345. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Smith) to Director of Central
Intelligence Turner1
Washington, July 11, 1978
SUBJECT
- South Africa Nuclear Issue
While in South Africa for talks on the nuclear issue, I raised with South
African officials our concerns regarding the Kalahari test site and a
highly secure research facility adjacent to the Pelindaba nuclear
research center. A member of my team and I were briefed on those
facilities by South African officials and I had two follow-up
conversations with Chairman Roux
of the Atomic Energy Board.
I enclose the following for your information:
1. The explanation by a General Lemmer (Assistant Chief of Staff (Army)
for Logistics) that the Kalahari site is for classified military
activities of a non-nuclear nature.
2. A description of the nuclear research conducted at the isolated
facility near Pelindaba.
3. Comments by Roux concerning
his unwillingness to permit a member of my team access to the isolated
facility, and Roux’s observation
that he had never been directed by his authorities to develop nuclear
weapons.
The South Africans are acutely sensitive to the appearance in the press
of any information they provide us in confidence [less
than 1 line not declassified]. Thus, I propose that
distribution of the enclosed materials be appropriately limited,
commensurate with the need for the experts to make use of them.
[Page 1051]
Attachment
Memorandum of Conversation2
Ambassador Smith and Locke
met with Major General Lemmer, Chief of Logistics for the South
African Armed Forces, Brigadier Swart, Armed Forces
Counter-Intelligence, and Col. von Bencker, Army Ordnance (Research
and Development), on June 29, 1978.
Smith explained the purpose
of our request for whatever information they could provide on the
Kalahari site: we were in South Africa to seek an accommodation on
nuclear matters that would serve both our countries’ interests;
there was a need, for our part, to be in a position to assure the
Congress of the U.S. that there was
no reason to believe that any accommodation would not be in the
interest of the U.S.; our
intelligence people were concerned about the Kalahari site, whose
features were most explainable in terms of nuclear explosives
testing.
General Lemmer said that he, personally, had arranged purchase of 4
farms north of Uppington in 1973–74 for use as a military training
area for the Uppington batallion. There were also other activities
there in the fields of testing, much of which he was not at liberty
to discuss in any detail. He and Brigadier Swart, in the course of
conversation, referred to the following activities: testing of
military vehicles in desert environment; destruction of obsolete or
redundant ammunition, including tank rounds; rocket, projectile, and
missile flight testing. There has been no nuclear testing at the
site. There could well have been instrumentation at the site, in
connection with other testing, and there were occasions requiring
elevated towers for taking photos.
Locke asked whether they might be in a position to confirm that there
were activities requiring the use of drill holes. Lemmer declined to
do so. Swart alluded to there being a water problem at the site, and
suggested that there were activities requiring a water supply; but,
he concluded, that was all he could say about holes in the ground.
Later in the conversation, Ambassador Smith queried as to the possibility of storage of
spent nuclear fuel; Lemmer and Swart tended to confirm that there is
storage of something at the site, but not of spent fuel. Lemmer
elaborated on the logic that any defense force would normally store
things underground.
[Page 1052]
In further discussion of the nuclear testing thesis, the Colonel
noted that there is a farm house within 4 kilometers of the site,
and 10 farming communities within a ten kilometer range, adducing
this as evidence that the site was not suitable for nuclear
testing.
Lemmer pressed hard to see our photographs (he had been told that
they were from satellites). He wanted to be satisfied: (a) that he
had been providing information about the site that concerned us, and
not some other; and (b) that there was not the chance that the
photos had been fabricated. He argued with some vehemence, further,
that we were asking for a one-way exchange of information and that,
in the context we described of a frank and confidential exchange, we
should be prepared to give them pictures. Ambassador Smith undertook to see whether
provision of a picture could be possible, although he had no
authority to make such an offer at this time.
Lemmer argued that merely being shown pictures would not be adequate
for his purpose, which was to be able to compare our photography
against the actual site. He indicated a possible willingness to
accept a photograph on a short-term loan rather than for permanent
retention; he, moreover, would undertake to have the photograph
annotated with South African explanations of features portrayed
before returning the picture to us.
Attachment
Memorandum of Conversation3
Pelindaba Nuclear Research Center, June 27, 1978,
2:30 p.m.
SUBJECT
-
SAG Explanation of Special
Research Facility at Pelindaba
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. J.W. de Villiers, Vice President of the Atomic Energy
Board
- Allen W. Locke, Deputy Director, Office of Non-Proliferation
Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Locke met with de Villiers pursuant to AEB President Roux’s offer to Ambassador
Smith to engage in
further and more expert exchange on the nature of a heavily secured
research facility at Pelindaba. De Villiers appeared completely open
in his presentation, to the extent of reviewing his personal
position on past and present disputes within
[Page 1053]
the AEB on the nature of the Board’s
reactor development program (which occasioned his resignation for a
period of time in the early 1970s).
De Villiers referred to the site as a “fast neutron facility”. It is
located in isolation for two reasons: the need for a sound
geological footing, and because contemplated activities would
require either concrete shielding or ample vacant surroundings. The
extraordinary security measure of a double fence is the result of
the facility’s being located outside the fenced and patrolled
Pelindaba facility, and further because the facility (located in a
hollow) is out-of-site of the main campus.
The facility is intended to support fact reactor studies—to prove
empirically various computer codes developed at Pelindaba. It
contains a pulse neutron source earlier acquired from the US; this
accelerator is in process of being rebuilt. The idea is to pulse
small assemblies of natural uranium, in order to measure the neutron
flux and the rate of decay of the neutron flux.
De Villiers described his plan to establish a fast critical assembly
at the site, to be patterned after such a facility at Argonne (where
he studied). For this purpose, enriched uranium (on the order of
20%) would be required from the US; in the absence of reason to
believe such material would be forthcoming (referring to the Safari
problem), de Villiers noted that the fast critical assembly was (or
is) under design with only a hope that enriched uranium could be
obtained from the US. The idea is from a similar facility at
Brookhaven.
Now in the facility is a “low mass facility”, with a channel
extending from the site to contain instrumentation lines. At the
site are a theoretical group doing fast reactor theoretical work,
and a group of physicists doing pulse neutron work. There are also a
“design office” and workshops.
De Villiers reviewed past approaches AEB has taken on developing
new-generation reactors. His current preference is to work on a
near-breeder, fueled with thorium and denatured uranium, paralleling
the US Shippingport facility. In response to a question referring to
South Africa’s major uranium holdings seemingly eliminating the need
for recourse to thorium, de Villiers argued that South Africa’s
proven reserves of uranium amount only to about 307,000 tonnes at
the 30 dollar price level, and only another 100,000 tonnes or less
at the 40 dollar level. He opined this would not prove adequate to
sustain a once-through light water fuel cycle indefinitely, and that
since South Africa did not intend to reprocess and recycle light
water fuel, something else was necessary. There was no discussion of
South Africa’s thorium reserves.
In de Villier’s view, South Africa has potential for becoming a
supplier of research reactors—not in Africa, he recognized, but in
other parts of the developing world (Middle East, Latin
America).
[Page 1054]
The discussion ended with de Villier’s expression of hope that
US-South African nuclear cooperation can be restored. South Africa
is increasingly isolated from scientific colleagues in other
countries; nuclear material and other supplies are impossible to
obtain. De Villiers has lost some 20 scientific-level personnel in
the past year, for lack of interesting work to encourage their
staying with the AEB. Of the 1860 personnel at Pelindaba, only
160-odd are scientists.
Attachment
Memorandum for the File4
The day after Smith and Locke
received explanations of the secure site near Pelindaba from
Roux and de Villiers,
Smith asked if Locke
could “look around” this site. Roux said he would look into the matter and about
four hours later said on the telephone that he was sorry Smith had not believed him when he
assured Smith that the secure
site did not involve any nuclear weapons related activities. He
regretted that the requested invitation could not be issued. He said
his people were “busy there with a few new developments” and if they
were to say you can’t see this or that, the Americans would get the
wrong impression. Later, he attributed the lack of an invitation to
“South African pride.”
The night before my departure he asked to speak to me privately at
his house. He opened a long monologue by saying how much he
regretted that I was leaving South Africa with “mixed feelings.” I
said he was an acute observer. He then spoke at length about South
African feelings of ostracism, lack of appreciation for racial
progress made, falsity of East German propaganda, and said there was
no nuclear weapons program in South Africa. He had never had any
direction from his authorities to develop weapons.
I surmised that some in the South African Government wanted a weapons
program. He assented by saying, “They call me their hope.”
He spoke of their experimental work going on at the site south of
Pelindaba which involved sodium and heavy water presumably for
thermal reactor design work. I said that surely he didn’t believe
the United States could learn anything from South African reactor
research and development. He said he would never go to the United
States and
[Page 1055]
ask, “What’s
in that building.” He referred to United States arrogance. It was at
this point that he said that the refusal to invite Locke into the
site was based on “South African pride.”
I speculated as to the possibility of some sort of an exchange to
permit South African visitation of a reactor development site in the
United States in return for our visiting this site.
The next day he called to say that he had a report from de Villiers
of his full explanation to Locke of the work at the site in question
and in light of that completely frank report he just could not
understand my continuing concern about the site. I pointed out the
importance of eliminating any doubts in the minds of Washington
estimators of the South African program.
