Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

107. Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State¹

Panama City, September 24, 1978, 0219Z

6968. For Asst. Sec. Vaky from Ambassador Jorden. Subj: Jorden Mission—Talk With Somoza.

1. This message follows on flash summary filed from Managua.² My two-hour talk with Somoza was notably frank and not without expressions of deepest bitterness on his part. Nevertheless the atmosphere was generally cordial and Somoza several times expressed gratitude for candor that prevailed in our exchange. Naturally he feels deeply wronged by chill he has experienced in relations with his oldest friend and mentor—the U.S. and he occasionally adopts a quote how have I gone wrong—how have I hurt you? unquote attitude. But, as he says, he is a practical politician and he recognizes quote realities unquote even if he disputes the so-called facts and analysis behind them.

2. I laid out our position and proposal pretty much in accord with talking points 1 through 14 plus 19—toning down or underlining as seemed appropriate (getting some guidance from remarkably expressive eyes, hands, and line of mouth).³ He tightened at every mention of Sandinistas. Twice he said quote what Sandinistas are we talking about? The real Sandinistas are dead or dispersed. These are Cuban Sandinistas. Unquote. He made clear they were illegal revolutionaries and that he would not deal with them.

3. First really negative reaction came when I named countries that were willing to cooperate with us in mediation and told him Bill Rogers was our mediator. Somoza said Rogers would not be acceptable to him because of anti-Somoza statements in the past. I described mediator as distinguished lawyer, former assistant secretary, a man who was knowledgeable and fair-minded. Somoza shook his head but made no additional comment.

4. When I had finished fairly extensive presentation—with emphasis on need for compromise and unacceptability of preconditions—Somoza launched extensive rebuttal. He began with stark statement: Quote I have to tell you that at this point I don’t trust the United States unquote. He said there was no doubt that there was opposition to him in Nicaragua. But, he said: Quote in this situation, the main party responsible is the U.S. Government. Unquote. He then proceeded to list series of sins committed by US over past year and a half: the munitions board ruling against selling weapons to Nicaragua in early 1977, the alleged anti-Somoza activities of Mark Sneider in the human rights area, the suspension of FMS, refusal to sign new aid agreements, instructions to vote against Nicaragua. In IDB and World Bank, anti-Nicaragua actions at UN, etc., etc. The long catalog of grievances made it unmistakably clear we are dealing with an embattled and frustrated man, a man who feels persecuted, as President Lucas of Guatemala said quote a wounded bear unquote.

5. Somoza said that if we were viewing alternative leaders we should know that there was no one else who would hold the country together. He stressed the fact that he was President, head of National Guard and leader of Liberal Party. I allowed as how he was an able and varied man and perhaps his only replacement—in the short run—would have to be a junta of three or four. He backed off, stating there would be difficulty finding them. Once again, backed into corner, he lashed out—the U.S. Embassy was 100 percent anti-Somoza; there was opposition among the elite but quote the people unquote were with him; he had 14,000 employees in Somoza enterprises and none of them were unhappy, none of them went on strike, etc., etc.

6. After his long litany of our sins, or imagined sins, Somoza got closer to immediate situation and proposal I had made. At one point, talking about Chamorro, he said he had told the assassinated oppositionist that he was not going to shorten his term quote under pressure unquote. The implication was that he would only do that in his own way and self-chosen circumstances. At another point he said he would hand over his power to another quote if he is elected unquote. And he said that he would have a popular referendum on his rule—if there were constitutional provisions for a referendum, which there isn’t. Greatest indication of regret came when Somoza said quietly: quote don’t imagine that I am happy to have these thousands of dead under my name in history unquote:

7. I had hit hard the matter of having absolutely no preconditions from any of the parties in advance of mediation efforts—and I used the demands for his immediate surrender of power as an example. Somoza said he understood, but he added that we are all quote sensible politicians unquote. He said he had two things in mind: 1) the Sandinistas are an illegal revolutionary band of cutthroats and I cannot sit at the same table with them, and 2) you have got to help me get this country going again. On the latter point, he had previously noted the cutoff of FMS, the refusal to sign new aid agreements, our negative votes in the IBD and World Bank, etc. In effect, he was saying: if I go with you on this one, you have got to turn off the anti-Nicaragua line in the economic field.

8. He then reviewed the list of potential participants in the mediation effort: Colombia would not be friendly because of the territorial dispute between the two (the islands); the Dominicans would remember that he helped the U.S. overthrow the PRD in 1965; the Mexican Foreign Minister quote hates me unquote; the Hondurans are pro-Peru revolutionary and he wasn’t sure he could trust them; Guatemala was ok. It was not clear whether he was saying he would balk at the suggested lineup or whether he was just going on record to make clear none of these folks were really pro-Somoza. I had told him frankly that if he felt that U.S. mediation alone would better meet his requirements, we would certainly respond sympathetically—though it could cause some problems with our friends and neighbors.

9. The bottom line came at the end when Somoza told me he wanted to consult with his Cabinet, the National Guard leadership and his political advisers. And he would get back to me promptly. He understood I was returning to Panama and said he would send me a message through Ambassador Solaun in the next day or two. His final substantive remark was: quote if the resolution in the OAS is passed,⁴ we have no problem unquote. I thanked him and left—noting that his Cabinet and Guardia officers were in the outer lobby waiting to see him.

Dikeos

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 21, Human Rights—Nicaragua IV. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Managua.
2. Reference is to telegram 4603 from Managua, September 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2513)
3. In telegram 240308 to Panama City, September 21, the Department provided Jorden with talking points. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2621)
4. In telegram 243433 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, September 25, the Department reported that that MFM of the OAS had approved by consensus on September 23 a resolution regarding Nicaragua noting, among other points, that “without prejudice to full observance of the principle of nonintervention, the Government of Nicaragua has stated that it is willing in principle to accept the friendly cooperation and conciliatory efforts that several member states of the organization may offer toward establishing the conditions necessary for peaceful settlement of the situation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780392–0326)