Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, General; The United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Disarmament Files

Memorandum by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy

top secret
RAC D–6/2a Final

[Washington,] April 15, 1947.

The Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments submitted to the three Secretaries on April 2, 1947, a paper entitled, “United States Policy in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission”.¹ This document was returned to the Executive Committee for further consideration in the light of the discussion at this meeting.²

The enclosure is a revision of this paper which has been approved by the Executive Committee and has the concurrence of Mr. Frederick Osborn. It is submitted for approval.³

John C. Elliott

Executive Secretary

[Enclosure]

United States Policy in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission

the problem

1. To determine the policy which the United States should follow with respect to the present phase of the work of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, having in mind that the Commission is due to submit a second report to the Security Council prior to the meeting of the General Assembly in September, 1947.

facts bearing on the problem and discussion

2. See appendix, page 4.^*

conclusions

3. It is concluded that:

(a) The basic objective of the United States continues to be the establishment of an effective enforceable system for international control of atomic energy.

(b) The record of the United Nations discussions of this subject to date indicates that the U.S.S.R. is opposed to the elements deemed by the United States and the overwhelming majority of the other members of the Atomic Energy Commission to be essential to an effective system of control.

(c) Therefore, the United States should follow a course designed to lead to the widest possible measure of agreement on these essential elements, and which will, whatever the outcome, make explicitly clear in the record of the United Nations discussions and to world opinion (1) what these essential elements of control are, and (2) should the U.S.S.R. continue to reject them, that it is the opposition of the U.S.S.R. which prevents progress in reaching agreement on an effective System.

(d) To undertake drafting of actual treaty provisions without basic agreement on essential elements of control would be likely to cause unwarranted public optimism throughout the world.

(e) It is possible that other members of the Commission would not agree to key provisions in treaty language without requesting, as ostensibly or actually essential to their understanding of them, additional information which the United States would not as a matter of policy and could not as a matter of law disclose.

recommendations

4. It is recommended that:

(a) The above conclusions be approved.

(b) The Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments work out with the U.S. Delegation as a matter of urgency (1) those essential elements of an effective system of international control on which discussion should be focused, not only to make absolutely clear the necessity of such elements for true international control, but if the Soviet Union remains unwilling to agree to such a system, to reveal this unwillingnesss in the most effective manner, and (2) a tentative order of priority of discussion of these elements.

(c) The United States should endeavor to obtain, preferably in, informal meetings of Committee 2, the widest possible agreement among the other members of the Atomic Energy Commission on the elements which we deem essential to an effective system of international control. It should, however, be understood that tentative agreements will be accepted by majority vote, it being further understood, however, that minority reports may be submitted. The work of the Committee should be initially directed toward describing the functions of the proposed international control agency. These functions should be stated in descriptive language, supplemented by such explanatory notes as may be desired.

(d) This paper be forwarded to the United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission for his guidance.

Appendix

facts bearing on the problem

1. On March 10, 1947, the Security Council asked the Atomic Energy Commission to continue studying all phases of the problem of the international control of atomic energy, to develop specific proposals as promptly as possible, and in due course to prepare for submission to the Council a draft treaty or treaties. It also requested a second report before the next session of the General Assembly. On March 19, 1947, the Commission itself decided that its committees should consider the questions arising from the Security Council resolution and particularly questions on which Members of the Commission had not reached agreement. Pursuant to this latter resolution the Commission’s Working Committee, which meets in private, resolved on March 31 to consider the points of disagreement outlined in the Soviet statements in the Security Council. The Working Committee further asked Committee 2, which also meets in private, to study the various questions arising from the Security Council and Atomic Energy Commission resolutions and, in particular, such questions as the detailed powers, characteristics and functions of an international control agency, provisions for the transition to the full operation of the international system, and new questions not studied before. These resolutions establish the framework within which United States policy must be carried out.

2. The Commission is renewing its labors against the background of the fact that its first Report of December 31, 1946, was approved by ten of its members, but not by the U.S.S.R. and Poland. Since the submission of that Report, three new members, all of whom apparently accept the basic principles contained in that Report, have joined the Commission. The Soviet Union, whose abstention from voting on the Report gave rise to uncertainty as to its exact attitude, has now indicated, through amendments submitted in February and through Mr. Gromyko’s speech of March 5, that none of the fundamental elements of the Report, which was based upon the United States Proposals, are at present acceptable to it.

3. The past work of the Commission had the effect of focusing public attention primarily on essentially procedural aspects of the problem, such as the scope of inspection and the relationship of the veto to the machinery of sanctions.

4. Several nations which voted for the first Report of the Atomic Energy Commission are extremely anxious to promote the earliest possible development of atomic power for peaceful purposes. Their national economic requirements lead them to stress this aspect of the problem much more than does the United States which places its chief emphasis on national and international security.

discussion

5. It cannot be stated now with absolute certainty that the U.S.S.R. will not within the next six months be prepared to accept a system for the international control of atomic energy which embodies the elements which the United States regards as essential. The issue depends at least in part on developments in the whole complex of Soviet foreign relations, of which the problem of international control of atomic energy is only a part. Nevertheless, there is good ground for believing that the U.S.S.R. is not at present prepared to accept such a system.

6. There is reason to expect that the great majority of the Commission’s twelve members will continue to agree to an effective system as its elements are further developed, although it must be recognized that there is a possibility that the United Kingdom, and perhaps France, will differ with the United States on the issue of international control of power-producing reactors. There may be other issues on which the present majority will split, e.g., the ownership and control of raw materials and mining operations.

7. It is of the utmost importance that the American people, and the Governments and peoples of other countries, be convinced:

(a) that the United States has been and remains absolutely sincere in its efforts for international control;

(b) that agreement on the basic elements of the United States proposals is essential to such control;

(c) that, if any delay in reaching, or any failure to reach, agreement occurs, the responsibility will not rest upon the United States.

8. The United States objectives in the present phase of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission work should accordingly be:

(a) to present clearly and concisely the elements which we deem essential to an effective system of international control, with particular reference to the functions and powers of an international authority;

(b) to attempt to obtain the widest possible agreement on these elements;

(c) to make it clear that, if, as appears likely, the Soviet Union will not accept these elements, the fault lies with the U.S.S.R.;

(d) to prepare a firm basis for whatever measures the United States may find it necessary to take in its own interest if and when it becomes clear that agreement on an effective system of international control is not possible.

9. Three possible courses of action which this Government might advocate have been considered. They are not all mutually exclusive:

(a) To debate the basic differences of principle which the Soviet amendments and Mr. Gromyko’s speech of March 5 have shown to exist between the Soviet Union and the overwhelming majority of the Atomic Energy Commission’s members. The Resolution adopted March 31 by the Commission’s Working Committee contemplates discussion of these differences as one of two parts of the Commission’s program.

(b) To examine the essential elements of an effective system of international control with the specific objective of developing actual provisions of a treaty. This alternative, which includes the submission of specific proposals of articles in charter language for inclusion in a treaty, has been informally discussed by the United States Delegation with other delegations.

(c) To focus upon the elements of an effective system of international control, which the United States regards as essential, particularly those relating to the functions and powers of the proposed Authority.

10. At first glance alternative (b) appears to have advantages. If this course were followed, it is argued, it would be possible to obtain agreement on a large number of charter articles, and because the discussion is taking place in terms of specific legal phraseology, to discover precisely where differences exist and the degree to which it might be possible to reconcile them. It is also argued that this course would permit the preparation of a treaty to which all could agree except the U.S.S.R. and Poland, and which could then be laid upon the table for signature at any time the U.S.S.R. is ready to sign.

11. These advantages are, however, offset by two major considerations:

(a) to attempt under present circumstances to focus discussion on provisions of an actual charter would almost certainly be to mislead the American public into believing that fundamental differences had been reconciled and that the United Nations Commission was now attacking the problems of organization and operation of the control authority.

(b) It would be impossible to enter a discussion of specific treaty language on key provisions without raising the question of the disclosure of classified information. Other delegations might legitimately contend that in the absence of the necessary information they could not agree to specific provisions even though all agreements would be subject to review on an overall basis. For example, treaty provisions for the control of reactors to be used as sources of power could probably not be agreed to by a nation which had no more knowledge of “denaturants” than is now public. The security provisions of the Mc-Mahon Act and the security requirements of the United States would not allow the release of such information. Disclosures of “restricted data” must be made only in accordance with the terms of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

1. RAC D–6/2 final, not printed.
2. For an extract from the minutes of the April 2 meeting of the three secretaries, see p. 452.
3. It was announced at the 27th Meeting of the Executive Committee, April 28, that the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission had indicated their approval (Department of State Disarmament Files).
4. Secretary’s note: Minor changes are being made in the last two parts of this document: Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion, in order that they may conform with the revised text of the Conclusions and Recommendations. They will be distributed shortly. [Footnote in the source text.]