136. Intelligence Note1
JAPAN AND CHINA NORMALIZE RELATIONS
The Japan-PRC joint communiqué issued in Peking on September 29 at the conclusion of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka’s discussions with PRC leaders closely follows a mid-August version leaked in the Mainichi newspaper and contains no real surprises. The communiqué agrees to the ending of the abnormal situation existing between the two countries since the conclusion of World War II, calls for the establishment of diplomatic relations effective September 29 with the exchange of ambassadors at the earliest possible moment, waives Chinese war reparations claims, mutually disclaims hegemonistic aims, and promises efforts to work out specific agreements on trade, aviation, transport, and fisheries matters. The two countries also agreed to begin negotiations to include a treaty of peace and friendship.
No Chinese Surprises. The Chinese dealt easily with Tanaka in the communiqué, as they gave every intention of doing, and two of China’s so-called “three principles” were, as expected, fudged. In the communiqué Japan expresses clear agreement with the first principle (the PRC is the sole legitimate government of China). With regard to the second (Taiwan is a part of the PRC), Japan “understands and respects” the Chinese position and “maintains the position based upon Article 8” of the Potsdam Declaration. The latter reference, which had not been foreseen in pre-trip speculation and hence may reflect a concession made by Tanaka during the week’s bargaining, amounts to an indirect Japanese renunciation of any residual claim to Taiwan. Article 8 cites the Allied position that Japan’s sovereignty after the surrender will be limited to the four main Japanese islands and such minor islands as the Allies determine, and also affirms the validity of the Cairo Declaration, which provided for the return of Taiwan to the “Republic of China.”
As for the third PRC “principle” (abrogation of the 1952 Japan/ROC peace treaty), the statement makes no commentary beyond an observation that Japan “fully understands the three principles.” However, in presumed compensation for this calculated vagueness, Foreign [Page 506] Minister Ohira in a post-statement press conference in Peking took pains to point out that Japan considers that the peace treaty with the ROC has “lost the significance of its existence.” In this connection, a September 30 People’s Daily editorial proclaiming normalized PRC-Japanese relations was content to record the observation that one of its three principles for normalization had been that the 1952 treaty “should be abrogated” and that the Tanaka cabinet had taken “many concrete steps” to improve relations.
Chinese Hospitality. The 80-odd Japanese reporters who were in Peking, as well as the host of other reporters, gave heavy play to the cordial reception, culminating with thousands of people beating drums and cymbals as Tanaka left Peking and arrived in Shanghai. Pictures of Chairman Mao’s one-hour benediction of Tanaka were shown on TV and were made much of by the Japanese media. The long-desired agreement plus the impact of TV clips and news photos of Mao and Tanaka shaking hands and chatting will endow Tanaka with additional charisma in the minds of the Japanese public, and give him and the LDP a political boost in the next Diet election.
Unsurprisingly, the joint statement made no reference to Japan’s security ties with the US, and this issue was not discussed by Foreign Minister Ohira in his follow-up press conference. However, Chinese officials told visiting Japanese privately that the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty is not an obstacle to improved Japan-PRC relations because the “Taiwan clause” of the treaty has been “rendered meaningless” as a result of the Shanghai communiqué and the improvement in US–PRC relations.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–JAPAN. Confidential. Director Paul Popple and Analysts Dalton Killion and Richard Williams of the East Asia and Pacific section of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research produced this Intelligence Note, which was sent as a Quick Reaction Comment. A heading near the top of the first page reads: “Quick Reaction Comment on a new development in international affairs, subject to modification in the light of further information. More complete analysis may be undertaken in subsequent INR reporting.”↩