Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western European Security and Integration, Volume IV

144. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Netherlands (Matthews) to the Department of State¹

The Hague, December 21, 1955—7 p.m.

915. With reference to my telegram 914, December 21,² I had lunch with another high Foreign Office official today. He also stressed Dutch pessimism over Paris WEU meeting³ and future of European integration. (Though he was quite pleased with outcome of NATO meeting, especially agreement that standing group should furnish military priorities.) He said that in his personal view it had been tactical mistake for Beyen and Spaak to go after Macmillan so hard in public meeting with “four other Ministers and some 80 experts in room” especially since Dutch should have known they would get no public support from Germans, French or Italians. Only sensible tactics, he said, would have been strong private talks with Macmillan.

My informant is, however, as bitter as all other Dutch over “tragic blunder” of British and tactless form of their approach in opposing common market with implication that support of Brussels meant opposition to OEEC. Fact that British Ambassador here had merely sent his counselor to see lower official in Foreign Office as sort of routine approach on matter of secondary importance rather than talking to Beyen him, added fuel to flames of Dutch resentment. Latter was high since Beyen, following his hopeful assurances from Butler (my telegram 888 December 14⁴) had told Dutch Parliamentary skeptics they need have no fears of British coolness, only to return to Foreign Office to find British démarche had been made that very morning. Also he said Dutch feel strongly they have been among staunchest supporters of OEEC and multilateral approach and resent implication that their support of Brussels group and common market is attempt to undermine OEEC. Their greatest fear, however, is effect of British moves on Germany and France “which may well spell end of all hope of progress toward integration.”

As to US attitude, he is well aware of our support, but as is Eschauzier (see last sentence my telegram 914, December 21⁵), he is worried lest public statements of support may mean we are departing from wise policy of past year of letting Europeans work out their own plans. If impression gets abroad that common market is something we are forcing down European throats, it will do more harm than good he said. He mentioned in this connection Secretary’s talks with Jean Monnet.⁶ He thoroughly approved of talk but thought publicity attending it was definitely harmful, especially as Monnet (whom he greatly admires), “is such a controversial figure both inside and outside of France.”

Matthews

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.00/12–2155. Secret. Repeated for information to London, Paris, Bonn, and Brussels.
2. In telegram 914, Ambassador H. Freeman Matthews reported on a conversation he had with Henri Fredrick Eschauzier, Director General for Political Affairs in the Dutch Foreign Office. Matthews noted that “Eschauzier showed himself skeptical of US willingness to give classified information to six-nation group including France to same degree as on bilateral basis. He also expressed hope US-Netherlands negotiations would not be given moratorium treatment because of EURATOM project. Eschauzier said that in his opinion public statements US support for European integration likely to do more harm than good particularly in France and that it would be preferable for US make its views known through diplomatic rather than public channels.” (Ibid.)
3. Reference is to a meeting of the Ministerial Council of the WEU, which opened on December 15.
4. In telegram 888, Matthews reported that he gathered from conversations with high Dutch Foreign Office officials that there was “keen disappointment as well as surprise here over British attitude toward Euratom, Common Market and European integration in general.” He noted that in a recent visit to the Netherlands, R.A. Butler, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, told the Dutch that the United Kingdom was studying the integration question with an open and sympathetic mind. (Department of State, Central Files, 840.00/12–1455)
5. See the last sentence in footnote 2 above.
6. See Document 138.