77. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
Sihanouk: Prospects for a Return
[2 paragraphs (18 lines) not declassified]
The Prince’s Position
[1 line not declassified] certain themes are consistently reiterated by the prince. These include:
—Political Solution. Sihanouk expects an ultimately political, rather than a military resolution of the situation in Kampuchea.
[Page 265]—International Conference. An international conference leading to a political solution would ideally suit the prince; he has long urged a Geneva convention to guarantee Kampuchean neutrality.
—Continued Resistance. Sihanouk maintains that continued military resistance is needed to prevent the consolidation of Vietnamese control over Kampuchea and eventually to force all parties to the conference table.
—Pol Pot, Enemy No. 1. Sihanouk has steadfastly refused to cooperate with the forces of Democratic Kampuchea since his escape from their captivity.
—[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]
Recent Activities
Late in September, Sihanouk announced the formation of a “Confederation of Khmer Nationalists” at a meeting in Pyongyang, North Korea. His supporters came from the Paris-based General Association of Khmers Abroad, an umbrella organization for non-Communist Kampuchean exile groups. Former Lon Nol officials In Tam and Cheng Heng figured prominently among Sihanouk’s subordinates in the new confederation. Despite vague allusions to military forces, there is no evidence Sihanouk’s group is physically represented in Kampuchea, and Thai opposition to Sihanouk will hamper his ability to establish a viable presence there. [portion marking not declassified]
Sihanouk earlier rejected a leadership position in a Chinese-sponsored front group that was essentially Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchean regime under another name. [5 lines not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]
Current Plans
At the moment, Sihanouk is in France on a world tour scheduled to include the United States. He says he hopes to organize support among exiles for a government and army to be established “in the Kampuchean jungle.” [1 line not declassified] the prince plans to travel extensively publicizing his position. [3½ lines not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]
The prince has been very successful in keeping himself in the public eye. He has sent several well-publicized letters to the Vietnamese proposing troop withdrawal and self-determination [7 lines not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]
Existing Resistance—Friends or Foes?
Disparate resistance groups operating along the Thailand-Kampuchea border comprise a “third force” alternative to the Pol Pot and Heng Samrin regimes. Elements of this force could be the raw material [Page 266] for Sihanouk’s army, as Sihanouk believes will be the case. Lacking overall unity or leadership, the many movements comprising the third force are loosely linked in a tangle of personal relationships. Although their search for international patronage so far has had only limited success, third force elements will become more important as the chances for Pol Pot’s survival are reduced. [portion marking not declassified]
Third force resistance is based on ethnic war against the Vietnamese. Some third force leaders are apparently professional revolutionaries; others are merely bandits or black marketeers; many are former Lon Nol officials. All are opportunists hoping to attract indigenous followers and international recognition. Although all of the groups are avowedly anti-Communist, a promise of support or collaboration could induce them to cooperate with ideologically-opposed forces. Most would readily accept Chinese aid if offered, and some seem to be receiving it already. [2 lines not declassified] The present level of third force military initiative appears fairly low as the various leaders adopt a wait-and-see attitude while continuing to proselytize. Vietnamese troops, however, appear to be increasingly seeking out and engaging third force elements. [portion marking not declassified]
Khmer Serei. Independently led anti-Communist groups known collectively as Khmer Serei (Free Khmer) have long been an irritant to various Kampuchean governments. Each Khmer Serei group appears to function with near autonomy among other self-proclaimed liberation movements. Khmer Serei obtain supplies at thriving markets just across the Thai border. Compared to the Pol Pot forces, the Khmer Serei living standard is reputedly higher, their fighting ability lower. [portion marking not declassified]
[1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]
Son Sann. The Khmer Serika (Khmer Liberation Movement) currently seems the most significant and cohesive among organizations comprising the third force. Its leader, the 68-year-old Son Sann, who was prime minister under Sihanouk, and is also president of the General Association of Khmers Abroad, on 9 October declared the creation of the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front. Dien Del, a former Lon Nol general, is military chief. Although increasing clashes have occurred lately between its forces and the Vietnamese, the movement’s leaders have adopted a strategy of lying low, avoiding contact, and building a political infrastructure. The movement is predicated on the assumption that Khmer nationalism and hatred of the Vietnamese will eventually compel the invaders to withdraw. [less than 1 line not declassified] Son Sann and Sihanouk are in contact via the General Association of Khmers Abroad, [2½ lines not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]
Son Sann is a favorite of the Thai, who have vigorously promoted his cause. [8 lines not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]
[Page 267]Pol Pot, “Enemy No. 1”
Sihanouk’s bete noir, Pol Pot, is still the most important guerrilla leader operating in Kampuchea today. Pol Pot maintains a communications network with Democratic Kampuchean forces around the country. These forces, though hard pressed, continue to harass Vietnamese and Heng Samrin troops in many areas. Guerrilla resistance, probably augmented by the activities of spontaneous bands of anti-Vietnamese sympathizers, makes few areas in Kampuchea safe for Phnom Penh troops. Heng Samrin and Vietnamese forces controlling major towns and roads are vulnerable to ambush; their grip on the countryside is even more tenuous. [portion marking not declassified]
[2 paragraphs (17½ lines) not declassified]
China’s Game
China’s fondest hopes seem predicated on the integration of Pol Pot forces and other resistance groups into a unified front. One Chinese scenario proposed close military and political cooperation between Pol Pot and Son Sann forces, with Sihanouk a prominent member of the coalition. [portion marking not declassified]
Beijing tried to foster such a united front with the proclamation by Pol Pot representatives in Beijing on 6 September of the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Unity. Sihanouk, however, turned down offers of the presidency of both the front and the Presidium of Democratic Kampuchea, and the new front failed to become a rallying point for resistance. [4 lines not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]
Sihanouk claims that when Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge disappear, he will be able to elicit Chinese support on his own terms. The often antagonistic attitude of the prince toward his potential supporters in Beijing creates a highly ambivalent atmosphere, but the Chinese are keeping their option of support for Sihanouk. [3½ lines not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]
Prospects
If the contending parties in Kampuchea decide that a political solution is the only way out of the conflict, Sihanouk would indeed be a major factor, especially as international opinion strongly favors him. This situation would arise only if the Vietnamese decide military victory is not feasible and the price of continued occupation too high. [portion marking not declassified]
If resistance persists at a level sufficient to contest control of the country and effectively block recognition of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea by the world community, the Vietnamese could decide that a political compromise involving Sihanouk is acceptable. They [Page 268] might even unilaterally place the prince in power in a rearguard action as they withdraw. This scenario, however, is most unlikely. [portion marking not declassified]
At present, the Vietnamese apparently are prepared to stay in Kampuchea despite any forseeable costs. In the face of Khmer hatred, they are willing to maintain an army of occupation and a policy of depopulation, and possibly to institute Vietnamese colonization of rich Kampuchean ricelands. Although resistance may continue, the Vietnamese will doubtless strive to contain and control it, while waiting patiently for international recognition of their puppet government. [portion marking not declassified]
Sihanouk also appears willing to wait. He has shown the wisdom to back off unless chances of success are good. If a very special constellation of factors were to converge, the prince’s star could rise again. It is more likely, however, that he will remain “the former head of state.” [portion marking not declassified]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 82T00267R: Production Case Files, Box 2, Folder 62: Sihanouk: Prospects For A Return. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A note on the first page indicates the memorandum, “based on information as of 20 December 1979, was prepared by [name not declassified], East Asia and Pacific Division, Office of Political Analysis, for Donald Gregg of the National Security Council. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations and the National Intelligence Officer for China and East Asia/Pacific.”↩