Department of State Disarmament Files

Memorandum by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

confidential
RAC D–5a (Final)

Attached for appropriate information and guidance is a memorandum entitled “Basis for United States Position on a Possible Proposal to Distinguish between ‘Offensive’ and ‘Defensive’ Weapons”. This memorandum was prepared in the Department and was approved by the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments on March 31 for transmission to the United States Representative to the United Nations.

A proposal to distinguish between “offensive” and “defensive” weapons as a basis for armament regulation could assume one of the following forms: (1) abolition of “offensive” weapons, (2) severe limitation of “offensive” weapons, or (3) “internationalization” of “offensive” weapons. The attached paper is based primarily on the assumption that the proposal will assume form (1). If the proposal assumed either of the other forms, a change in emphasis in the memorandum would be required.

It should also be noted that the position stated in the attached memorandum differs from the position which the United States took during the Disarmament Conference of 1932.1 During that Conference the United States Delegation advocated the abolition of “offensive” weapons, particularly certain weapons of land warfare. In the event the question of “offensive” weapons arises in the course of the current discussions, it may be anticipated that references will be made to the earlier position of the United States on the matter.

John C. Elliott

Executive Secretary
[Page 458]
[Annex]

Basis for United States Position on a Possible Proposal to Distinguish Between “Offensive” and “Defensive” Weapons

It has been proposed that the problem of armament regulation and reduction be approached by drawing a distinction between “defensive” and “offensive” armaments with a view to abolishing or limiting the latter. At first glance there is an attractive simplicity in the idea that the identification of “offensive” weapons and their elimination from national armaments would automatically render attack impossible, prevent aggression and thus establish international peace and security. If it were true that certain weapons could be used only for aggression, while other weapons exist solely for defense, the United States would be the first to support the proposal to establish a distinction between them, since the United States obviously does not intend to engage in aggression. But reflection must lead inevitably to the conviction that it would be fruitless and impracticable in the highest degree to attempt to decide whether some weapons are “offensive” and others “defensive” as the basis for the regulation and reduction of armaments.

As a practical matter, it is impossible in a military sense to distinguish between “offensive” and “defensive” weapons. Armaments are simply an effective means for the concentration of force, which is indispensable for both defense and offense. It is obvious that nearly all armaments have to some extent both an offensive and a defensive character, and that virtually every weapon can be employed offensively or defensively in turn. Offense and defense are subjective terms dependent on circumstances, applicable to the way in which weapons are used but not to the weapons themselves. The fact is that a weapon is defensive when used for the purpose of resisting aggression and offensive when used for the purpose of promoting aggression. A pistol in the hand of a man bent on murder is offensive but that same weapon in the hand of a man defending his life against murderous attack is defensive. As an international body of military experts reported in 1926: “The principal test whether a force is designed for purely defensive purposes or built up in a spirit of aggression remains in any case the intentions of the country concerned”.*

The idea of basing armament regulation on a distinction between “offensive” and “defensive” weapons is not new. The Disarmament Conference which began in 1932 adopted this approach and sought to implement it by subjecting the whole range of land, sea and air armaments to a searching technical examination. The result is well known: The Conference was unable to draw a distinction between “offensive” [Page 459] and “defensive” weapons. Those who insisted that such a distinction was feasible could do no better than stigmatize the most powerful modern weapons as “offensive”, although it was pointed out that wars of aggression had taken place from the dawn of history, long before the development of these modern armaments. After months of intensive study, debate and negotiation the discussion of this subject ended in confusion and futility. Surely the present discussions will not be condemned to the same fate.

In this connection one more point must be emphasized. The Charter is based on the principle that Members of the United Nations will make available to the Security Council armed forces for the maintenance of international peace and security. If an attempt is now made to distinguish between “offensive” and “defensive” weapons, if (following a certain trend in the Disarmament Conference of 1932) it is decided that the most powerful modern weapons are “offensive” and should be abolished, the result would be to deprive the United Nations security forces of the most effective weapons for the repression of aggression. The authority of the United Nations would be undermined and the way smoothed for an aggressor who might install himself in the territory of a weaker state through his quantitative superiority in older-type armaments. The United States has repeatedly indicated that arrangements for providing military force under Article 43 of the Charter constitute an important element of security on which sucessful armament regulation depends. The national contingents of these forces must not be deprived of weapons adequate to their task; they must not be hamstrung at the outset by a fictitious distinction between “offensive” and “defensive” weapons.

  1. For documentation on United States participation in international negotiations for disarmament in 1932, see Foreign Relations, 1932, Vol. i, pp. 1574.
  2. Report of Subcommission A to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Geneva, 1926. [Footnote in the source text.]