Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

73. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

Washington, February 15, 1978

SUBJECT

• U.S. Reaction in IFIs to Argentine Human Rights Actions

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether recent human rights actions by Argentina are sufficient grounds for revising your earlier decision to vote against two Argentine loans in the World Bank, now scheduled for a vote on February 21.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

A vote is expected on February 21 on two Argentine projects which, before the developments outlined below, you decided to vote against: a $109 million silo project in the IBRD and a $9 million cement plant loan in the International Finance Corporation. The Argentine Ambassador has mentioned publicly that the silo project was developed after discussions with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, referring to our possibly negative position on it as an indication of mixed and confusing positions being taken by the U.S. government. Even if we follow current instructions on voting, we need to know what to say to Argentine feelers about our response to human rights actions which they believe are positive.

A progress report on the human rights situation in Argentina was sent to the Department by our Embassy on February 7 and is attached.²

—Prisoner releases. Approximately 440 prisoners have been released from the state of siege powers of the Argentine Executive since December 20, 1977.

—Prisoner lists. On February 3, in a significant, long sought after step, Argentina published a list of 705 state of siege prisoners. A second list of 795 prisoners appeared on February 13; further lists are expected.

—Right of option. Our Embassy believes that the right of option program, whereby prisoners may opt for exile, is now “definitely” being implemented, and the Argentine government has told foreign embassies that it will cooperate in helping prisoners meet visa requirements. The Embassy has underscored the importance of this measure to prisoner releases.

—Treatment of prisoners. The International Committee of the Red Cross resumed prison visits in December and has reported that political prisoners are being held in the same physical conditions as other prisoners. This is an improvement.

—U.S. interest cases. The Argentines have authorized the departure of certain high U.S. interest cases recently, including Guillermo Vogler and one of the Panero sisters.

—Intangibles. The attached cable reports that the Argentines are becoming more “sensitized” to the importance of human rights steps and are no longer “stonewalling” the subject. The cable states also that there is an attempt underway to reorganize counter-subversive forces in order to achieve tighter control over them by the central government.

On the other hand, and as the same cable reports, there continue to be many problems. While disappearances may have declined in 1977, more recently they appear to have run at the same rate as a year before. According to our Embassy, it has heard of 39 disappearances since December 1, including two French nuns and mothers of the disappeareds who were abducted without a trace in mid-December.³ The Embassy adds that reports of secret detention centers persist, and that there is no evidence to suggest that torture for information is no longer practiced. In addition, the GOA admits that it is holding over 3600 prisoners under executive detention. Human rights groups estimate that many thousands more are being held secretly, in non-official detention centers. To date the GOA has answered few of our requests for information on missing persons. The International Committee of the Red Cross has not visited military camps where unaccounted for prisoners may be under detention. Few prisoners have been released by the right of option program to date. In the case of high U.S. interest cases such as Timerman or Deutsch, they remain detained. Internationally, the Argentine government has mounted a campaign in the United Nations against Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.

However you decide to handle this issue, our response will come very shortly after Under Secretary Benson decided against the sale of any further military training to Argentina.⁴ This means that we have continued to get progressively tougher with Argentina.

Under Public Law 95–118 (FY 1978 IFI authorizing legislation),⁵ opposition to a loan may consist of either a no vote or an abstention. Neither of the proposed options recommend support for Argentine loans at this time.

THE OPTIONS

1. Follow current instructions but acknowledge change privately. We would advise the Argentines that we decided to vote no on the $109 million silo loan and the $9 million cement plant because of continuing concern with the human rights situation in Argentina. We would note that improvements in human rights will be factored into the stance we take on future projects. We would acknowledge privately, however, to both the Argentine and other bank directors that we have noted favorable signs and express the hope that they indicate a new trend.

Pro:

—This would demonstrate our ongoing serious concern over continuing disappearances and other human rights abuses but inject an element of hope into our IFI voting pattern in return for further human rights performance. We would not run the risk of suggesting that we are willing to alter our policies in response to minor improvements.

Con:

—This would fail to recognize sufficiently or encourage actively Argentine human rights change, which may seem minimal to us but is important in the Argentine view of things. It risks signaling, especially when we have just decided to deny all military training requests, that we remain opposed adamantly to the government, and in the context of our posture, our action might not only serve as a human rights disincentive but impact negatively on other major interests, notably non-proliferation.

2. Abstain on both loans. We would inform the Argentines that their recent steps will affect our stance on the two loans, but we would not be more explicit prior to the votes. We would abstain on the loans, and explain privately to the Argentines and interested Bank members that our stance was taken in recognition of recent positive signs, emphasizing the need for further steps leading toward overall improvement in what remains a poor situation.

Pro:

—This represents a prompt revision of our earlier negative stance in the IFIs, signaling our willingness to change as the Argentines change. It could also: a) help to stem human rights regression, because the Argentines would not wish to precipitate a return to no votes in the banks and, b) it would strengthen the hand of those in the government who are seeking human rights improvement and who would be able to point to our action as indicating acknowledgment of steps being taken.

Con:

—The publication of two lists and some prisoner releases represent only the beginning of what is needed for real improvement in the human rights situation; to reverse our position with alacrity would undermine the seriousness with which we have viewed past violations, including very recent disappearances.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve Option 2 to abstain on both the silo and cement projects, and privately explain our votes in terms of Argentine human rights steps (favored by ARA, S/P, Treasury, and the U.S. Director to the IBRD).⁶

ALTERNATIVELY, that you approve Option 1, (favored by HA) maintaining your earlier decision to oppose the two projects but authorize representations to the Argentines recognizing hopeful human rights developments.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 27, Human Rights—Argentina II. Confidential. Drafted on February 14 by Rondon; cleared in draft in EB/IFD/ODF, S/P, and the Department of the Treasury and by Bova. Rondon initialed for all the clearing officials.
2. Not attached. Reference is to telegram 965 from Buenos Aires, February 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780057–0810) In a February 22 memorandum to Carter, Vance reported many of the points in this section and wrote that the lists of prisoners “are important because once the government acknowledges that it holds an individual, the likelihood of physical harm is diminished.” Carter wrote, “good.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State), 2/78)
3. See Document 69.
4. Not found.
5. See footnote 9, Document 59.
6. Christopher checked the approval option.