Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

98. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, October 4, 1980, 1837Z

265533. Subject: (S) US-SRV Dialogue: October 2 Meeting. Ref: A. State 262659 (Notal); B. State 263652 (Notal).²

1. (S–Entire text).

2. Introduction: Following in paragraph below is a fairly full report on our two hour meeting October 2, at Vietnamese request, in New York with Vietnamese PermRep, Ambassador Ha Van Lau. Lau responded to our presentation September 16 in Bangkok³ (Ref A). Action addressee posts may draw on this report to brief host governments. USUN is also briefing PermReps in New York. End Introduction.

3. At Vietnamese request, Ambassador McHenry, Ambassador Petree and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke met October 2 in New York with Vietnamese PermRep, Ambassador Ha Van Lau. Meeting was fourth in recent periodic exchanges with Vietnamese,⁴ principally to determine if there is any flexibility in the Vietnamese position which could lead to resolution of the Kampuchean problem.

Under instructions from Hanoi, Ambassador Lau responded to presentation Amb Abramowitz made September 16 in Bangkok to SRV Ambassador Hoang Bao Son. Lau contended that the U.S. continued to collude with the Chinese to use Thai territory to interfere in the internal affairs of Kampuchea and Indochina. He advocated again the Indochinese FonMin July 18 proposal in Vientiane as best means to resolve the dangerous tensions along the Thai-Khmer border.

Lau elaborated on aspects of the proposal along the lines as did Vietnamese FonMin Nguyen Co Thach in his UNGA speech, and, as he said, Thach had with FonMin Sitthi. He said that agreement to create a DMZ on both sides on the Thai-Khmer border would lead Hanoi to hold talks with Heng Samrin authorities in Phnom Penh on withdrawal within days or even hours of “a number” of Vietnamese troops. Pending creation of the DMZ, both sides should “undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within the existing borders, end all hostile acts of one side against the other, stop allowing the Pol Pot remnant troops and other reactionary forces to use sanctuaries in Thailand, halt the supply of arms and food to them, disarm and place them into separate camps and move the refugee camps out of the border areas.”

In later clarification, Ambassador Lau said that the Indochinese countries were prepared to conduct negotiations (concerning Kampuchea) on the basis of certain principles, including the Vientiane communique, ZOPFAN (KL Declaration 1971), and the Kuantan Principle.⁵ This did not mean that Vietnam accepted all these principles, but they represent a basis for negotiations and discussion. He also noted that the PRK had rejected the proposal for an international conference as contained in the ASEAN peace proposal,⁶ because it was interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea. Draft also fails to deal with a major factor—the continued threat by China to the Indochinese countries.⁷

Lau reiterated familiar theme that Vietnamese troops were in Kampuchea for the third time historically and would all be withdrawn when the Chinese threat was removed and the Kampuchean Revolutionary Council and Kampuchean people asked them to leave.

Ambassador Lau said that the U.S. clings to the Thai effort “to impose a solution” on Kampuchea and to reject the Heng Samrin administration which has the support of the Kampuchean people. Kampuchean people were just emerging from the nightmare of Pol Pot and were preoccupied with their immediate needs. He agreed that the Kampuchean people must be allowed to choose their own future. We respect their right of self-determination, he said. In this context, Ambassador Lau said that elections were planned for early 1981 in Kampuchea and Phnom Penh is already working on a constitution.

Ambassador Lau called U.S. concern about Thai security a “smokescreen” for interference in Kampuchea. He reiterated, quoting FonMin Thach, that Vietnam was no threat to Thailand. Lau said that the June 23 border incident resulted because the Thais were repatriating “Pol Pot remnant troops” in May and June. He stated that the Kampuchean Government does not deny, however, the legitimate right of Khmer to repatriate themselves and return to their native villages. He noted that there were currently under discussion proposals toward repatriation involving national Red Crosses and ICRC. Ambassador Lau said that Thai side had arbitrarily and unilaterally started repatriation without discussion with Heng Samrin authorities. The blame must not be put on Kampuchean authorities.

FonMin Thach’s meeting with Thai FonMin Sitthi. Ambassador Lau described the atmosphere as friendly without acrimony. Thach had clarified the four point Vientiane proposal, as Lau did with us, and FonMin Sitthi explained the ASEAN peace proposal. They had agreed to meet again with date and place to be worked out subsequently.

In preliminary commentary on Ambassador Lau’s presentation, Ambassador McHenry stressed that there was no American solution nor should there be a Vietnamese solution to the question of a government in Kampuchea. Kampuchean people should be allowed to determine freely both their own leadership and form of government without outside interference from Vietnam or any other power.

Ambassador McHenry also emphasized the dangerous situation on the Thai-Khmer border and our concern that the presence of Vietnamese military forces there could even unintentionally result in incidents. We should work to defuse that situation, but not in such a way as to prejudice the overall outcome. It was for this reason that we and others found the Vientiane proposal unacceptable, since it attempted to force recognition of the Heng Samrin authorities.

Mr. Holbrooke expressed pleasure that two U.S. officials, representatives of the U.S. Joint Casualty Resolution Center, were currently in Hanoi. He stressed the importance to the American people and government of resolution of the POW/MIA issues.

Mr. Holbrooke noted the recent announcement that the U.S. would support the ASEAN position on the Khmer credentials issue, and emphasized that this decision did not change our total opposition to the return of the Pol Pot group to power in Phnom Penh. In this context, he said that Vietnamese charges of U.S.-Chinese collusion were obviously, patently untrue. He also commented that the fact that approximately the same large number of nations in the UN still hold the same view on Khmer credentials as last year suggests strongly that the majority of the world’s countries are very concerned over the principles involved (opposing invasion and takeover of one country by another) and are not in fact voting for Pol Pot. He also recalled that the U.S. had opposed Pol Pot for many years at the time it appeared that Pol Pot and the Vietnamese were working closely together against the U.S.

Mr. Holbrooke noted that we had been unable to bring to fruition the US-SRV normalization talks of 1978 because of the circumstances surrounding the Kampuchean situation, and because of the boat people. In this regard, he stressed that there was no “China card”. Our relations with China and our relations with Vietnam followed independent tracks and were separate issues.

Holbrooke told Lau that our objective remains as we have often stated, to work for the development of a stable system of independent states in Southeast Asia. This is why we build much of our policy toward Southeast Asia around support for ASEAN, a constructive, economically oriented organization. It would behoove Vietnam to improve relations with ASEAN. He also reiterated that our commitments to Thailand and the Philippines remain very important to us.

Finally, Mr. Holbrooke raised the question of Vietnam’s relations with the Soviet Union, an issue which he described as “extremely difficult” for the Vietnamese. He noted frankly that we are well aware that the Soviets enjoy increasing military access to Vietnam and are using Vietnamese territory for naval and intelligence purposes, as well as to provide massive support for Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea. He recalled that Ambassador Lau, in the twelve years we have been dealing with him, has always stressed the independence and freedom of Vietnam, yet a significant change has taken place in the nature of Vietnam’s relations with the Soviet Union. No wonder that ASEAN is skeptical of Vietnam’s intentions, he commented.

Regarding the U.S. side’s comments, Ambassador Lau said that Vietnamese-Soviet relations were a matter only for the two nations to determine, but their relations were of “militant solidarity of two socialist countries”. Since the incidents in Kampuchea, the U.S. and its friends have been trying to strangle Vietnam economically. The Soviet Union had been the power which helped Vietnam over the difficulties caused by the war. He asserted that there were no Soviet bases in Vietnam, but Vietnam would use its territory as it saw fit to defend its independence and sovereignty when they were threatened.

Comment: Substantively, the Vietnamese still continue to be willing to enter into negotiations only within the framework of their Vientiane proposal concerning border issues. We, thus, found nothing new of substance. Their reference to withdrawal of “a number” of Vietnamese troops is not new, was originally raised, we believe, in Kuala Lumpur in May and with Waldheim in Hanoi. FonMin Thach alluded to this possibility in his talk with Washington Post’s Don Oberdorfer which formed the basis of Oberdorfer’s story in the Post September 25.⁸ The idea, nonetheless, remains unilateral, reserves right for Vietnamese troops to remain semi-permanently in Kampuchea, and is not linked to Khmer self-determination. Idea remains in an unacceptable framework, although this is the first time the Vietnamese have confirmed this notion directly with us. The only binding agreements into which the Vietnamese appear prepared to enter concern border issues, and not the central issues of troop withdrawal and Khmer self-determination.

Ambassador Lau was firm in his faithfulness to the Vientiane communique as the basic Vietnamese position. He was slightly more conciliatory generally and perhaps slightly defensive on the issues of Khmer self-determination and troop withdrawal. He was defensive and almost emotional in responding to the question of Vietnamese independence and freedom and Viet-Soviet relations.

Muskie

1. Source: Department of State, Miscellaneous Old Vietnam Political Records, 1968–1991, Lot 94D430, US-SRV Meetings, New York, October 2, 1980. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Anderson; cleared by J. Willett (USUN), Philip Wilcox (IO/UNP), Negroponte, and W. Scott Butcher (S/S–O); approved by Holbrooke. Sent to USUN, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Manila, Singapore, Paris, Tokyo, Beijing, Canberra, Wellington, London, and Ottawa. Sent for information Priority to Hong Kong, Vientiane, Moscow, and the White House.
2. Telegram 262659 to multiple posts, October 1, provided instructions on informing host governments of the October 2 U.S.-SRV meeting in New York. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880026–0519) Telegram 263652 to multiple posts, October 2, provided further information about the October 2 U.S.-SRV meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880026–0507)
3. See Document 97 and footnote 4 thereto.
4. See Documents 94, 95, and 97.
5. ZOPFAN, Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, was a declaration signed by ASEAN Foreign Ministers on November 27, 1971. The Kuantan Principle was signed by the Malaysian Prime Minister and Indonesian President in March 1980.
6. Presumably a reference to UN General Assembly Resolution 34/22. See footnote 3, Document 70.
7. Presumably this reference is to the draft resolution that was adopted as UN General Assembly Resolution 35/6 on October 22. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980, pp. 332–335.
8. See Don Oberdorfer, “Hanoi Proposes Plan for Limited Pullout from Cambodia,” Washington Post, September 25, 1980, p. A16.