Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa

115. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 21, 1978, 9:30–10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Meeting with President Nimeiry of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• *Vice President Walter F. Mondale
• Andrew Young, U.S. Representative to the U.N.
• Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
• Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• David A. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
• Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs
• Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• Donald C. Bergus, U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan
• **Parren J. Mitchell, Congressman from Maryland
• Jerrold Schecter, NSC Staff Member for Relations with the Press
• Paul B. Henze, (Notetaker), National Security Council Staff Member
• Gaafar Muhammed Nimeiry, President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan
• Rashid Al-Tahir Bakr, Vice President and Foreign Minister
• Dr. Francis Deng, Permanent Secretary, MFA
• Abu Bakr Mohammed Osman Salih, Minister of State, Council of Ministers
• Omer Salih Eissa, Sudanese Ambassador to the United States

* Present for the first part of the meeting.

** Present during the last part of the meeting.

The President, who had welcomed President Nimeiry and his party on the portico, opened the formal meeting by stating that we were pleased at the close relations we have developed with Sudan during President Nimeiry’s tenure and that we were happy to welcome him also as a representative of the entire continent of Africa as Chairman of the OAU.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Africa.]

President Carter then suggested that the discussion turn to African problems and OAU efforts to settle them. President Nimeiry replied that African problems, too, were complex, and Sudan considered them just as important as Middle Eastern ones. He said he would like to comment briefly on four crisis situations: the Horn, South Africa, Chad and the Western Sahara.²

The basic problem in the Horn is backwardness, President Nimeiry declared. This is why the Ethiopian people reacted the way they did. He recalled that shortly after changes came in Ethiopia he had visited President Ford and had urged continuation of American military and economic assistance for Ethiopia.³ He was puzzled about what happened after that, he said, for the United States did not give help and left the Ethiopians no alternative but to accept Soviet help. The Soviets rushed in and things have gone from bad to worse, with the Soviets now moving into the area of political organization. Errors on the part of Somalia also contributed to this situation, he said. Ethnic problems in Ethiopia took most serious form in Eritrea because Eritrea had had a separate colonial existence. For Sudan Eritrea is a very important problem, President Nimeiry said, because it affects Sudan directly, with half a million Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees there. The OAU Summit meeting in Khartoum recognized this problem, he said, and tried to find a way of trying to settle it, with Sierra Leone taking the lead in mediation efforts.⁴

As long as the Soviet Union and Cuba are involved in Ethiopia, President Nimeiry said, he feared the Eritrean problem could not be settled, for he was convinced the Soviets wished to exploit it to consolidate their position in Ethiopia. The Somalis were continuing to support the guerrilla movement in the Ogaden and Sudan fears that this may bring about another outbreak of war. This would also help Soviet and Cuban interests. “What exactly are Soviet and Cuban intentions?” he asked—“I cannot be sure about them but I believe that their objective is still to expand their influence and to bring Marxist ideology to all of Africa. The Soviet Union, using Cuba as an instrument, is very active in Africa and claims to be opposing imperialism or reactionary systems. A central factor is the speed with which the Soviet Union responds to the needs of Africans so that some of the smaller and weaker countries find it very attractive to turn to the Soviet Union for help, knowing that they will get it quickly—the Soviets pour in weaponry. They take advantage of the poverty of people in these countries and their lack of knowledge of the real intention of the Soviets. We have tried to find alternative solutions for some of these countries.”

Returning specifically to Ethiopia, President Nimeiry said Sudan had tried to find a basis for settlement in Eritrea and also a basis for settlement between Ethiopia and Somalia. He was convinced that these efforts would have had some success had it not been for the fact that the Soviet Union moved with such speed to undermine them. President Carter said we had evidence of strain between the Soviets and Mengistu and reports that Mengistu had asked the Cubans to reduce their forces; he added that we knew Mengistu had made overtures to the Egyptians for better relations. “What are the chances for better relations between you and Ethiopia?” President Carter asked.

“We believe we could move very fast in improving our relations with Ethiopia but only on condition that the parties commit themselves to a non-violent means for settling problems,” President Nimeiry replied. “It may be that next month I will have a meeting with Mengistu in Dar es Salaam. I intend to confront him very frankly with some of the problems that we see confronting Ethiopia and to suggest what could be done to bring Ethiopia back to a better position. But I am afraid that Ethiopia under the leadership of Mengistu seems to resort too rapidly to extreme Marxist approaches—this may well indicate that Ethiopia is going to be a second Cuba and merely an instrument of the Soviet Union.” He commented on the recent celebrations of the fourth anniversary of the revolution in Addis Ababa, saying that these had been a demonstration of extremist Marxism and “no country which stands in the way of Marxism in Africa was left uninsulted.” “China, too, was insulted by Mengistu simply because it has a quarrel with the Soviet Union,” President Nimeiry declared.

President Carter, noting that time was pressing, asked President Nimeiry to be sure to discuss Rhodesia, Namibia and other African issues with Deputy Secretary Christopher and other Administration officials and to give them the full benefit of his ideas.⁵ He then asked President Nimeiry for comments on the bilateral relationship. He observed that what President Nimeiry has done to bring peace to the Sudan and to recognize basic human rights is a tribute to his statesmanship and leadership. He noted that the United States is helping Sudan with F–5’s and C–130’s and said he wanted to see the military relationship continue. He asked President Nimeiry to comment on what might be done in the future to strengthen U.S.-Sudanese ties of friendship and mutual support.

President Nimeiry said Sudan needed rapid response to its needs because it is in an area where many challenges must be faced from elements who tend to get responses very rapidly from other sources. Sudan needs military support to confront threats from outside because it is a large country located in a crossroads position and it is affected both by what happens in Africa and in the Middle East. Sudan’s only source of strength, he said, was its internal strength. Changes which have been brought about have made the country stronger, he maintained.

President Carter replied that the United States is eager to continue to increase assistance because we recognize the benefits that come from stability and peace. “You have a leading role to play in Africa and in the Arab World. This is in itself a great protection for your people, as are your relationships with countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kenya. We would like very much, before you leave Washington, to have your frank ideas on how we may be of greater assistance to you. My own inclination is to support you in your needs. Our aid program is limited but we recognize the value of your friendship and your strength,” the President concluded.

President Carter then introduced Congressman Parren Mitchell, Chairman of the Black Caucus, who had joined the meeting somewhat earlier, and stressed the importance of Congress in supporting the Administration’s efforts. The Congressman indicated that he would be going to Sudan in a few weeks for a first visit and President Nimeiry assured him of a warm welcome.⁶ With expressions of appreciation for a good meeting from both Presidents, the talks came to an end. President Carter escorted President Nimeiry and his party to their car.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President, 8–9/78. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.
2. The discussion of the Horn took up all available time and there was no discussion of the other three situations. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. See Document 235 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, for the June 10, 1976, meeting between Ford and Nimeiry.
4. The OAU summit took place in Khartoum July 18–21. The Embassy reported on the Ethiopia/Sudan Mediation Commission, chaired by Sierra Leone, in telegram 3335 from Khartoum, July 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780303–0679)
5. In telegram 243435 to Khartoum, September 25, the Department reported on discussions between Nimeiri and officials from the Department of State. Nimeiri and Deng delivered Sudanese assessments on the subjects of peacekeeping in Africa, Namibia, sanctions on South Africa, Rhodesia, and the economic development of Sudan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780392–0337)
6. In telegram 5773 from Khartoum, November 30, the Embassy reported on the November 29 meetings between Nimeiri and attendees, including Mitchell, at the ninth annual conference sponsored by the African-American Institute, which took place November 27–30 in Khartoum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780496–1029)