104. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger1
SUBJECT
- Nuclear Arms Control Negotiations with the Soviet Union (U)
1. (TS/S/OWL) The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly support the President’s goals of deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms and the eventual establishment of deterrence based on defense rather than offense. As the President’s discussions of these issues with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and General Secretary Gorbachev draw near, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it would be helpful to set forth their assessment of certain essential military requirements.
2. (TS/S/OWL) The establishment of a deterrent posture based on defense is a goal to be reached in the future based on the work done through SDI. Until we begin to rely on defenses, we must continue to base deterrence on strategic offensive forces. Such deterrence has served us well for 40 years. A combination of the strategic forces we have today and those coming into the inventory through the President’s full strategic modernization program should provide reasonable assurance that we will deter for years to come. Even before we move to deterrence based on defense, some reduction of the levels of our strategic offensive forces would be possible if the Soviets were to reduce also. There is, however, a minimum level independent of Soviet force size below which US forces would be militarily insufficient. To assure that the risk of any proposal for limiting offensive strategic nuclear forces is within acceptable bounds, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should certify whether a particular approach is militarily sufficient as directed by NSDD 160, 24 January 1985.2 Of particular concern would be approaches which would result in weapon levels below those in the US START position. The level to which strategic offensive forces can be reduced is dependent upon the mix of strategic offensive and defensive [Page 427] forces. In addition, in light of the overall conventional and strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, approaches which specify continued, time-phased, offensive weapon reductions with no end point are militarily insufficient.
3. (TS/S/OWL) In the discussions with the Soviet Foreign Minister and the General Secretary and in the negotiations themselves, two military requirements must be foremost.
a. First, additional limitations on defenses should not be accepted. SDI must be protected and our right to deploy defensive systems should not be further limited. The Soviet emphasis on defense is clear. They have substantial defensive programs in existence including construction of the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar. In this regard, we must avoid a “trade” involving Soviet willingness to reduce offensive weapons for a US willingness to constrain defenses. Even at deeply reduced offensive force levels, the Soviets could inflict unacceptable damage on the United States in the unlikely event that deterrence failed. The United States must not forego its right to develop and deploy defenses in the face of such a Soviet capability.
b. Second, any limitations on the US right to modernize its forces would have grave consequences. Reductions in US strategic offensive forces emphasize the need to continue to modernize those forces. The completion of the President’s strategic modernization program is essential to allow full achievement of the US START goals.
4. (TS/S/OWL) As the United States considers any Soviet proposal, the proposal should be measured against the following criteria:
a. The United States should take no action which would jeopardize the right to develop and deploy required defenses.
b. It is essential to protect modernization including completion of the President’s strategic modernization program.
c. Verification should be enhanced by requiring the Soviets to comply with current agreements and change their deception and coverage practices; e.g., stop encryption on missile tests.
d. Research of all types must be protected to guarantee our continued security over time as well as to provide a hedge against Soviet cheating or breakout.
e. The forces remaining after any reductions must provide sufficient capability to maintain deterrence and, if required, implement our national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success.
In observing these standards, it is essential to maintain the support of the public, Congress, and US allies in order to protect the key elements of deterrence, not only SDI and completion of the strategic modernization program but also support for conventional forces and preservation of our alliances.
[Page 428]5. (TS/S/OWL) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you forward the views expressed in this memorandum to the President of the United States.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Summit—Geneva II (3 of 3). Top Secret; Sensitive; Owl. In a September 30 covering note to Reagan, Weinberger wrote: “Mr. President: Attached is the unanimous military advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to you, with respect to any agreements on nuclear arms with the Soviet Union. Very respectfully, Cap.” See Documents 92 and 97.↩
- For the text of NSDD 160, “Preparing for Negotiations With the Soviet Union,” see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 369.↩