205. Telegram 5215 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State1
5215. Subject: Belize Dispute: Recommendations for Approach to British. Refs: (A) Belize 595 (B) State 222582 (C) London 14513 (D) USUN 4344 (E) Guatemala 5152 (F) Belize 613 (G) Belize 614.
Summary: Embassy believes threat of Guatemalan military action against Belize is unlikely to be removed unless GOG sees some prospect of eventual progress in Guatemala-UK negotiations. Threat in fact will increase to virtual certainty of military conflict if UNGA resolution calls for independence or self-determination without conditioning them on prior negotiated settlement of dispute with Guatemala. Both progress in negotiations, over long run, and successful handling of UNGA resolution, in short run, depend primarily on UK, not on U.S. Embassy recommends these points be made to HMG at high level.
1. Embassy’s reporting both overt and covert, makes clear that GOG has virtually decided invade Belize if UNGA adopts “extreme” resolution “humiliating” Guatemala. Reftels report that both UK and Belize authorities say they wish to avoid extreme, immoderate resolution but authorities do not always make clear what they mean by extreme or whether what they mean is same as what Guatemala means. We were pleased to see Minister Ennal’s remarks (ref B) that UK aware Guatemala may be tempted take drastic action and that it will urge inclusion in any UNGA resolution of a call for a negotiated settlement with [Page 574] Guatemala prior to independence. This is precisely Guatemala’s position, and if UK is successful we see no reason why Guatemala could not accept such a Belize resolution. President Laugerud told Ambassador September 19 (ref E) that he could accept resolution which called for independence of Belize provided it also called for prior resolution of dispute with Guatemala through continuation of negotiations. Omission of recognition of need for peaceful negotiated solution to Guatemala’s claims should be regarded as humiliating and, President said, would force Guatemala into military adventure Guatemala does not want and can ill afford.
2. Late reporting from Belize, on other hand, finds Premier Price’s view (ref G) limited to belief that “a strong resolution would be better than a weak one” and illusion that chances of obtaining “effective defense guarantee from neighboring countries should be enhanced” by UN endorsement of independence. Governor Posnett (ref F) says he has “drummed into Price the view that utility of resolution would depend on extent to which it established principle of self-determination as basis on which dispute should be settled.” If self-determination alone is established as basis, Guatemala would regard its cause as hopeless and would see no point to negotiations. For this reason GOG will fight reference to it in resolution and would regard any resolution based on it as forcing it to abandon hopes of peaceful solution.
3. GOG acceptance, at least tacitly, of independence but resistance to self-determination may be difficult for non-Guatemalans to understand. Difference, in Guatemalan minds, is that they have come to accept inevitability of an independent Belize—perhaps with different borders, or tied to Guatemala in various ways, but still an independent state. If independence is conditioned on successful conclusion of Guatemala-UK negotiations, then it will come as result of an agreement with Guatemala, not as result of unilateral UK or Belize decision. “Guatemalan territory” will not rpt not have been disposed of without Guatemalan consent. Self-determination, however, means that whenever people of Belize—in each and every nook and cranny of present Belize territory decide they wish to be independent, or decide they do not wish to be part of Guatemala, their wishes are governing and determining; neither GOG nor UK will have any control over the matter. As GOG officials have put it to us, if UNGA recognizes applicability of self-determination to Belize dispute, there is nothing left for the negotiators to negotiate about. We believe GOG might accept some substitute phrase such as “taking into account aspirations of Belizean people,” but not red flag of “self-determination.”
4. UK officials in London, Washington and New York are undoubtedly well-briefed on Guatemalan sensitivities, but they might be asked to make these points to Belize authorities, and USUN might do [Page 575] likewise when it sees Shoman. Hopefully Belize Government will recognize that it is not simply question of showing Guatemala that Belize has world support for independence; it does, including U.S. support. But world, again including U.S., should also support moderates in Guatemalan camp who have so far been able to insist on pursuing negotiated settlement rather than resort to force.
5. Over long term, even if present crisis over UNGA resolution is finessed, possibility of Guatemalan resort to force will recur whenever talks appear stalemated. President Laugerud said, and we believe he is sincere, that he is in no hurry to push talks to early conclusion as long as there is some appearance or hope of progress. We agree with Laugerud that there is little such appearance at present, on basis of what both Guatemalans and UK have told us about negotiations.
6. We believe time has come for us to become more actively involved in the dispute—behind the scenes and not as formal mediator. Pressure should be applied to all three parties—to the Guatemalans, as we have already begun to do, to show restraint; to the British, to give new life to the negotiations and to avoid confrontation in the UN; and to the Belizeans, to permit the British to compromise. We do not rpt not believe British have made maximum effort to be forthcoming in negotiations. This was a quite understandable tactic as long as stalling worked. It is no longer working. We hope that Ambassador’s September 19 démarche has given GOG food for thought, but we are not sanguine that even our active opposition will deter invasion if Guatemalans feel they have no options. Formal U.S. mediation of dispute, which GOG has requested, we believe would serve no present purpose, other than to win enmity of both sides, unless British were able to develop some face-saving concessions that could be offered Guatemala. We conclude that in any event, with or without greater U.S. involvement, only prospect for avoiding conflict lies in greater British effort toward compromise.
7. We recognize extreme difficulty of offering any territorial concession to Guatemala, in light of Premier Price’s understandable refusal to cede any part of country he hopes to lead to independence, especially given the flimsy nature of Guatemalan claim. But we understand Guatemalans have mentioned a number of nonterritorial agreements that might be reached, and that British response has been only that they would be studied. Specifically, Guatemalans appear to attach great significance to Bay of Amatique and to possibility that Belize could claim most of Bay either as territorial waters or as zone where economic exploitation is reserved to Belize. Could possibility be explored of agreement on sea border, at least as first step toward agreement on land border, or even of joint exploitation of certain areas beyond 12 miles? Guatemalans are also concerned about prospect that yielding all claim [Page 576] to Belize would surrender possibly valuable oil reserves. Could an agreement on joint benefit from any oil exploration in certain land and sea areas be offered?
8. Guatemalan FonOff (Sanchez) told us September 22 that solution to dispute need not be territorial, and that most important consideration for Guatemala is security. While he may not have full authority to speak for GOG on first point, we believe he is right on the second. What GOG really fears is Cuban influence, either by infiltration of Cuban guerrillas through undefended and indifferent Belize or directly through large Cuban Embassy in a Belize with a weak, unstable and Marxist-oriented government. Sanchez noted that GOG had years ago proposed that neither Belize nor Guatemala enter into military agreements without consent of other. Could another look be taken at kind of formal assurances or arrangements that Belize might offer Guatemala in this regard?
9. British reaction to these suggestions may be, as with proposal to refer entire matter to ICJ (ref C), that Price is opposed. In that event, we believe HMG should be bluntly told that if UK is unprepared to explore any proposal to which Price is opposed, and if Price remains opposed to all agreements of any significance with Guatemala, then we do not see how Guatemala can be discouraged or deterred over long run from resort to military action to force some kind of face-saving concession.
10. In short run, however, there are some steps British could usefully take to improve Belize’s defenses. We recommend they consider scheduling frequent visits by British frigate to Punta Gorda, to demonstrate that British naval forces are nearby and can be brought there on short notice, preferably 24-hour notice. In our view most probable Guatemalan plan is for combined land and sea invasion of area south of Monkey River, which has been their maximum claim in current negotiations. They have specifically mentioned their need for another port on the Caribbean, and Punta Gorda is nearest thing to a port in that area. Also, if invasion is to have any claim to success, some population center must be seized, and Punta Gorda is largest town in area. GOG is strongly intimidated by British Navy and even one frigate, frequently in Punta Gorda, could give them pause. We recommend against any increase in number of British troops in Belize as is reportedly under consideration (ref A). GOG would regard this as violation of understanding with UK on size of British garrison and clear signal that UK has decided against negotiated settlement.
-
Summary: The Embassy reported that the Guatemalan Government had virtually decided to invade Belize should the United Nations General Assembly adopt a resolution in favor of Belizean independence without providing for a continuation of negotiations over Guatemala’s territorial claims, and recommended greater U.S. involvement in the dispute behind the scenes.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750330–0178. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Belize City, London, and USUN. Telegram 595 from Belize City is dated September 12. (Ibid., D750318–0813) Telegram 222582 to Guatemala City is dated September 18. (Ibid., D750324–0876) Telegram 14513 from London is dated September 19. (Ibid., D750325–0790) Telegram 4344 from USUN is dated September 18. (Ibid., D750324–0072) Telegram 5152 from Guatemala City is published as Document 204. Telegrams 613 and 614 from Belize City are both dated September 20. (Ibid., D750327–0409 and D750327–0411) In telegram 5203 from Guatemala City, September 23, the Embassy reported that Defense Minister Lucas García had cancelled the C–47 transaction. (Ibid., D750330–0552) In a briefing memorandum to Rogers through Ryan, October 3, Lazar verified the cancellation and noted that “President Laugerud reportedly stopped the sale of a civilian airport radar from a U.S. firm because he does not want to get involved in another USG-controlled export.” Lazar also noted a “bizarre conversation” among Meloy, Lucas García, and Acting Foreign Minister Obiols, in which the Guatemalan officials had invoked “emotionalism, repeated appeals for U.S. mediation and support and statements of ‘dying with honor on the battlefield.’” (Ibid., ARA/CEN Files, Lot 78D110, Guatemala 1975 Oct., Territory, Boundaries)
↩