143. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 21, 19551
SUBJECT
- European integration: The Common Market
PARTICIPANTS
- ITR—Mr. Frank
- RA—Mr. Barnett
- BP—Mr. Winter
- TAD—Mr. Weiss
- TAD—Mr. Blake
- Mr. Couillard, Counselor, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Couillard indicated that the purpose of his visit was to learn the United States views regarding the proposal of the six European countries for the establishment of a common market. He was not coming on instructions of his government, but he had seen reports in the press indicating U.S. “support” for European integration and he wondered what the extent of that “support” might be. Mr. Couillard went on to point out that the Canadian Government had not taken any formal position on the possible establishment of a common [Page 375] market by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy. However, Mr. Pearson, Canadian Minister of External Affairs, had indicated last week at the NATO meeting Canadian sympathy with the objectives of the six continental governments insofar as they would contribute to European political stability. He had also expressed, however, the traditional Canadian doubts based on commercial and political considerations regarding the possibility of European integration actually taking place. Mr. Couillard recalled the Canadian misgivings regarding preferential trading arrangements and indicated that while Canada would welcome a rapprochement between France and Germany, its initial reaction to the suggestion for the establishment of a European common market was that the project could prove to be more of a divisive force in Europe rather than source of unity, particularly in NATO and the OEEC.
Mr. Frank asked why the Canadians thought this might be the case. Mr. Couillard replied that Canada would welcome European economic integration if it could be achieved overnight. However, the practical problems associated with achieving it and the long delay envisaged for their solution could only result in an increase in the frictions and difficulties between the six governments concerned, and between those six and the countries outside the integration movement.
Mr. Frank stated that the United States shared the concern of Canada regarding preferential arrangements in international trade, and the level of the common tariff of the six countries, of course, would be of very great interest to this government. The United States also shared the British interest in preserving and increasing the progress made by such institutions as the OEEC in the removal of quantitative restrictions on trade. Moreover, its general commercial policy continued to be based on a belief in the benefit of the multilateral as against the regional approach to international trade problems. On the other hand, he saw no reason at this time to be concerned over the common market tariff or arrangements by the six countries with respect to quantitative restrictions on trade. No concrete proposals had been formulated regarding either problem. Consequently, there was really no evidence as yet that the objectives of the six countries and those of the OEEC were fundamentally incompatible.
Mr. Barnett noted that European integration was an objective which the United States wished to support in view of the contribution it might make to a solution of the Franco-German political problem which had been aggravated by the outcome of the recent Geneva Conference. Furthermore, supranational institutions would be the surest way of associating Germany with Western Europe. In this U.S. approach other problems including the admittedly serious commercial [Page 376] ones which might arise as a result of the development of the common market, were necessarily subordinate. Mr. Barnett went on to point out that the United States in favoring integration by the six countries was not at this stage making any judgment regarding the means that had been outlined, for example in the working group report on the common market, for its achievement. The six governments directly concerned had not yet developed concrete plans for the integration of their economies. Until they did the United States would maintain its support of European integration as a highly desirable objective while at the same time reserving its right to judge on their merits any specific means suggested for the attainment of that objective. In the consideration of any approaches that may eventually be formulated by the six governments, he felt sure the United States would view with very considerable concern the possible development of a protectionist bloc in Europe.
There was some discussion at this point in the light of the GATT experience of some possible safeguards against the development of excessive protectionism in regional groupings.
Mr. Couillard stated that one problem the Canadians had with the integration concept was the notion that it would “tie” Germany to the West. In the Canadian view, the effect of integration might well be to make Germany the dominant power in any group of countries forming a common market. He personally believed that concern on this point underlay the French reluctance to embark on European integration projects. In concluding, Mr. Couillard asked whether it would be correct to summarize the U.S. position on European integration as follows: (1) the United States generally supports a closer integration of Europe in view of the political advantages that might result therefrom; (2) the United States would look at any specific proposals for a common market in terms of the contribution which they would make to the achievement of European integration; and (3) in reaching a judgment on any such approach the United States would be influenced by the international ecomonic obligations of the countries desiring to integrate their economies. Mr. Frank and Mr. Barnett agreed that this was a fair statement of the U.S. position on the matter at this time. Mr. Couillard thanked them for their assistance in making clear the United States thinking on the subject.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.00/12–2155. Confidential. Drafted on January 4, 1956, by James J. Blake of the Trade Agreements and Treaties Division, Office of International Trade and Resources.↩