23. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
- The President
- The Vice President
- The Secretary of State Alexander Haig
- The Secretary of Treasury Donald Regan
- Counsellor to the President Edwin Meese
- Chief of Staff to the President James Baker
- Deputy Chief of Staff to the President, Michael Deaver
- Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard V. Allen
- Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Chief of Staff Richard Darman
- U.S. Ambassador Designate to Canada, Paul Robinson
Canadian
- The Prime Minister
- Canadian Ambassador to the U.S. Peter Towe
- The Under Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan Gotlieb
- Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet Robert Fowler
- Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet P. Michael Pittfield
- Acting Principal Secretary to The Prime Minister Thomas Axworthy
- Executive Assistant to the Prime Minister Ted Johnston
The following is a reconstruction of comments based on notes taken in the meeting. It is organized by broad topic area. This organization corresponds to the actual flow of the meeting.
(1) Global Negotiations (and Caribbean Basin Plan)
Prime Minister Trudeau led with a characterization of the U.S. sensitivity to the phrase “Global Negotiations” as representative of Americans being nominalists. He distinguished himself, rather, as an Aristotelian. Richard Allen intervened and suggested that he would prefer to characterize us as Hegelians.
Somewhat less elliptically, Secretary Haig suggested that we should deal with the problems of concern to developing countries by trying our Caribbean Basin plan first.2
Richard Allen noted that the U.S. had taken a significant step forward by agreeing to attend the conference at Cancun—and that in so doing, we were reversing a Carter policy. Prime Minister Trudeau dismissed this by returning to his mode of characterization, describing President Carter as a “personalist”—noting that Carter didn’t like Lopez-Portillo, and that the feeling was mutual (suggesting that this was Carter’s reason for turning down Cancun).
Prime Minister Trudeau went on to make the following points: he would not insist on using the phrase “Global Negotiations” in the communique if the U.S. would not want to; but he suggested that it would be more direct if we would use the phrase, say that we didn’t really know what it meant, and then explore constructively what could and could not be “put behind the words.” He argued that we ought not to use the phrase “North-South.” He said that these were “bad buzz words” to the developing countries. He said that Schmidt would be glad to add the phrase “Global Negotiations” while nonetheless insisting that the phrase must not mean such things as negotiations on the governing structure of the IMF.
Prime Minister Trudeau went on to argue that it was necessary to use some words that would give hope to the developing countries—stating [Page 61] that if we don’t use the phrase “Global Negotiations”, Cancun may not take place; or if it does take place, it may become a “slugfest”. He noted that the U.S. would be isolated on this issue.
The President intervened and returned to the theme that we should use the Caribbean Basin example as a start.
Prime Minister Trudeau then argued that “global” was not a geographic concept to be distinguished, for example, from a regional approach. Rather, he said that “global” meant “universal”—with emphasis on participation by all countries. He then distinguished this interpretation of “global” from the more narrowly based negotiations of CIEC.
Vice President Bush intervened stating that the problem with the concept is that it involves a notion on the part of developing countries of somebody owing them something—a notion of right that goes beyond compassion. He said that the problem was exemplified by the experience with the Law of the Sea negotiations.3
Prime Minister Trudeau responded that this was correct, that there was such a notion of right behind both the phrases “North-South” and “New International Economic Order.” He argued that the concept of justice would always be there however; and said that “Global Negotiations” was essentially a procedural concept: by which all were to be included.
The President stated that he was unwilling to accept that LDCs’ undeveloped condition was a function of exploitation. Nor would he accept the view that the economic conditions of such countries as China were principally a function of their population problems. He contrasted the Singapore experience with that of China, and attributed Singapore’s development to the benefits that accrued from a century and a half of British training. He noted that in the case of the U.S., we, through enterprise, developed our resources. He argued that what we owe is compassion and also training/education—in order to allow the people of the developing world to help themselves on a continuing basis. He elaborated by analogy with the story of the hungry man who was given a fish and who woke up the next day hungry vs. the hungry man who was taught to fish.
The President went on to note that only 27 percent of the world’s surface had been explored for oil, and that there was in all likelihood a vast additional potential for development. Prime Minister Trudeau intervened and asked, “But how many of your companies would help in Niger or Upper Volta?” The Vice President then responded that we [Page 62] were already exploring in such areas and that American companies had found oil in Upper Volta. He noted that in other less developed areas, U.S. companies had been accused of exploitation when they did go in. He argued that it was necessary to change the attitude that when U.S. companies attempt to develop resources it is for the purpose of exploitation.
The President returned to the virtues of the Caribbean Basin plan—noting its emphasis on tying foreign investment to local developmental needs. He added that it was necessary that there be adequate assurances that the locals would not say “get out”.
Counsellor Meese returned to the problem with the phrase “Global Negotiations”. He stated that although the word “global” is acceptable, the word “negotiations” is troublesome because it presumes standing (in the legal sense)—and it raises what may be false expectations. Canadian Under Secretary Gotlieb responded that if we were starting afresh this view would be ok; but to take this position now would be perceived as backing away. He said he could see little gain if there were a breakdown on this one word—and a big loss in increased tension. Assistant to the President Allen noted that the absence of one word would not mean opposition to developmental goals and objectives.
Secretary Haig intervened and urged that the two countries get their heads together on the bracketed language. He granted that the U.S. was isolated. Under Secretary Gotlieb noted that the sherpas came close to acceptable language (in his view) at Montebello.
The President then noted that what we’re talking about is helping the poorer countries help themselves. He said that our goal must be to make them “economically self-sustaining”; and that we must help remove the social inequities that make less developed countries the targets of dictators from either side.
[Omitted here is discussion of Southern Africa, the Middle East, and bilateral issues.]
- Source: Reagan Library, Henry Nau Files, Ottawa Economic Summit (Binder) [07/20/1981–07/21/1981]; NLR–395–1–32–4–9. Confidential. The working lunch took place in the Blue Room. Drafted by Darman who sent the memorandum to Allen under a July 11 covering memorandum, writing: “I hope you may find these notes of value in the development of appropriate follow-up actions. Please use the notes as you see fit.”↩
- Documentation on the Caribbean Basin Initiative is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XVII, pt. 1, Mexico; Western Caribbean.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues II, Documents 114–202.↩
- Darman initialed “R.G.D.” above his typed signature.↩