Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

208. Telegram 15823 From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, October 15, 1975, 1454Z.

15823. Subject: Callaghan on Belize.

1. Summary. Foreign Secretary Callaghan is determined to cut the Gordian knot and permit Belize to “proceed to independence by measured steps.” He intends to reinforce British troops there but will keep USG informed before taking any action. End summary.

2. In course of wide-ranging discussion with me yesterday (October 14), Foreign Secretary Callaghan expressed his appreciation for helpful USG role in Guatemalan-Belizean dispute. Claiming that he had not focused on problem until several weeks ago, Callaghan asserted his firm belief that HMG really should not hold up Belizean independence because of Guatemalan threats. He had instructed Ivor Richard to work for a UN resolution that the Guatemalans could live with, and to negotiate for “next three months,” if necessary, but Gordian knot, he said, had to be severed and Belize permitted to “proceed to independence by measured steps.”

3. Turning to what he termed saber rattling by the Guatemalans [less than 1 line not declassified] threatening military movements, Callaghan commented that British forces would be in real trouble if Guatemalans invaded and that he would be very culpable if he let it happen. Therefore, Callaghan said, he intended in “low-key way” to reinforce British troops. Noting that reinforcements thus far had been minimal (“a few boats and helicopters”), Callaghan added, “but I don’t want to leave it at that.” Although it was not yet settled HMG policy, Callaghan said, he personally wanted to put in enough additional troops (150 or so, he thought) to hold the Guatemalans until a UN resolution has been passed.

4. Callaghan assured me that HMG would inform USG before making any moves in order to get U.S. reaction. He said he did not want to worry Secretary with this all the time, and would like to keep in touch with me about it.

5. Callaghan said that Venezuelans had offered to make informal contacts with both sides on this issue, and Costa Ricans and Mexicans had also expressed interest in the problem. I inquired whether HMG had considered raising the matter with the OAS and Callaghan thought it was an idea worth pursuing. FCO Assistant Under Secretary Edmonds, who was also present, thought Belizeans would not be attracted by possibility of OAS intercession since they would assume most OAS members would side with Guatemala. I commented that OAS might instead feel challenged to play a constructive role in promoting a peaceful resolution of the dispute.

Richardson

1. Summary: In a conversation on Belize, Foreign Secretary Callaghan explained to Ambassador Richardson that the British Government planned to work with Belize to achieve its independence through measured steps, while staving off a Guatemalan invasion through low-key reinforcement of British forces.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750357–0730. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to the USUN, Guatemala City, and Belize City. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. In a memorandum to Kissinger, October 10, marked “OBE,” Rogers observed that with regards to Belize, “The British just want out.” (Ibid., P810028–0068) In telegram 1722 from Nassau, October 14, the consulate reported “that six or seven UK RAF Hercules aircraft staged through Nassau International Airport on 12 October 1975 loaded with troops and equipment destined to reenforce the British garrison in British Honduras (Belize).” (Ibid., D750356–0486)