I would appreciate it very much if you would send the attached paper to
the President.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Defense Intelligence
Agency2
Washington, November 20, 1984
1. SOVIETS TRY TO PRESSURE US INTO SPACE TALKS (S/[handlingrestriction not declassified]
REF: (S/[handling restriction not
declassified] CIA [number not declassified], 15 Nov 84.3
After his return from Moscow in late October, First Secretary Rogov
of the Soviet Embassy in Washington discussed several issues [less than 1 line not declassified]. The
question of space talks dominated his comments, which he probably
expected to be relayed to the US
Government.
[Page 1134]
The Soviet diplomat contended Foreign Minister Gromyko’s impression was “negative”
about his September meeting with President Reagan.4
Gromyko believed Reagan was interested in holding
space talks but not on substantive issues. Moscow insists, according
to Rogov, that unless space talks materialize, nothing else is
important enough to negotiate. Space talks could “pull along” other
negotiations that were halted. He also said Moscow will watch
national security appointments in Reagan’s second term; unless the US makes personnel changes, the Soviets
have little hope of “doing business.”
Rogov threatened that Soviet policy toward the US could get worse. He thinks, however,
that US hostility toward the USSR has reached rock bottom and
Washington is moving into a more pragmatic, less ideological stance.
Thus, Moscow still sees the possibility of fruitful space
negotiations. Rogov admitted that space tests and R&D already underway could not
simply be abandoned; but a range of space weapon issues, in which
only limited R&D had occurred,
could. The USSR was ready to
negotiate on this range without demanding the elimination of
concepts and research.
COMMENT: The Soviet campaign against a US space program, including a strategic defense, is
intensifying. Rogov’s comments reflect some aspects of this
multifaceted effort.
The Soviets are trying to entice the US with hints that discussions on START and INF-related forces can eventually be held, if the
US agrees to space talks on
their terms. Although Rogov does not refer to these terms, other
Soviet statements indicate they expect a US moratorium so long as the talks go on. Thus, they
can hold hostage the development of US strategic defenses and ASATs. Rogov’s threats that superpower relations will
deteriorate further are aimed at putting the US on the defensive, so that Washington will make
concessions to Moscow.
Rogov’s remarks also reflect Moscow’s demand for the appointment of
US officials whom it views as
more ready to compromise than incumbents in key positions dealing
with arms control. This point has been made by other Soviets,
notably by members of Moscow’s Institute of the USA and Canada to prominent American
visitors. The Soviets clearly have their own candidates. They are
frustrated that their successful techniques of the 1970s are failing
with the current US
administration.
The defeat of a US strategic defense
in whatever mode—traditional ABM or
as part of SDI—has overwhelming
priority for the Soviets. They are concerned that such a US capability would undercut their
[Page 1135]
strategy based on a
preemptive first-strike potential. Moscow’s obsession with SDI stems from its fear that decades
of investments in its strategic offensive forces would be
jeopardized. [1 line not declassified]
