781.9411/81: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 14—5:30 a.m.]
762. For the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary. My 761, April 13, 4 p.m. The Moscow radio this afternoon announced the signing of a treaty of neutrality between the Soviet Union and Japan and a supplementary declaration. The essence of the treaty is that each contracting party will observe neutrality if the other is the object of military action by a third party or parties. The essence of the declaration is a reciprocal undertaking to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo and the Mongolian People’s Republic. For the protection of our codes the texts of the treaty and declaration are being sent in a separate telegram following and bearing the next number after this.
The extravagant predictions and threats against the United States which have appeared in the German press and which have been broadcast from Germany regarding the consequences to be expected from Matsuoka’s visit to Berlin make it reasonable to suppose that the Soviet-Japanese treaty of neutrality will be hailed by Germany as the successful result of its efforts to bring about a Soviet-Japanese political agreement which would relieve Japan of the fear of an attack by the Soviet Union should Japan become embroiled in hostilities with the United States.
I believe, however, that the treaty was brought much less by German influence or a desire on the part of Japan to prepare itself for eventual collaboration with Germany in hostilities with the United States than by the fear on the part of Japan that it may become involved in hostilities with United States against its will and the desire on the part of the Soviet Government to prepare itself against a possible attack by Germany.
During the early months of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations it was clear that the Soviet Government was not unduly anxious to enter into a political agreement with Japan and that it would only do so for a high price, including substantial territorial concessions.
On the other hand while the Japanese Government did not conceal its eagerness to conclude a political agreement with the Soviet Union, which it desired to be of as far-reaching scope as possible, it was not willing to pay the price demanded by the Soviet Government especially in so far as concerned the cession of lower Sakhalin or even the surrender of the Japanese concessions in northern Sakhalin.
[Page 943]I believe that during the three weeks that have intervened since Matsuoka’s departure from Moscow for Berlin the attitude of both the Soviet and Japanese Governments has undergone a profound change. I am of the opinion that the Soviet Government having become convinced of the possibility of an attack by Germany decided to abandon its favorable bargaining position in exchange for an assurance of Japanese neutrality in the event of a German attack on the Soviet Union.
I likewise believe that as a result of his talks with Mussolini and Hitler, and also perhaps because of the impression made upon him by the threats against the United States which appeared in the German and Italian press in connection with his visit, Matsuoka returned to Moscow fearful that Japan might find itself maneuvered into a position which would lead to hostilities with the United States. In this connection it will be recalled (see my 581, March 24, 3 p.m.) that Matsuoka on the first occasion of his first visit to Moscow expressed the view to me that “American history indicates that it is the United States which goes to war with other countries.”
In consequence he felt the necessity of coming to some agreement with the Soviet Government which would protect Japan against cooperation by the Soviet Union with the United States in such an eventuality and at the same time indicate to Germany that he does not consider Japan bound under the Tripartite Pact to go to war with either the Soviet Union or the United States in the event that Germany should declare war or take offensive action against either country.
It would appear from the foregoing that both Governments found it expedient to abandon their earlier specific desiderata (such as territorial concessions by Japan and cessation of aid to China by the Soviet Union) and rather than have the negotiations break down or be further prolonged enter into a simple and limited reciprocal commitment to remain neutral in the event that either country should become the object of military action by a third party or parties.
Matsuoka left this afternoon on the Trans-Siberian for Manchuli whence he will fly to Tokyo. Stalin was at the station to see him off, an attention he did not show to von Ribbentrop and which in so far as I am aware is without precedent. His action was presumably designed to lend the appearance to the treaty.
Shortly before his departure Matsuoka sent me the following letter marked confidential and written by him in longhand:
“Dear Steinhardt: I am leaving this afternoon as scheduled and wish again to thank you and your charming wife for the kind attention given me and the most pleasant chats I enjoyed at your Embassy. [Page 944] Also thank you for your thoughtfulness in enabling me last evening to meet Sir Stafford.
I would also inform you that after being made to feel disappointed as to the conclusion of the Russian-Japanese pact of neutrality,—upon my present visit to Moscow (neither was I necessarily hoping or pressing for it), I was told that the Soviet Government was prepared to sign it at once when I called on Mr. Stalin to say good-by and to thank him in person for all the courtesies extended to me and my suite in my present visit to Europe. Of course I had said good-by to Mr. Molotov on the previous day.
They stressed the necessity and importance of settling the question of liquidating the concessions in northern Sakhalin simultaneously with the signing of the pact. I reiterated that I had no authority to discuss and settle it right now and the consequence was a deadlock. In all probability the pact will be signed before my departure and it will be published by the Moscow Government together with the text of a declaration. Believing Your Excellency is interested to know the above, I take pleasure in adding a bit of the inside story. Sincerely yours, Matsuoka.”
Repeated to Tokyo.