not in the government. He was more concerned about France, even though there presently appeared to be a majority in the French Parliament for the agreements. If the governmental crisis were drawn out, mounting disagreements and tensions over other problems, such as Algeria, could have an adverse effect on ratification. He was, nevertheless, still optimistic over the outlook. As for England the British position, as the Secretary had indicated, had been clarified in the Bonn talks with Prime Minister Macmillan and Foreign Minister Lloyd. The British had made it clear that they would no longer try to have the free trade area question settled prior to ratification of the common market; also that they were willing to postpone further discussion of the Grand Design, which could have interfered with ratification.

Brentano said that he hoped the United States would continue to be helpful in GATT when the Common Market plan was discussed there. It was expected other nations would cause difficulties with the Common Market plan. He referred to a similar tendency in OEEC to attack the EURATOM agreement. Brentano said the support of the United States Government would be welcomed in trying to get discussion of these questions deferred until after ratification.

The Secretary said that there was no doubt that the fall of the Mollet government5 would have a bad effect on the attitude of other countries, such as Italy. Certainly the United States would do all it could in any quarter to assist this matter forward. He had repeatedly emphasized to the French his opinion that failure on their part to ratify the Common Market and EURATOM agreements, following on the defeat of EDC, would have a catastrophic effect on United States attitudes toward Europe. As for the Netherlands, he would be glad to look into the matter. He was aware that under Dutch constitutional requirements the ratification process was ponderous and slow-moving, and it might be hard to stir them into any speedier action.6

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.00/5–2657. Secret. Drafted by Creel on June 3.↩
  2. Adenauer was in the United States for an official 6-day visit, May 24–29.↩
  3. Macmillan and Adenauer held a series of discussions in Bonn between May 7 and 9.↩
  4. On May 6, Prime Minister Segni resigned; Adone Zoli formed a new government on May 19.↩
  5. Prime Minister Mollet resigned on May 21.↩
  6. On May 28, at the conclusion of their talks, Eisenhower and Adenauer issued a joint communiqué and declaration which expressed, among other matters, their strong support for European economic integration. The text of the communiqué is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 17, 1957, pp. 955–956.↩