Iran 1970


44. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Flanigan reported to Kissinger on possible means of meeting Iran’s oil revenue requirements.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II, 6/1/70–12/70. Secret.


45. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Acting Secretary of State (Richardson)

Sisco sent Richardson the draft of a letter for Acting Secretary of Defense David Packard requesting an early decision on the continuation of the USAF technical assistance team for Iran.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–9 US-IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Miclos; and cleared by Rockwell and Matheron. Tab B was attached but is not published. In a handwritten note on the memo, Sisco added, “The problems at the ISA level in Pentagon are fantastic. We have to do something about it!” Richardson replied, “Please inform UAJ [U. Alexis Johnson] in case he wants to take up with Packard.”


46. Telegram 602 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Ambassador MacArthur relayed the Shah’s urgent demand for a response to the matters he had raised with President Nixon in October, particularly oil.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Secret; Exdis. On February 19, in Telegram 25377, Sisco responded sympathetically to MacArthur’s plea for the government to be forthcoming towards the Shah’s requests, but added that the Shah’s appetite was difficult to satiate. (Ibid., POL IRAN-US)


47. Memorandum of Conversation

Since Congress was delaying Foreign Military Sales (FMS) legislation, Iranian Plan Organization Managing Director Mehdi Samii asked Assistant Secretary Sisco to estimate the Iranian Government’s prospects for U.S. foreign military sales credit in FY 1970.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by McClelland. The conversation took place at the Department of State.


48. Letter From President Nixon to the Shah of Iran

Nixon replied favorably to the Shah’s request for more Air Force technicians, but said he could not yet commit himself to more pilot training or the Shah’s oil proposal.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Iran. No classification marking. In his December 17 letter, the Shah had queried Nixon on the above items, pledging cooperation with Saudi Arabia in Gulf defense but warning that Iraq was becoming “an armed camp.” (Ibid.)


49. Telegram 668 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Ambassador MacArthur informed the Department that after three days of student demonstrations, the Iranian Government had cancelled the recent hike in bus fares.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, CINCSTRIKE, London, and Rawalpindi.


50. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Flanigan informed Nixon of the National Iranian Oil Company’s (NIOC) interest in selling oil to Norwegian agents for shipment to Cuba on behalf of the USSR, since the oil consortium would be unable to increase Iranian oil liftings.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. 1, 1/20/69–5/31/70. Confidential. Sent for action. The President initialed his approval of the memorandum, and, with reference to the oil consortium, wrote: “Flanigan—Tell them unless they help us on this I shall reverse the oil import decision. This is an order. No appeal.”


51. Memorandum from the Country Director for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen and Aden (Brewer) to the Country Director for Iran (Miklos)

Brewer strongly dissented from the rationale with which Embassy Tehran had justified military credit sales to Iran.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File, 76D470, Box 9, Chronological Correspondence from Ambassador, 1970. Secret. Tehran’s A–69 is not published.


52. Letter from the Shah of Iran to President Nixon

The Shah complained that his oil-for-arms plan had made no progress, and that the terms for procuring American military equipment were too severe.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Iran. In a March 4 memorandum, Kissinger suggested to Flanigan that it would do no harm to remind the consortium, as ALAM recommended, of the U.S. Government’s “persistent interest” in the oil negotiations. (Ibid., Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. 1, 1/20/69–5/31/70.)


53. Telegram 928 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Ambassador MacArthur conveyed the Shah’s belief that the Iraqi Government’s concession of an autonomous province to its Kurds bore out his fears of Soviet influence on Baghdad.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. 1, 1/20/69–5/31/70. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated for information to Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait City, and London. In Telegram 291 from Dhahran, March 14, Consul Lee F. Dinsmore observed that “it was Iran which encouraged [Kurdish leader] Mulla Mustafa [Barzani] to sustain military pressure on Baghdad Government, by means of arms, training, food, and a porous border. Israel supported Iran in this effort… If Soviet Union is happy over direction Kurdish situation taking in Iraq, it may have our friends to thank. It is doubtful Kurds could have held out over last 10 years had they not had Iran’s help.” (Ibid.)


54. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels)

Flanigan sketched out his recommended solution for meeting Tehran’s oil requirements.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 6 IRAN. Secret. The memorandum is a copy that is not initialed.


55. Telegram 1019 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Ambassador MacArthur summarized his recent audience with the Shah in which the latter reiterated his arguments for more U.S. credit to purchase military equipment.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis.


56. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Eliot informed Kissinger that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia had agreed to supply Iran with $100 million in FMS credit for FY 70.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Secret. Drafted by McClelland; cleared by Sisco; Davies, Miklos, William D. Brewer (NEA/ARP), Stanley D. Schiff (NEA/RA), Christian Chapman (PM), OASD/ISA, Treasury. Attached but not published were the minutes of the NSCIG/NEA meeting of March 17.


57. Telegram 1247 From the Ambassador in Iran to the Assistant of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)

To avoid a crisis with the Shah over U.S. difficulty in meeting his needs, Ambassador MacArthur proposed that the United States stretch out the current military credit agreement with Iran.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN. Secret; Nodis.


58. Telegram 1312 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Ambassador MacArthur reported that Iran had contracted to purchase some Soviet military equipment at very low interest rates, and again urged extension of the 1968 military agreement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Secret; Exdis. Kissinger’s May 13 summary for the President of the Shah’s conversation with General Earle Wheeler is Document 67.


59. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Kissinger advised Nixon on how to respond to the Shah’s recent letter inquiring about the status of his oil and military credit sales requests.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Iran. Secret. Tabs A and B were attached but are not published. Nixon signed the letter, which was sent on April 16. (Ibid.)


60. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)

Packard presented Richardson with the Defense Department’s case against extending the 1968 credit agreement with Iran.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–76–067, Iran 1970, Iran 400.737. Secret. Underneath his signature, Packard added, “Read this subject to our telephone conversation of April 14.” In an April 15 memorandum to Kissinger, Saunders noted that Packard would reluctantly concur with the plan if the Review Group had no time to meet before Richardson’s trip to Tehran. Saunders added, “It is difficult to conceive that we will reduce our present military relationship with Iran and that we will build our posture in the Persian Gulf around it.” Saunders did not believe “the decision we are asking the President to make now will foreclose any realistic option.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. I, 1/20/69–5/31/70.)


61. Memorandum of Conversation

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Wheeler and Under Secretary Richardson discussed Iranian capability to absorb the military equipment which the Shah insisted on acquiring.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Miklos and approved in U by John D. Stempel. The conversation took place in the Department of State.


62. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

After weighing the pros and cons, Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve the Ambassador’s military stretch-out proposal.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. I, 1/20/69–5/31/70. Secret; Nodis. According to a note on an April 14 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, the President approved the plan on April 17, and Richardson notified the Shah on April 20. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US-IRAN.)


63. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Saunders sent Kissinger a memorandum from DCI Helms on intelligence facilities in Iran, which both Saunders and Helms felt justified an increase in credit assistance to Tehran even at the expense of other programs.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. I, 1/20/69–5/31/70. Top Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger wrote on the memo, “Hal—where do we stand on mil credit? HK.”


64. Telegram 1626 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

The Shah presented to Under Secretary Richardson his list of concerns regarding Iran’s military equipment program.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 U. Secret; Exdis. In Telegram 1736, April 25, the Ambassador reported that the Shah appeared more relaxed following his meeting with Richardson, and that if financing could be arranged for Iran’s military equipment program, the Shah might abandon his oil quota idea. (Ibid.)


65. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan)

Saunders informed Flanigan of the outcome of the annual Iranian-consortium negotiations, crediting Flanigan with the consortium’s greater flexibility.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II, 6/1/70–12/70. Secret; Exdis. Kissinger wrote on a copy of a May 8 memorandum from Flanigan to the President informing him of the agreement, “Since when does Saunders write memos to Flanigan?” The “French company” was CFP, the French member of the consortium, which had agreed to supply oil to Iran at a “quarter way” price, i.e., between cost and posted price, for Tehran to sell on its own. In another memorandum of May 8, Samuels observed to Flanigan that “this arrangement is extremely sensitive to the oil companies and could be explosive if it became known in the other oil producing countries.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 6 IRAN)


66. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird

Nutter provided Laird a detailed analysis of the Iranian FMS credit program and its probable cost to the U.S. Government.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–76–067, Box 73, Iran 1970, Iran 400.137. Secret. A note on the memorandum indicated that Laird saw it.


67. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Kissinger furnished a summary of General Earle Wheeler’s conversation with the Shah during the April CENTO meeting, adding that the Shah seemed to be testing the limits of Washington’s capacity to help him.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. I, 1/1/69–5/31/70. Secret; Nodis. A stamp on the memorandum indicated that the President saw it on May 19. The attached memorandum from Wheeler to Nixon is not published.


68. Telegram 2225 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Ambassador MacArthur advised against the British plan for arbitrating the territorial dispute between Iran and the sheikdoms of Sharja and Umm-al-Qaiwain, since Tehran would consider it a test of the US-Iranian relationship.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33 Persian Gulf. Confidential; Priority. Repeated Priority to Beirut, and to Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait City, London, and Rome. In Telegram 2059 from Jidda, May 26, Hermann F. Eilts observed that the Arab and Iranian sides both had to be considered in the dispute, which involved the sovereignty claims of the sheikdoms of Sharja and Ras Al-Khaimah to the islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. Noting that Abu Musa was inhabited by Arabs, he added that “with deep respect, however, I find it just a bit difficult to accept suggestion that Iran’s vital security and ‘even survival’ may depend on possessing these islands. While appreciating Iran’s potential for stabilizing Gulf, we and Iran should also bear in mind that this is best achieved through sincere cooperation with Arab littoral states.” (Ibid.)


69. Telegram 2333 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Ambassador MacArthur warned Under Secretary Richardson and Assistant Secretary Sisco that the Shah was alarmed at growing Soviet pressure upon Iran and suspicious that the United Kingdom was plotting with Iraq against Iranian interests.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL IRAN-USSR. Secret; Priority; Exdis; Noforn.


70. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Saunders and Kennedy furnished Kissinger with a briefing on the subjects which would be covered at the Review Group’s upcoming Persian Gulf meeting.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-files), Box H–046, Senior Review Group Meetings, Persian Gulf, 6/5/70. Secret. National Security Decision Memorandum 92, which emerged from the June 5 meeting, is Document 97. The minutes of the meeting are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV: Arabian Peninsula; Middle East Region, 1969–1972; Jordan, 1970. The attachment entitled “Programs” is not published.


71. Telegram 87985 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran

The Department endorsed the Ambassador MacArthur’s reassurances regarding British intentions, and considered Soviet moves as anti-U.S. rather than anti-Iranian.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL IRAN-USSR. Secret; Exdis; Noforn. Drafted by Miklos; cleared by Emory C. Swank (EUR), Irving Cheslaw (EUR/BMI), Davies; Richard W. Murphy (NEA/ARP), Bryan H. Baas (NEA/ARN), and Brown (S/S); and approved by Sisco. In Telegram 2506 from Tehran, June 13, MacArthur advised that the British be urged to reach an agreement with Iran over the Gulf islands, so as to prevent an Arab-Iranian rupture. MacArthur recommended that the British put forward a reasonable arrangement that, while not impairing the Sheikhs’ legal claims to the islands, would meet Iran’s basic security requirements. If the British did so, MacArthur suggested that the United States use its influence informally to persuade Iran to blur the issue of sovereignty. (Ibid., POL 33 Persian Gulf) In Telegram 93548 to Tehran, June 15, Sisco agreed. (Ibid.)


72. Airgram 182 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Ambassador MacArthur notified the Department that the Iranian Government, still determined to produce opium, had doubled the acreage allotted to poppy cultivation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5 IRAN. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Ankara, Kabul, and Paris. Drafted by John H. Rouse, Jr, Political Officer, Executive Section; cleared by Donald R. Touissaint, Political Officer, Political Section; and approved by Thacher, DCM. Enclosures 1 and 2 are not published. In Airgram 296, October 12, the Embassy reported that in September the government had banned private poppy cultivation, which it interpreted as showing Tehran’s determination to control these crops. (Ibid.)


73. Letter From the Shah of Iran to President Nixon

The Shah renewed his warning to Nixon about threats to Gulf security before asking again for an importation quota which would permit him to purchase military hardware.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL IRAN-US. No classification marking.