179. Minutes of a Meeting of the Senior Review Group1

SUBJECT

  • Vietnam

PARTICIPATION

  • Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
  • State
    • Under Secretary John N. Irwin
    • Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson
    • Ambassador William Sullivan
    • Mr. Arthur Hartman
    • Mr. Ron Spiers
  • Defense
    • Mr. Dennis Doolin
    • Major Gen. Fred Karhos
  • CIA
    • Mr. Richard Helms
    • Mr. George Carver
    • Mr. Paul Walsh
  • JCS
    • Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
    • Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt
  • OMB
    • Mr. James Schlesinger
  • NSC Staff
    • Mr. K. Wayne Smith
    • Col. Richard T. Kennedy*
    • Mr. John H. Holdridge
    • Mr. W. R. Smyser
    • Mr. Robert L. Sansom*
    • Mr. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Senior Review Group discussed the results of the studies prepared to assess enemy military capabilities in 1971 and 1972 and considered the requirements for further studies to provide a comprehensive analysis of the situation which the U.S. will face in Vietnam in 1971 and 1972. It was agreed that the following studies would be prepared, with drafting responsibilities and deadlines to be coordinated subsequently with the agencies concerned:2

1.
Analysis of enemy strategy alternatives in terms of logistics and manpower requirements, and the control situation and main force balance in each MR. (CIA for logistics and manpower analysis; Defense for MR control and main force analysis—April 26)
2.
Projected friendly main force surpluses or deficits by MR and countrywide against alternative enemy strategies. (Defense—April 26)
3.
Improvement of the RVNAF. (Defense—May 3)
4.
Role of the TCCs, especially continued utilization of Korean forces. (Vietnam Ad Hoc Group—April 26)
5.
Residual U.S. forces, including advisory personnel, in Vietnam. (Defense—May 14)
6.
Air interdiction options. (Defense—May 14)
7.
Economic development prospects for South Vietnam. (Vietnam Special Studies Working Group and AID—to be submitted as soon as work already underway is completed)
8.
Effectiveness of police and anti-VCI program in Vietnam. (Vietnam Ad Hoc Group—May 14)
9.
Political situation in South Vietnam. (Vietnam Ad Hoc Group—May 3)
10.
Prospects for regional cooperation among non-communist Southeast Asian nations. (Vietnam Ad Hoc Group—May 3)
11.
North Vietnam’s potential to continue the war. (CIA—May 14)
12.
Projected military situation in Cambodia. (Defense—May 14)

Dr. Kissinger: First, why don’t we have a ten minute summary of the paper that CIA has distributed?3

Mr. Walsh: We have prepared some tables, the meaning of which will become a little clearer as I proceed.

(Mr. Walsh distributed the tables. A copy is attached to these minutes.)4

I would briefly like to give the gist of the study which we submitted on April 2. This was a joint DIA/CIA effort. The purpose was to assess the logistical and manpower considerations that might affect Hanoi’s options over the next few months. We considered both the quantifiable and non-quantifiable factors. We analyzed the logistical and manpower resources that the enemy would have to commit in South Vietnam and Cambodia in order to carry out five different strategies. The strategy with the lowest requirements would be one of protracted warfare. The highest requirements would be for a sustained offensive throughout South Vietnam and Cambodia. We considered three [Page 541] intermediate strategies: an offensive campaign confined to MR 1, to Cambodia, or to both MR 1 and Cambodia.

Let me explain how we considered the logistical problem. There were three steps in our methodology. The first was to calculate the volume of supplies that would have to be consumed or stockpiled over a period of one year for each of the postulated strategies. The second step was to translate these calculations into input requirements, that is, the amount of supplies that would have to be brought overland from North Vietnam to Laos. Thirdly, having determined input requirements, we then compared them with the performance of the system during the current dry season. All of this is set forth in Table 1.

Admiral Moorer: Did you assume that stockpiles would be raised up to the same level as when the enemy started [this year’s operations]?

Mr. Walsh: The concept was that the enemy would build up his stockpiles. We estimated they would aim for about 1-1/2 times the amount of planned consumption. Such a calculation would be compatible with what we know about the enemy logistical doctrine and would be consistent with what they have previously had in their stockpiles.

Mr. Sullivan: Could you please explain these tables a little more?

Mr. Walsh: The first line shows the enemy supply requirements to carry out protracted warfare in 1970 for South Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia. This is in terms of how many tons of supplies would have to get through [to these areas]. Our estimate is that this would amount to 278 tons per day. This is all the North Vietnamese could move if a dry season of eight months duration is assumed.

Next we have the estimated enemy [logistical] performance. We give high and low estimates, which range from 295 to 370 tons per day. The name of the game is to compare these figures [requirements vs. performance] in order to see if the system can carry the burden.

Mr. Schlesinger: If the performance is on the high side of the range, they can do everything.

Mr. Walsh: Yes, although we would fudge a bit on the likelihood of their carrying out the high strategy. Although the figures indicate that they could undertake such a strategy, we estimate that they won’t try it.

For manpower, we have used the 1968 offensive as a base and then figured what would be required to build up to that level in South Vietnam and Cambodia. We have then adjusted the figures to take into account likely casualties and have come up with a net figure on the amount of infiltration that would be required.

The results of our logistical analysis shows that for the low option, an input of 278 tons per day would be required. For the maximum option, the requirement would be 332–364 tons per day, and for the intermediate options, 293–347 tons per day.

[Page 542]

Admiral Moorer: What percentage of this input gets to the consumer?

Dr. Kissinger: This analysis makes allowance for what gets lost along the way.

Mr. Walsh: Assuming present levels of air interdiction.

Dr. Kissinger: Your analysis also assumes that there will be no new Lam Son.

Mr. Walsh: That’s right.

(Col. Kennedy joined the meeting at this point.)

If we take the midpoint estimate of enemy logistical capability, all of the options except Option 1 [countrywide offensive] should be feasible in the 1971–72 dry season. If one estimates enemy logistical capabilities toward the low end of the range, Strategy 1 would not be possible at all, and strategies 2–4 would not be feasible until late in the dry season, with exception of a MR 1 offensive, which could be undertaken earlier because of the proximity of the region to North Vietnam. If one gives an estimate close to the high end of the range, all of the strategy options would be possible for the enemy. However, he would probably want to make sure all of the required supplies were in place and would therefore wait until the following dry season to launch such an attack.

Dr. Kissinger: At what point could any of these offensives be started? Would it be possible on the first day of the dry season?

Mr. Walsh: You can’t slice the estimates that thin. They could probably undertake an offensive in MR 1 rather early in the dry season. The other strategies might not be possible until well into the dry season.

As for manpower, our estimates indicate that 20,000 troops would be required for an offensive in MR 1, 40,000 for a combined offensive in both MR 1 and Cambodia, and 60,000 for a countrywide offensive.

(Mr. Sansom joined the meeting at this point)

Mr. Walsh: These manpower requirements correspond to annual infiltration requirements ranging from 120,000 to 250–300,000 men annually.

Mr. Schlesinger: Why aren’t the infiltration figures additive?

Mr. Walsh: To give an example, in the case of an offensive only in Cambodia, the enemy would be holding his troop levels in South Vietnam to the existing levels.

Mr. Schlesinger: But they still should be additive for the increments of infiltration.

Mr. Walsh: Some analyst judgments are involved in setting these figures.

Mr. Sullivan: Probably this assumes that more support forces are needed in Cambodia.

[Page 543]

Mr. Walsh: No. Most of the support forces are already pretty much in position.

Mr. Sullivan: Are these figures on an annual basis or do they refer only to the dry season?

Mr. Walsh: They are for a twelve month period, probably starting at the beginning of the dry season.

Dr. Kissinger: As I understand it, you say that the enemy can carry out only one of these [strategic options] early in the dry season. In other words, they can carry out an offensive in MR 1 at any time. However, for the others, they would first need to build up their stockpiles.

Mr. Walsh: Building up stockpiles is required for all strategies, but it could be accomplished more rapidly in MR 1 because of the proximity to North Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: Can you put a month on it [any of these strategies]?

Mr. Walsh: We haven’t done so. We estimate that a combined offensive in both MR 1 and Cambodia could not take place until late in the dry season.

Dr. Kissinger: The controlling factor is Cambodia, since they can carry out an MR 1 offensive at any time.

Mr. Walsh: That’s right.

Dr. Kissinger: Therefore, if there is going to be a Cambodia offensive, it would be late in the dry season.

Mr. Walsh: That is what we think.

Dr. Kissinger: Does late in the dry season mean February or March?

Mr. Walsh: Strategy 1 would not be possible until late in the dry season, that is, possibly April or May. However, for other reasons we feel that this is not the option they will try.

Dr. Kissinger: Then take Case 2 [offensive in Cambodia].

Mr. Walsh: This would be pretty tight for them if they were performing at the low end of their estimated capability.

Dr. Kissinger: But they could do it anytime.

Mr. Walsh: Yes, even with the capability in the low range. However, if the input rate were 370 tons per day they could do it earlier.

Dr. Kissinger: Then you would put this as likely to happen in the middle of the dry season. I am not trying to get a date with a view to holding you to it. All I want is some sense of the timing.

Mr. Walsh: I would say the middle of the dry season in this case.

Mr. Irwin: In your calculations for 1970–71 were you estimating what the enemy would have to do?

Mr. Walsh: We are estimating what he will have done [by the end of the dry season].

[Page 544]

Mr. Irwin: Do you estimate that he will do the same thing next dry season?

Mr. Walsh: We are using that [the 1970–71 estimate] as a base for our calculations for the dry season but making adjustments to take account of new factors.

Mr. Sullivan: This infiltration will not have to be accomplished this dry season?

Mr. Walsh: That’s right. The spread of 250–300,000 in the infiltration requirements for Case 1 is designed to take care of a number of contingencies which might cause the enemy to require more manpower.

Dr. Kissinger: As I understand, you ignored Lam Son altogether in making these calculations. Have you calculated what they can accomplish during the remainder of this dry season or what they will consume?

Mr. Walsh: On the question of stockpiles, we had a little divergence in views. They could move some supplies through during this period.

Dr. Kissinger: Your last paper assessing Lam Son contained a number of assumptions which gave all the breaks to the enemy.5 You estimated that the bomb damage rate would be no greater. This appears to be a conservative assumption in view of the increase in gunship effectiveness. You estimated they would maintain 10,000 additional personnel in Laos instead of the 20,000 you cited in your previous estimate. The point is that there were a number of assumptions that if changed would reduce our estimate of enemy capabilities. However, I take it that changing these assumptions would not affect the conclusions of the study.

Mr. Walsh: No, it would not. Lam Son becomes significant only if we assume there would be another Lam Son next year. Another Lam Son would make it probable they would not be able to undertake Strategy 4 [combined MR 1/Cambodia offensive].

Dr. Kissinger: Let me sum up, in order to see if we all agree on what I get out of the paper. First, you consider it improbable that the enemy can mount an all-South-Vietnam-Cambodia offensive before the very end of the dry season.

Mr. Walsh: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: You also conclude that an offensive in MR 1 is possible at any time, but that they probably won’t make the effort.

Mr. Walsh: That’s right.

Dr. Kissinger: As for Cases 2–4, depending on the estimated input and the scale on which the enemy is operating, the timing of these operations could move toward the end of the dry season.

[Page 545]

Mr. Walsh: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: The necessary infiltration would have to be accomplished by the beginning of any operation. Thus, we would have some indication of what was coming.

Mr. Walsh: A year ago I would have said yes. However, I am not sure that we would pick up any indication of increased infiltration.

Dr. Kissinger: If we had the ability to pick it up, this would tip us off that something was afoot.

All right. This gives us a pretty good idea of what we have ahead of us. It suggests that the time to resign is before January.

Admiral Moorer: (to Mr. Walsh) Your analysis doesn’t take into account what is happening with the interdiction effort. It is more effective now than it has ever been, but this isn’t taken into account.

Mr. Walsh: We do consider this. Admittedly, our estimate [of bomb damage] is conservative. Two years ago we made a study of the interdiction program and found that it was necessary to discount reported truck kills. We then thought that a reasonable bomb damage assessment figure would be about 10–15 percent. However, it was the general judgment that this figure should be raised to 25 percent. Now with the new gunships there may be reason to raise the figure, but we haven’t decided on a percent.

Admiral Moorer: Then you are assuming the same loss as in your previous analysis?

Mr. Walsh: I don’t know.

Dr. Kissinger: If the Air Force is claiming 3700 kills—

Gen. Vogt: The figure is 9,000.

Dr. Kissinger: If they are claiming 8,000 kills against 4300 last year, then one can say that whatever the actual number is, it still amounts to only 25 percent [of total tonnage passing down the trail] because there has been an increase in input. Or one can say that the figure is so unreliable that it cannot be used even to establish a proportion. Without tying you to numbers, is it possible to get some estimate on this?

Mr. Walsh: I do not have any particular feeling that the Air Force figures are either more or less reliable this year. I do have a strong feeling that 25 percent is a pretty good bomb damage estimate.

Dr. Kissinger: But you can use Air Force claims to establish a proportion.

Mr. Walsh: We are not ready to do that yet.

Dr. Kissinger: You are not ready to make an increase in the proportion of tonnage destroyed.

Gen. Vogt: The Air Force figures are evaluated.

[Page 546]

Admiral Moorer: Let me show you some pictures we took of the Kissinger Trail.

Dr. Kissinger: You mean Route 914.

Admiral Moorer: Yes.

(Shows aerial photographs to Dr. Kissinger.)

You can see where there are trucks spread along the trail every few yards. We didn’t have this kind of concentration last year. That 25 percent figure couldn’t be right for both years.

Mr. Samson: The 25 percent could be right for both years if the total input had increased.

Dr. Kissinger: If the input was much greater. (to Mr. Walsh) You think it was about the same.

Mr. Walsh: We think it was up about 15 percent. If I can restate our argument, when we began to use the 25 percent figure we thought it was generous. We are still using 25 percent, but now it has become a conservative estimate.

Dr. Kissinger: Supposing the figure were 30 percent, how would that affect your conclusion?

Mr. Walsh: I would have to go through and calculate that again. However, it would mean a tight situation would be a little tighter. It would not affect the high option.

Dr. Kissinger: An increase of five percent would amount to 20 tons per day.

Mr. Irwin: This figure is the best judgment of the intelligence community without any relation to claimed kills this year versus last year.

Dr. Kissinger: All I say is what Tom [Moorer] says: that if it is claimed that a larger number of trucks have been killed, the [BDA] percentage ought to be increased proportionally to the increase in truck kills less the increase in input.

Mr. Walsh: Since Gen. Bennett is not here, I hesitate to speak for him. However, I think he would tell you that the BDA figure is closer to 40 percent. Nevertheless, his analysis enables him to come to the same conclusions that we reached.

Dr. Kissinger: No analyst ever gets in trouble predicting a calamity.

A five percent differential either way amounts to 20 tons per day. If they were building up for an offensive, this differential would have more effect at the end than at the beginning of the dry season.

Mr. Walsh: It would if you regard these figures as a concrete thing. However, they aren’t. If you treat the figures this way you would also have to figure what the enemy is going to do during the next rainy season. He could put some supplies through at that time. This would probably wash out any increase in the BDA figure. No single figure is [Page 547] so valid that one could say that the conclusions would change after the statistics changed by five percent.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, you also assume that the enemy would maintain the same forces in Laos. However, they won’t do that if Lam Son is not credible.

Mr. Walsh: We looked at that. If the threat of another Lam Son is credible, they might keep 100,000 troops there; however, they would never keep 40,000.

Dr. Kissinger: But they might keep 60–80,000.

Mr. Walsh: Yes, although they could redeploy them to North Vietnam where supply would be less of a problem.

Mr. Schlesinger: With regard to the force ratios for the MRs, the ratio is inversely proportional to the difficulty of the situation in each MR.

Mr. Walsh: When one starts talking about levels of infiltration that are required in order to carry out certain military activities, a great many subjective judgments are involved. You have to consider how long it would take to get troops in place and what level of control the enemy has over the territory. To my mind these infiltration figures are much softer than the logistical figures. However, they do square with what we know about the 1968 offensive.

Dr. Kissinger: The major reason for this meeting was to see how we could use this estimate (recognizing that the recommendations drawn from it have to be tentative) for our future planning. The President wants us to work out coherent programs for the rest of this year and for next year so that we will not slide into crisis situations that we haven’t foreseen. We need to consider what we would like to discuss and then get a work program established. Today we reviewed enemy capabilities, but we haven’t considered the strategies that may follow from these capabilities. We need to have some discussion of the most probable enemy strategies and what we need to do to deal with them. This should be related to the situations that we will find in the MRs, as indicated by the analysis that has already been done.

Then we need to consider what can be done now to improve the situation in these MRs before the dry season.

We have already asked Defense to prepare a study of what Vietnamization will entail, including force requirements. (Maybe we can get Joe Alsop off our back on the question of helicopters.) We need to know what is expected from the Vietnamization program and why we should believe that the South Vietnamese, with 100,000 fewer U.S. troops and one fifth the helicopters that the U.S. forces have, can do the same thing that we are now doing.

[Page 548]

We also need some projection of TCC participation independent of fiscal restraints. It isn’t self-evident why the ROK forces have to come out next year and why their removal wouldn’t put a strain on the South Vietnamese.6 I am not trying to pre-judge the conclusion. I just want to make sure that we look into these questions.

There is one other point related to military programs. We have heard a great deal about residual and advisory forces. Some of the most intense negotiations now being carried on are those we are conducting among ourselves on this subject. We need an analysis of just what residual, and particularly MAAG, presence is to be left behind. What would be the size of the force? How would it function?

Mr. Johnson: Aren’t you putting air support on the agenda?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. We need to look at the air interdiction program. We also want to look at the economic development program in order to determine what economic assistance South Vietnam will need over a two to three year period.

We should look at what other fixes might be needed within South Vietnam; for example, improvements in internal security and support for the police.

We also need an analysis of the political situation in general. This applies to the political situation in Vietnam. We are assuming that there will be no negotiations.

The President wants this group to meet once a week until this work is completed. He wants to have a picture of where we are heading.

I wonder if instead of kicking this around today in the abstract, we might just give out some assignments, and then our offices can be in touch to work out the details of what is to be done and when it is to be submitted.

For example, the projection of probable enemy strategies might be undertaken by CIA, working in coordination with other agencies, of course. Defense could do the analysis of the military situation in the MRs, including likely force surpluses and deficits. State might be involved in a study on the general situation in Cambodia. (to Mr. Doolin) As I understand, you are thinking of sending a group out there.

Mr. Doolin: The paper [proposing this] is going to Secretary Laird this afternoon.

[Page 549]

Dr. Kissinger: We are getting a paper from Defense about the questions we raised on RVNAF modernization. We are getting a paper on air interdiction from the JCS.

(to Ambassador Sullivan) Bill, we need from your group a paper on the political situation in South Vietnam and one on the police and anti-VCI programs.

(to Mr. Smith) The economic study is under way.

Mr. Smith: It is being done in the VSSG Working Group.

Dr. Kissinger: Also from Bill Sullivan’s group we might have a paper on what measures of regional cooperation may be under way.

I would like to set up due dates in cooperation with your offices. This group can meet once a week to review the papers as they are prepared. We need to look into all of these questions. We do not want to risk the nightmare of having the situation in Vietnam come apart under the impact of continued U.S. withdrawals.

Mr. Irwin: What about the question of Thai involvement?

Mr. Doolin: That is part of the TCC question. That subject will be taken care of by Bill’s [Sullivan’s] group too.

Dr. Kissinger: We also need an analysis, which CIA might prepare, on Hanoi’s potential for continuing the war. Maybe CIA will conclude that the North Vietnamese can’t continue, and then we won’t have to worry about these other questions.

Ambassador Sullivan: What about the POW issue?

Dr. Kissinger: I want to leave that for separate handling. All of this study effort assumes the war will still be going on in 1972. It is directed against a possible catastrophe then.

Mr. Irwin: All of this pretty much omits North Laos.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t think we need to put that in this package.

Ambassador Sullivan: Is any study being done on the span of attention or support we can obtain from Congress for these programs?

Dr. Kissinger: Do we have any experts on that?

Mr. Sansom: We could use the same methodology [used to analyze enemy intentions].

Dr. Kissinger: Probably the easiest thing to get done for next week would be some of the intelligence work. However, we won’t settle that now. We will distribute a suggested schedule and list of assignments. This is not intended to be exhaustive; additions can be suggested. The President gives this effort top priority. He wants this group to run the project with an iron hand.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original.
  2. Not present at the beginning of the meeting.
  3. Not present at the beginning of the meeting.
  4. Due dates and primary agency drafting responsibilities given in parentheses following each item are as proposed to Dr. Kissinger by the NSC staff following the SRG meeting. In addition to the studies mentioned at the SRG meeting, the two following studies are also planned as part of the assessment of the situation in 1971-72: (1) Update of cease-fire study (Vietnam Special Studies Working Group, May 14); (2) Economic stabilization projection through mid-1972 (Vietnam Special Studies Working Group, May 16). [Footnote in the original.]
  5. An Intelligence Memorandum entitled, “NVA/VC Military Activities,” April 2, prepared jointly by CIA and DIA. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 153, Vietnam Country Files, Viet 29 Mar 71–8 Apr 71)
  6. Attached but not printed are table 1, “Logistic Factors for Alternative Strategies,” and table 2, “Incremental Combat Forces and Infiltration Required for Alternative Offensive Strategies.”
  7. For a summary of the paper, see Document 166.
  8. In a February 24 memorandum to Kissinger, Eliot informed him that the Republic of Korea announced it would remove two divisions and a marine brigade from South Vietnam. K. Wayne Smith wrote to Kissinger in an April 26 memorandum that even though the Korean troop performance had been disappointing, the loss of those troops would nonetheless produce a significant gap in the allied force structure. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–57, SRG Meetings, Vietnam Assessment 4–27–71 (2 of 3))