Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

169. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, February 8, 1984

SUBJECT

• US-Soviet Relations in 1984

Ustinov’s surprise cancellation of his visit to India once again highlights the Andropov health problem and the need for sobriety and caution in US-Soviet relations this year.² I would like to follow up my brief comments on Bill Casey’s paper³ by some more extended analysis of (1) the Soviet leadership’s situation at home and abroad; (2) Soviet options vis-à-vis the U.S. this year; and (3) our posture toward the Soviets in 1984.

The Soviet Situation

We have a policy framework that lets us move forward or back as the situation requires. The issue we will be confronting here in Washington is whether the Soviet internal situation makes it impossible to move forward in US-Soviet relations this year, if that is what we want to do.

There is no doubt that the Moscow leadership feels hemmed in at home and abroad, and is having difficulty making major decisions:

At home, even if Andropov continues in office, his physical condition will never let him establish the primacy previous leaders have had. He will be forced to fashion Politburo majorities issue-by-issue from his sickbed. New departures are very difficult, and the pace of change will be painfully slow. Andropov began by proclaiming that he would use increased discipline on labor, management and dissent as one means to get the economy and country going again after the late Brezhnev drift. Discipline and repression have been hallmarks of his year-plus in office.

Some argue that we are witnessing a regression into neo-Stalinism and paralysis, but this picture is probably overdrawn. Discipline and repression there are, and they bear a cost in terms of initiative. But they have also helped justify the replacement of large numbers of senior and mid-level officials across the country with younger and at least in some cases abler people, and they have probably contributed to the significant upturn in industrial productivity and output in 1983 (agricultural output also rose for the first time in five years, but because of better weather).

Thus, there is new blood in the system, including the Politburo, a heftier economic cushion, and even some tentative, gingerly reforms. Everything is slow, but things do move. The evidence points less to paralysis than to uncertainty and maneuvering for and against change. Succession is certain to come sometime, and may already have started.

We do not know all the issues around which succession maneuvering will crystallize. But we do know our policy will be a factor in the debate and in the decisions.

For the Soviets themselves, the economy rather than the U.S. is the top priority problem. Recent visitors to Moscow find them even more preoccupied with their economic problems, and with the outlines of the 1986–1990 plan that must be decided soon, than with INF. But there is a functional link. While the 1983 economic results were encouraging, the Soviets face a resumption of declining economic growth rates unless they take serious measures. In particular they need to increase investment and consumer spending. But this comes at a time when the pressure to increase defense spending also has grown. In recent years the Soviets have cut the rate of growth in defense spending from four to two percent, and increases for military procurement to zero. Even with decelerating defense outlays, however, the economy has continued to slow down. There is now a painful choice between accelerating defense spending to meet the enhanced security problem they face and concentrating on their economic needs—on which their long-term security equally depends.

The Soviets see themselves faced with a resurgent “Imperialist Camp” led by the U.S. For them this is a trend, rather than a fait accompli, and they hope it is still reversible. But if the trend continues, the prospect for them is not simply difficult but dangerous. They have spent the last year trying to reverse the trend by extrapolating from accepted policy lines. This has failed: the Soviet Union has lost rather than gained ground. Our rearmament program and alliance systems are intact; leaders with very robust approaches to the Soviet Union are in place for an extended period in the major allied capitals; and Soviet analysis points toward a Reagan reelection. So they must begin to think in terms of the next five years, and they must ask themselves what strategy is needed to defuse the growing western threat to their security and thereby free resources for the economy.

Soviet Options in a U.S. Election Year

For all the expertise and experience they have accumulated in Western Europe and the Third World, the Soviets continue to see the U.S. as their number one problem, and they know that the U.S. election is a crossroads. Barring Andropov’s sudden disappearance, our election will be the largest single factor, foreign or domestic, forcing the Soviet leaders to make rather than defer decisions.

They would probably prefer to wait us out:

—They are genuinely angry at the President. From their point of view he has delivered some telling blows; they do not wish to help him get reelected; and they especially do not wish to be seen as crawling back to business-as-usual after these humiliations.

—Recent U.S. politics have been volatile, and it does not seem farfetched to Soviet leaders to hope that the President will stumble between now and November.

—The Soviets have the means to maintain a general level of anxiety which keeps pressure on us; to prevent us from resolving problems alone in key regional situations; and to exploit opportunities which may occur to pick up chips in the global sweepstakes.

But the Soviets also have the option of keeping the US-Soviet relationship active by doing some business. The President has given them that option, and they are suspicious that it is merely an election ploy. But it is neither unfamiliar nor unattractive:

—Like waiting us out, keeping things going is also “continuity.” Very little change would be required: they would continue to build arms, promote “peace,” keep western anxieties up, try to split our alliances.

—But standing pat after walking away from nuclear arms negotiations strengthens the Administration’s claim that it is the USSR rather than the U.S. that is responsible for current East-West tensions.

—Furthermore, success in managing the U.S. relationship remains a key measure of Soviet leadership competence, and if we insist and persist, competence will require a measure of active dialogue with us this year.

—There may be problems that can only be dealt with if the U.S. and USSR are talking about them. Among regional issues, Zagladin mentioned Lebanon and Central America to the French.⁴ Further down the road, the Soviets are genuinely anxious about the costs of an arms race with American technology in new areas (ABM, space, etc.), and they want to slow us down.⁵ Fear and soft soap—“return to détente” and “return to the cold war,” the alternating hot and cold showers of the past three years—have not helped. Negotiations might.

—The Soviet Union can afford to deal with the Americans, short of humiliating major concessions. In Soviet eyes, the USSR was not the expanding monster of 1980, and is no paper tiger now. Their INF “countermeasures” show to their own satisfaction that they have the resolve to compete; they are hurting us in Lebanon, Central America and elsewhere through arms supply; and their last resort—military strength—remains enormous.

There is no surefire way to predict which option the Soviets will choose. Larry thinks that over the past year the Soviets have run up to a number of favorable decisions in relations with us, and then backed away at the last moment—e.g. Shcharanskiy. Andropov’s health problems are making important decisions all the more difficult (and hard to decipher). We tend to be wary, and we should.

Nevertheless, most recent signs suggest that where the Soviets have made decisions, they have been in favor of keeping the option of doing business with the U.S. open. By mid-December, they had fallen back from the high-decibel war scare talk that accompanied initial INF deployments to the line that tensions are unprecedented, but the danger of war is not immediate. In Stockholm, Gromyko’s harsh speech was followed by a rather different private line⁶—nuclear arms control nyet (or not yet), other issues da (maybe)—not just with you but with other Western colleagues. Andropov’s Pravda interview January 24 gave nothing away on substance, but resembled Gromyko’s private presentation in its structure, and was notably more moderate than his previous statements in its tone.⁷

Moreover, Andropov has now introduced a more flexible formulation on resumption of nuclear arms control—that practical positive steps in the direction of an effective process would find the Soviets duly responsive. East European colleagues have told Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mojsov that START could be resumed by July.⁸ Careful and obedient Czech Prime Minister Strougal told Trudeau last week that the Soviets are trying to find a way to resume the Geneva talks by this summer, although some face-saving device might be needed.⁹

And, in the meantime, the last six weeks have been peppered with concrete diplomatic steps: agreement to and flexibility in the Hotline talks; agreement to meet bilaterally on nuclear non-proliferation in Vienna; agreement to begin negotiations on the Pacific Maritime Boundary here; Gromyko’s proposal to resume MBFR on March 16, pointedly given to you first rather than to another Foreign Minister; and the Soviet proposal in Montreal to form a USSR-Japan-U.S. group within ICAO to study practical steps to prevent another KAL.

In sum, there has been some backing away from the total belligerency of late November. Partly, this has been our doing. The announcement that you were going to Stockholm brought Gromyko there; the President’s speech helped force a response in kind.¹⁰ Angry as they are, and under wraps as Andropov has been, the Soviets have been moving in the right direction. It will be, at least in part, up to the United States to determine how much further they move this year.

The U.S. Posture

We have put in place a sustainable strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union over the long term. We have made progress in implementing it. We are in a position to move forward on the dialogue element, by demonstrating the ability to establish a process of serious exchanges designed to find mutually beneficial solutions to real problems.

A stand-pat approach at this point could make it harder to keep the overall policy intact. Both the West Europeans and Japanese welcomed the President’s speech partly because it provided long-hoped-for cover for their own desires to talk more to Moscow.¹¹ Foreign ministers will be doing so—Howe, Genscher, probably Abe—and heads of government will not be far behind; others may not follow, but Trudeau has led the way.¹² And, although American opinion is more solid, opposition politicians will be tempted this year to call for “results” in US-Soviet relations that they themselves could not deliver.

In order to continue to set the agenda, we need to continue to be active, and that agenda should include genuine content. Soviet practice is to respond: you saw an example of this in Stockholm, where Gromyko delivered a tirade, you kept your cool and appealed to him, and he came back with the most positive remarks this Administration has heard from him. The Soviets can field propaganda initiatives like non-use of force with ease; they have rarely been able to make the first substantive move. This will be even more true this year than usual.

The 1984 Agenda

I have given some thought to the areas where it ought to be in the interest of both sides to see movement this year. At this point, I think we could hope by the end of the year to have in place a work program of contacts and transactions with the Soviets that will have served (1) to prevent the relationship from deteriorating further, and (2) to create a process and a degree of momentum upon which we could build in 1985 and the years beyond. It is too early to tell whether the Soviets will actually agree to bring even minor matters like the Hotline to successful conclusion. However, if they become more convinced President Reagan will be reelected, and if we are offering things they want, the possibility of concrete results will increase.

The agenda could encompass the four topic areas we have identified to the Soviets:

—On nuclear arms control, the Soviets will have to sort out their approach before they return to negotiations, and it will not be easy. Even if they are moving toward a START/INF merger,¹³ there are many pros and cons, as you are aware, and they are clearly unsure of where they want to go. It would be to our advantage to get back into dialogue and even back to the negotiating table. One way to hasten their decision-making would be to lay out some more specific ideas in the START area, as we originally contemplated for Stockholm. There has been a great deal of work on START substance in the interagency community, and there is more and more support for the idea of a common framework that you discussed with the President. It would be worthwhile, therefore, to reconfirm the President’s support for this idea, and be ready to lay some of its elements before the Soviets early on.

—On non-nuclear arms control, the most promising is also the most modest—an accord on Hotline upgrade, where the technical side can easily be wrapped up by this summer. In MBFR, we should get Option Three approved and presented in Vienna. In CDE, it should be possible to establish a constructive working relationship between the U.S. and Soviet representatives and a serious discussion of the specific measures.

—On regional issues, candid discussion in bilateral channels might help us avoid direct US-Soviet confrontation, and could conceivably help produce parallel steps by the two countries that ease tensions or advance solutions to individual situations. Middle East issues remain the most urgent, but difficult. I think we need to look at ways to establish a more routine and serious dialogue among experts on a number of regions. I will have some thoughts for you on this subject shortly.

—On human rights, we have been running into a stone wall. But last year the Soviets did move on the Pentecostalists in response to the President’s interest,¹⁴ and we are once again hearing from official Soviets that positive steps are not excluded. Potential priorities are one or more major cases like Shcharanskiy, Sakharov and Orlov, and movement on a number of lesser cases. The Soviets may choose to mask movement by ostensibly responding to appeals from others rather than us, but we are after results and can afford to respect their sensitivities.

—In the bilateral area, it is in our interest to go as far as we can toward agreement on and implementation of specific measures to prevent a repeat of KAL. If we can get that process underway, there are a few other steps put on the back burner by KAL that are worth considering.

The most likely candidates are things that benefit people or that get us in touch with the Soviet people on a reciprocal basis, in line with the President’s own reaffirmation of commitment to this aspect of relations in his January 16 speech and again in the State of the Union message.¹⁵ That, after all, is our basic rationale for post-KAL steps to ensure the safety of air travelers. Our interest in the cultural exchanges agreement and the consulates has the same root, and I understand that Bud McFarlane and Jack Matlock favor moving ahead on these in the near future. I agree, although we should anticipate bureaucratic problems with cultural exchanges.

We might look at new ways to deal with the upsurge of interest across the country in renewing and expanding contacts with the Soviet Union. Wilson Center Director Jim Billington has raised this with me, and I agree with him that there is room to work with responsible people on the outside to limit exploitation of such contacts by the Soviets and by our domestic critics this year. For example, I believe we should now tell the American Council of Young Political Leaders that they can resume their exchanges with young Soviet political leaders. This has been an excellent, tough-minded program in the past, with Mike Deaver a member of the ACYPL Board.

Congressional visits are another area that bears watching. There will be strong interest on the Hill in visiting the USSR and inviting Soviet “Parliamentarians” here in return. We should continue to brief outgoing delegations thoroughly on the Foley/Pell model to minimize the daylight the Soviets will try to open up between our branches of government,¹⁶ but at this point there are some reservations in our branch about giving the green light to return forays at congressional invitation. However, pressure from the congressional leadership may build, and we may need to reconsider. In that case, we should encourage hosts to broaden the Soviet delegations beyond familiar propagandists to include possible successor politicians like Gorbachev, Aliyev and Vorotnikov. They have had virtually no contact with Americans, and they are in the Supreme Soviet.

Conclusion

Our basic objective this year should be the one we adopted for our Soviet policy a year ago: to get a productive dialogue going at the pace and level justified by the Soviet response. Our realism and our new strength make dialogue possible; dialogue serves to keep the policy framework for realism and strength intact. If we find we are making substantial progress on the issues I have noted, it would be appropriate to consider your going to Moscow to push the process along, and inviting Gromyko to Washington (in keeping with pre-Afghanistan tradition) when he comes to the UNGA in the fall. With such a process underway, we would be able by the end of the year to point at a minimum to a serious effort by the Administration to engage the Soviets on a broad front. There are a variety of further steps we could take in other areas, bilateral and multilateral, depending upon how far we want to go. We should damp down expectations for any specific agreements, but we might end up with a few small ones. And even if we do not, we would be well positioned both for 1984, and equally important, for 1985 and beyond.

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/01/1984–02/08/1984); NLR–775–11–14–5–9. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons and Palmer. Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on February 8.
2. See footnote 2, Document 167.
3. Not further identified.
4. In telegram 984 from Moscow, January 24, the Embassy reported on comments made by Zagladin during a reception for a French-Soviet Arms Control Colloquium: “He struck the French as fairly up-beat on prospects for U.S.-Soviet dialogue. He was frank in describing certain arms control negotiations (presumably those dealing with nuclear weapons) as ‘blocked.’ He nonetheless indicated that there were other areas where the Soviet Union would welcome negotiations with the U.S. He then cited essentially the list of topics subsequently ticked off by Andropov in his interview as possible subjects for U.S.-Soviet dialogue: Space, CDE, etc. Zagladin went beyond Andropov, however, in suggesting that certain regional issues (he mentioned the Middle East and Central America) might also be candidates for bilateral progress. Zagladin concluded that progress in these two areas (arms control and regional) might create conditions which would open up those areas currently blocked.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840051–0486) For Andropov’s interview, see footnote 7, below.
5. This sentiment was indirectly expressed by Velikhov during his discussion with Horowitz. See Document 163.
6. See Documents 159 and 160.
7. In telegram 957 from Moscow, January 25, the Embassy reported on Andropov’s Pravda interview: “Andropov has responded to President Reagan’s January 16 speech be reiterating that the Soviet Union is ready for dialogue, while insisting that any US-Soviet dialogue for the foreseeable future be on Soviet terms. His written answers to questions by Pravda are less polemical than Gromyko’s Stockholm speech (and indeed may be intended to repair some of the damage caused by that speech), but reveal no willingness to address US concerns on nuclear arms control, regional or human rights issues. He does hold out the possibility of progress in MBFR and passes up the opportunity to declare his August ASAT moratorium void in the wake of the US’s recent ASAT test; nor does he address compliance. On INF, Andropov repeats his November 24 formula that the US and NATO must ‘display readiness’ to return to the pre-deployment status quo but adjusts somewhat his language on what Moscow would be prepared to do in response to such a display. The absence of a specific reference to START may be encouraging in that he has forgone the necessity of spelling out conditions for a return to negotiation. Andropov’s answers reflect a reaffirmation of Soviet efforts since last fall to portray US-Soviet relations as at a dangerously low level and to deny the Reagan administration the opportunity to claim otherwise. But, in taking a slightly more positive public position than Gromyko’s speech last week, it opens the door to US-Soviet dialogue just a crack more. This more positive gloss was spelled out to the French by Party official Zagladin yesterday.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840051–0019) The full text of Andropov’s interview was printed in the New York Times, January 25, 1984, p. A6. For his statement of November 24, 1983, see footnote 4, Document 141.
8. In telegram 32806 to Belgrade, February 2, the Department reported that Mojsov “said that some EE Foreign Ministers are speculating that START talks might resume in July, but that they are worried about the high level of emotional anti-U.S. feeling in Moscow and the limiting effect of the U.S. elections.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840073–0049)
9. Telegram 978 from USNATO, February 7, reported: “Strougal pointed to Andropov’s latest ‘appeal’ to support his view that the Soviets want real progress (on INF), and he predicted (Soviet) movement in the second quarter of 1984.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840082–0415)
10. See Document 158.
11. In telegram 15036 to Stockholm, January 18, the Department commented: “Official reaction from our European allies was especially helpful, and much press coverage in the non-aligned nations also welcomed the President’s remarks, expressing interest and hope that improved atmospherics would lead to early progress on arms control and a reduction of international tensions.” It continued: “Press coverage in Asia was generally favorable, especially in Japan, with many commentators noting that the President’s approach to Moscow was based on an upswing in U.S. power.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840035–0270)
12. In telegram 350 from Ottawa, January 17, the Embassy reported that “in response to Parliamentary questioning Jan 16, Prime Minister Trudeau applauded the ‘conciliatory’ tone of President Reagan’s Jan 16 speech on US-Soviet relations and called on the Soviet Union to respond in kind. Trudeau welcomed what he saw as ‘a different tone coming out of Washington’ and the President’s commitment to genuine dialogue between East and West.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840034–0074)
13. See Document 161.
14. See Document 74.
15. In his January 25 State of the Union address, Reagan remarked: “People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy, for your country and mine, to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then would it not be better to do away with them entirely?” For the full text of Reagan’s address, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book I, pp. 87–94.
16. See Document 79.