Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

281. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Departments of Defense and State¹

9582.

Rabat, September 30, 1988, 1226Z

Military addressees treat as Specat Exclusive. DOD for Carlucci. Dept NEA for Murphy. CIA for Gates. NSC for Burns. EUCOM for General Richards. Subject: Hassan Meeting With ASD/ISA Armitage.

1. Secret, Entire text.

2. Begin summary: In unusually lengthy, cordial and candid discussion Sept 29, Hassan told ASD/ISA Armitage that he was prepared to consider all options presented by the U.S. for future military cooperation. He asked that discussion begin with the more demanding longer term items, since the creation of de facto permanent bases would be a change in the nature of the military relationship. He explicitly linked expanded programs to provision of F–16s to Morocco. On other topics, he announced that Royal Air Maroc would buy Boeings rather than Airbus, and said AFERDOU 88² cancellation had been due to political optics of timing in conjunction with Maghreb meetings in Morocco. Hassan expressed his great esteem for President Reagan, for SecDef Carlucci and former SecDef Weinberger, adding that he greatly appreciated the understanding Morocco had always enjoyed in the Pentagon. End summary.

3. Hassan received ASD/ISA Armitage in Rabat Sept 29 for nearly two hours. Also present were Chargé, the Crown Prince, Royal Counselor Guedira, Prime Minister Laraki, General Achabar, Moroccan Ambassador Bargach and Military Attaché in Washington Colonel Kostali. After initial pleasantries, Hassan launched into an extended expose of his thinking on defense cooperation.

4. Focus on Long-Term
Hassan noted that he had read the baseline study which US had submitted on military cooperation.³ These were, he observed, divided into short, medium, and long term proposals. He said he would not exclude consideration of any of the U.S. proposals in any area. However, it was necessary first to determine what the real issue was. In Hassan’s view, there is a fundamental difference in the nature of U.S. military activity proposed in the long term, from what presently exists under the 1982 access and transit agreement. In effect, what the U.S. is seeking is one or two military bases. The change is thus not simply a matter of degree.

5. Given the far-reaching nature of the change in the relationship which the creation of de facto bases would imply, these proposals need to be studied in depth. In that process, Hassan said he hoped U.S. would consider Moroccan requirements along with U.S. military requirements. Hassan noted that the Moroccan armed forces had always been his private preserve. The Parliament had never discussed the military budget, which he claimed showed absolute popular confidence in his management of national security issues. Since he had that public confidence, Hassan said he was willing to consider any options, even those which, like the creation of operational/maintenance bases, could seem to conflict with Morocco’s other international obligations. As examples of potentially conflicting obligations which would have to be considered, he noted Morocco’s membership in the Arab League, the Non-Aligned movement, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the OAU (cited even though he noted, Morocco is not presently participating). Such U.S. military cooperation options could only be considered, however, on condition that he could be convinced, and could convince his people, that they would be for the net benefit of the Moroccan people and nation.

6. Hassan recalled, for example, that he had once remarked publicly that, if the Arab League had recognized the Polisario, he would have withdrawn from the organization and signed a defense treaty with Israel. Such a move would have met the criteria of being justifiable to the Moroccan people as defending national security and territorial integrity. Hassan contended that the Moroccan mentality was unique in the Arab world. The Moroccan people could be counted on to show the necessary flexibility, imagination, and maturity to support whatever decisions are necessary. To do this, however, they need logical, historical arguments to support any decision. If such arguments were available, Hassan said he was prepared to discuss U.S. long-term proposals, “and even beyond”.

7. Making Use of Détente
In response to ASD/ISA’s question, Hassan said that Morocco was not overjoyed with the present situation with regard to U.S. military cooperation, but was not complaining. The primary problem is that the Congress does not understand the importance of U.S.-Moroccan military relations. For the future, Hassan suggested that the best approach is to seek to improve and build on the existing access and transit agreement as much as possible, possibly through further exchanges of letters. In the process, we should jump over the middle term, to get directly to discussion of the longer term.

8. Hassan observed that the world was entering what promised to be a prolonged period of détente. This was a period which should be used to take steps to ward off future trouble. It is a good time to look at the long term, calmly. Many things can be done together, directly and indirectly. A study, beginning now, of the long term, would look at how we can work together to defend our civilization, our values, our liberties.

9. Citing various examples of long-term preparation, Hassan noted that Morocco had pursued an application to join the EC, which had been greeted sympathetically. Clearly membership was not for tomorrow, but he said he was sure it would come eventually. Europe, he argued, would find itself in need of strategic depth in the political area, just as it has found it needs strategic depth in the military field. He noted, as another example, Morocco’s excellent relations with Portugal, and discussions on defense cooperation. He said that Portuguese PM would be bringing a draft defense treaty when he visited Morocco in October.

10. The F–16 Quid
Armitage said that the U.S. would be prepared to discuss long term questions, but only if it could be ensured that Morocco would not feel that its sovereignty had been violated or its interests neglected. We would not want to get into a position where Morocco felt it could not support what we had discussed. Armitage said that the U.S. had done an analysis which provided order of magnitude ideas on the benefits to Morocco of the proposals we had presented. There were certain direct benefits, e.g. monies spent on military construction. There were also indirect benefits, such as the degree to which enhanced cooperation with Morocco would make the Congress more receptive to arguments for greater military and economic assistance. There were also benefits from Moroccans employed by U.S. programs.

11. Hassan said that this was a simple matter. International relations involve a balance of compensations, give and take. All that would be required would be to ensure that he was in a position to show a suitable counterpart to his people, which would be sufficient to make Moroccan defense credible until 2010. In this regard, his primary interest is in “my squadron of F–16s.”

12. Armitage said that it would be up to the U.S. and Morocco together to consider a payments schedule for such an acquisition, and how funds might be applied against the schedule. He noted that the dols 52 million of security assistance earmarked for Morocco this year would not be sufficient to the purpose. Hassan interjected that it was not only inadequate for purchase of F–16s, but did not reflect Morocco’s geostrategic importance. Armitage said there could be other possible approaches. For example, one approach might be to provide F–16s on lease, although he stressed that he was not sure this was possible.

13. Hassan concluded that he hoped ASD/ISA Armitage would inform the President and Secretary Carlucci that he wanted to consider the long term relationship, but that he wanted the work on this to start now. Armitage asked if Hassan would entertain a further US presentation on benefits. Hassan said he would, but asked that it not be made a subject of official correspondence, but simply be passed orally for Moroccan representatives to take notes. Armitage said he would be in contact with Ambassador Bargach and Defense Attaché Kostali on this.

14. The Sahara and the Maghreb
Hassan said that there was a promising future in the Maghreb. The conflict in the Sahara continued for the moment. Algeria had a psychological problem, in that they clearly wanted out of the conflict, but in a way which would keep them from losing face, particularly in front of all the countries they have pushed to recognize the Polisario. Morocco, for its part, would not retreat from its demand for a referendum. The present “atmospheric disturbances”, however, would not change the basic movement toward resolution of the Sahara conflict. Morocco and Algeria have signed an agreement for a gas pipeline which will make Europe less dependent on Soviet gas. Both Morocco and Algeria have a strong interest in the success of that accord, despite the continuation of the conflict in the Sahara. Hassan asserted that the gas pipeline accord had, in fact, settled the question of war and peace in the region.

15. Looking at the Sahara problem, Hassan commented that Algerian President Bendjedid is trustworthy, “a gentleman”. But he had not yet gained full control of what was a very bad internal situation. The FLN Congress in December, and the presidential election in January, were part of that process, and Hassan said he strongly hoped that Bendjedid would win. In that campaign, Hassan saw Bendjedid’s platform as based on (1) economic reform; and (2) the normalization of relations with Morocco.

16. Whatever the shape of the Maghreb, Hassan asserted, Morocco will preserve its military independence. It would be crazy to do otherwise. Hassan added that Morocco is currently studying a military rebuilding program keyed to the end of the Sahara conflict and the anticipated ensuring period of détente. It should be a period, he noted, in which the countries of the Maghreb can attend to their reequipment needs with less concern for the reactions of their neighbors than in a period of tension.

17. Boeing Purchase by Royal Air Maroc
In the category of things which Morocco and the U.S. can do for each other, Hassan noted that he had decided that Royal Air Maroc would purchase Boeing 737–400s, as replacement aircraft, rather than the competing Airbus model. He said that the long competition between the manufacturers had come down to packages which were essentially equal. Thus, he had to make a political choice, which he had done on the basis that there was insufficient U.S. private sector involvement in Morocco, in comparison to the heavy European private sector involvement in everything from public works to banking. Moreover, RAM has had a good experience with Boeing planes over the years.

18. AFERDOU Cancellation
Responding to ASD/ISA’s concern that cancellation of exercise AFERDOU 88 might have indicated that Morocco was reacting negatively to something the U.S. had done, Hassan said that the timing of the exercise had conflicted with what he called the “prenuptial” period in Maghreb relations. The Maghreb Commission will meet in Rabat in late October. This will be followed by a Maghreb summit, which Hassan said would also be held in Morocco by virtue of his status as senior head of state. In this context, it would not have been good to have the exercise go forward. But this did not mean that for the future Morocco did not want to have an active mutually beneficial exercise program.

Hawes

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–90–0080, 1988 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 11, Morocco. Secret; Specat; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to USCINCEUR, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Algiers. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Information Service Center.
2. Reference is to the planned United States-Moroccan joint exercises scheduled for early September.
3. Not found.