Document 271

Washington, October 20, 1971.

The Senior Review Group at its meeting on October 18, 1971,2 agreed that:

—The $310 million FY 1972 economic and military assistance and $20 million PL–480 in the President’s budget request is essential to achieving U.S. objectives in Cambodia, and that a Cambodian force of 220,000 with training completed by January 1973 will be the basis for planning for FY 1972.
—The TCN logistic improvement program of approximately 52 personnel is approved. It will be implemented after informal consultations with the Congress to take place following completion of Congressional mark-up of the FY 1972 foreign assistance Authorization Bill.
—The program to increase the training rate for Cambodians in Vietnam and to provide training facilities and trained instructors in Cambodia will be accelerated to the maximum extent possible.
—The MEDT may be increased by up to 12 positions in Cambodia to support the logistics and training programs.

The Senior Review Group also agreed that:

—DOD, in coordination with the Department of State, will prepare by October 27, 1971 an analysis of three alternative MAP programs for FY 1972 with funding of $200 million, $225 million and $250 million indicating the differences in program composition and in effective FANK capability at the end of FY 1972.3 Implications of the alternatives for FANK capabilities and for MAP funding in FY 1973 will be specified. Alternatives for the speed of tactical air build-up should be clearly identified.
—AID in coordination with the Departments of State and Defense will prepare:

(a)

By October 27, 1971, an analysis of the effects of diverting from the $110 million AID programming base varying amounts from $30 million, and $60 million to MAP to complement the alternative FY 1972 MAP program assumptions of the DOD paper.

(b)

By November 1, 1971, an analysis of the Cambodian economic situation, the stabilization program, and steps which need to be taken to strengthen the Cambodian economy. The effects of various postulated force levels, and various degrees of control over the contingencies and economically important LOCs, on the economic situation should be described.
—The VSSG Working Group will coordinate the development of a systematic information system to assess the degree of control of the countryside, and communist intentions and potential in the countryside.

All of the foregoing papers should be submitted by the dates indicated for consideration by the Senior Review Group.

Henry A. Kissinger 4

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–63, SRG Meetings, Cambodian MAP, 10/18/71. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, and the Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget.↩
The minutes of the SRG meeting are ibid., Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971.↩
Laird responded in an October 29 memorandum to Kissinger with an assessment for each funding level. The analysis concluded that $225 million would have no impact in 1972, but would delay FANK expansion by a year; in FY 73, a 220,000-man force would cost $240 million and a 256,000-man force would cost $280 million. The $200 million level would require a 35,000-man force reduction, elimination of all lead time procurement, and cancellation of logistics improvements, but the FANK would still be able to hold main population centers and water and land lines of communication. In FY 73, a 220,000-man force would cost $250 million and a 256,000-man force would cost $300 million. The best option for FYs 72 and 73 was $250 million, which was Laird’s recommended level. (Ibid., Box 513, Country Files, Far East, Cambodia, Vol. XIV)↩
Haig signed for Kissinger above Kissinger’s typed signature.↩

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972