108. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan1

SUBJECT

  • My 9/27 Meeting and Dinner With Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

In my two-hour plus conversation yesterday afternoon with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, we reviewed your morning meeting, discussed arms control items at some length, and—most usefully—went through our list of regional and bilateral items. The atmosphere was good, but Korniyenko again sometimes marred the exchange by making propaganda points or pulling back Shevardnadze when we seemed to be communicating. The informal dinner later that evening gave Obie and me a good opportunity to establish personal contact with the Shevardnadzes without the interference of his staff.2

About two-thirds of the time at our afternoon meeting was taken up by arms control items, much of it a standard recitation of Soviet positions by Shevardnadze. He pushed hard on their testing moratorium, and we talked at length, although to no effect, about chemical weapons—including their use in the Iran-Iraq War. Shevardnadze also floated what purported to be a new approach on INF designed to appear more flexible than the unyielding position given in the letter to you from Gorbachev, although it was equally unacceptable. He referred to my earlier expression of interest in discussing separately any of the items at the Geneva NST if progress can be made that way—our standard position since January. He then put forward his own “interim proposal” consisting of a freeze on INF deployments and some cuts, followed by discussion of more radical reductions. This proposal will presumably be set out more fully in Geneva.

The most useful part of the discussion was a run-through of our agenda on regional, bilateral, and human rights issues. We agreed our regional discussions had not accomplished much, but nevertheless marked the start of an ability to exchange information on problems in various parts of the world. We can probably agree to regularize them [Page 449] for the future. We agreed to have the Central America/Caribbean talks in Washington in late October. I again raised the question of Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet forces, but he did not appear interested in any real discussion.

I again offered confidential discussions on human rights issues, noting the obvious connection with trade. Shevardnadze reiterated that they were interested in discussing individual cases, but not broad principles of human rights actions by the Soviet Union. I went quickly through points on finishing up our work on civil aviation, consulates, and exchange negotiations by November, and informed him of our desire to move ahead with the Incidents at Sea talks. We both agreed that any final document from your meeting with Gorbachev should be based on the substance we have achieved, although he repeated the Soviet interest in broad formulations.

In conclusion, we agreed that preparations for your meeting in Geneva had high priority for both governments. Both sides would work hard to make the meeting as productive as possible.

At dinner, Shevardnadze agreed on the importance of you and Gorbachev having some time alone together in Geneva. He described Gorbachev to me as a man who is resourceful, strong, energetic, wants much for his country, and is acutely aware of the Soviet people’s desire for peace.

  1. Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1985. Secret; Sensitive. A typed notation in the top left-hand margin reads: “Sent to WH 9/28 pm by SWO per BMCK.” No drafting information appears on the memorandum. According to a covering memorandum to Shultz from Ridgway, attached to a draft of Shultz’s memorandum, the memorandum was drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Parris and Palmer. On this draft, Shultz made extensive edits which were incorporated into this final text.
  2. Shultz’s wife, Helena; see document 107.