203. Editorial Note

The activities of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry in Tehran culminated in the events of March 7–11, 1980. On March 7, at 10:15 a.m., lawyer Hector Villalon notified Henry Precht, Director of the Office of Iranian Affairs, that the hostages would be transferred to the control of the Revolutionary Council on March 8. (Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 34, Iran 3/80) Villalon called Precht again at 1 p.m. that afternoon to relay the following scenario: After the transfer of the hostages that night, the Commission would visit them on Sunday, March 9, at the Embassy compound (where they would remain temporarily). A team of physicians would see them immediately after the transfer, and the Commission would then make an official visit to the Foreign Ministry. “Sometime soon” thereafter the hostages would be moved from the Embassy compound to a government guest house. The Commission would leave Tehran on March 10. (Memorandum for the Record, March 6; ibid.) As noted in Iran Sitrep #245, this scenario did not guarantee the departure of the hostages from Iran. (Telegram 61042 to all diplomatic and consular posts, March 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800117–0370)

The next day, March 8, Ghotbzadeh announced his intent to put this scenario into operation: As a representative of the Revolutionary Council, and acting under the Ayatollah Khomeini’s orders, he would take charge of the hostages and the compound and move the hostages to a secret location for questioning by the Commission members. The students in turn announced that they would turn over the hostages [Page 519] after their physicals, but intended to remain in control of the compound in order to safeguard documents and files to prove Iran’s case against the United States. Later that day the students, calling Ghotbzadeh a “liar,” demanded that someone other than he represent the Revolutionary Council. (Telegram 62650 to all diplomatic and consular posts, March 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800119–1050)

Meanwhile, Christian Bourguet and Villalon informed the Department that the Iranians insisted on establishing the joint U.S.-Iranian Commission, the last step of the agreed-upon scenario (see Document 180) before the complete liberation of the hostages. The Iranians also wanted to establish the principles of the Commission and an outline of its work, expecting it to meet in Switzerland. (Unnumbered telegram, March 9; Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 34, Iran 3/80) That same day, a Dr. Gharahi saw 43 or 44 of the hostages and informed the Department that physically the hostages were fine but that their mental condition was “not good.” (Memorandum from Constable to Vance, Christopher, and Newsom, March 12; Department of State, Official Files of [P] David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lot 82D85, Iran Update Mar 1980) As Sick later recalled, President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr sent a personal message to President Jimmy Carter pledging that the hostages would be transferred to the custody of the government 15 days after the Majles election (March 14). (Sick, All Fall Down, page 318)

The next day, Sunday, March 9, the students announced that the hostages were ready for delivery to a representative of the Revolutionary Council between 1:30 and 8:30 p.m. EST, “provided he brings with him an official order from the Council.” They rejected any visit by Commission members. The Revolutionary Council responded that the Commission “can meet the hostages, unless the students continue to oppose such a meeting, in which case, as they proposed, the hostages should be handed over and the Foreign Ministry should then be responsible for the procedure.” Khomeini announced that he would not make a statement on the situation. (Telegram 63666 to all diplomatic and consular posts, March 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800121–0876)

By March 10, no Commission visit had taken place, none was scheduled, and the hostages had not been transferred. Ghotbzadeh publicly expressed his anger at the students and demanded they “make a final decision” within 24 hours on the transfer of the hostages. (Telegram 63683 to all diplomatic and consular posts, March 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800123–0493) That morning Khomeini met with the Revolutionary Council and the Council of Ministers (without Bani-Sadr) and announced afterwards that the [Page 520] students should make their documents available to the Commission, that “the meeting with the hostages involved in compiling the dossier on the crimes committed by the Shah and the United States can take place for the purpose of their interrogation,” and that if the Commission announced its views in Tehran about the Shah’s crimes and U.S. interference in Iran’s affairs, “then a meeting with the hostages can take place.” Within hours the students withdrew their offer to transfer the hostages. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 31, Iran 3/80) The text of Khomeini’s statement is in FBIS 31, March 10. (Ibid.) See also Sick, All Fall Down, pages 316–317.

Given the turn of events, Carter met on March 10 with senior-level advisers and congressional leadership. As related by historian Richard Cottam to Ghotbzadeh, the administration’s mood was “pessimistic” but determined to pursue negotiations and keep the Commission of Inquiry in being. Ghotbzadeh agreed to keep Iranian statements from complicating efforts to keep the Commission operating. (Memorandum of conversation, March 11; Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 35, Iran, Ghotbzadeh, Cottam) The meeting with congressional leadership is recorded in a handwritten memorandum of conversation, March 10. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 99, Meeting File, 3/10/80 President’s Meeting with Congressional Leadership)

In his memoir, Carter wrote that the “deranged” Khomeini had overridden the government and aborted resolution of the crisis. Carter found Khomeini’s demands to be “obviously unacceptable.” Quoting from the March 10 entry in his personal diary, Carter wrote:

“It [events] shows that the UN commission must return. And it also shows that there is no government in Iran other than the fanatics. . . . We’ll hold off breaking diplomatic relationships. We’ll impose economic sanctions as soon as the commission is clear of Iran. We’ll investigate the possibility of confiscating Iranian assets in addition to just impounding them. We should not attack Bani-Sadr and Ghotbsadeh, because they have indeed been the ones who have tried hardest to get the hostages out.

“. . . Vance called during lunch to say that the UN commission had been asked by Bani-Sadr to stay over until tomorrow night to meet with the Revolutionary Council to receive a proposal for a simultaneous statement on American and Shah abuse and an announcement that the hostages could all be visited by the commission. I told Cy, ‘Absolutely not!’ This was unacceptable to me. There’s no way to trust the Iranian government officials, because they can’t speak with any authority.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, pages 498–499)

The Commission of Inquiry left Iran on March 11, 1980.