4. National Security Study Memorandum 11
Washington, January 21, 1969.
TO
- The Secretary of State
- The Secretary of Defense
- The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
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In an effort to develop an agreed evaluation of the situation in Vietnam as a
basis for making policy decisions, the President has directed that each
addressee of this memorandum, the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and MACV prepare a
separate response to the attached questions. The answers should include a
discussion of uncertainties and possible alternative interpretations of
existing data.
The President wishes to receive, as well, the Secretary of State’s comments
on the Ambassador’s response, and the comments of the Secretary of Defense
on the responses of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and MACV.
All replies should be forwarded to the President by February 10, 1969.
Attachment
VIETNAM QUESTIONS
Environment of Negotiations
- 1.
-
Why is the DRV in Paris? What is
the evidence?
(Among the hypotheses:
- a.
- Out of weakness, to accept a face-saving formula for
defeat.
- b.
- To negotiate the withdrawal of U.S. (and NVA) forces, and/or a
compromise political settlement, giving a chance for
NLF victory in the
South.
- c.
- To give the U.S. a face-saving way to withdraw.
- d.
- To undermine the GVN
and U.S./GVN relations,
and to relieve U.S. military pressure in both North and
South Vietnam.
- e.
- Out of desire to end the losses and costs of war on
the best terms attainable.)
- 2.
- What is the nature of evidence, and how adequate is it, underlying
competing views (as in the most recent NIE on this subject,2 with its dissenting
footnotes) of the impact of various outcomes in Vietnam within
Southeast Asia?
- 3.
- How soundly-based is the common belief that Hanoi is under active
pressure with respect to the Paris negotiations from Moscow (for)
and Peking (against)? Is it clear that either Moscow or Peking
believe they have, or are willing to use, significant leverage on
Hanoi’s
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policies? What is the
nature of evidence, other than public or private official
statements?
- 4.
- How sound is our knowledge of the existence and significance of
stable “Moscow” and “Peking” factions within the Hanoi leadership,
as distinct, for example, from shifting factions, all of whom
recognize the need to balance off both allies? How much do we know,
in general, of intraparty disputes and personalities within
Hanoi?
NVA/VA
- 5.
-
What is the evidence supporting various hypotheses, and the
overall adequacy of evidence, relating to the following
questions:
- a.
- Why did NVA units
leave South Vietnam last summer and fall?
- b.
- Did the predicted “third-wave offensive” by the NVA/VC actually take place? If so, why did it
not achieve greater success?
- c.
- Why are VC guerrillas
and local forces now relatively dormant?
(Among the hypotheses: 1) response to VC/NVA battle
losses, forcing withdrawal or passivity; 2) to put diplomatic
pressure on U.S. to move to substantive talks in Paris; 3) to
prepare for future operations; and/or 4) pressure of U.S. and
allied operations.)
- 6.
- What rate of NVA/VC attrition would outrun their ability
to replenish by infiltration and recruitment, as currently
calculated? Do present operations achieve this? If not, what force
levels and other conditions would be necessary? Is there any
evidence they are concerned about continuing heavy losses?
- 7.
-
To what relative extent do the U.S./RVNAF and the NVA/VC share in the
control and the rate of VC/NVA attrition; i.e., to what extent, in terms of
our tactical experience, can heavy losses persistently be
imposed on VC/NVA forces, despite their possible
intention to limit casualties by avoiding contact?
(Among the hypotheses:
- a.
- Contact is predominantly at VC tactical initiative, and we cannot
reverse this; VC need
suffer high casualties only so long as they are willing
to accept them, in seeking contact; or
- b.
- Current VC/NVA loss rates can be
maintained by present forces—as increased X% by Y
additional forces—whatever the DRV/VC
choose to do, short of further major withdrawal.)
- 8.
- What controversies persist on the estimate of VC Order of Battle; in particular, on
the various categories of guerrilla forces and infrastructure? On
VC recruiting, and manpower pool?
What is the evidence for different estimates, and what is the
overall adequacy of evidence?
- 9.
- What are NVA/VC
capabilities for launching a large-scale
offensive, with “dramatic” results (even if taking high casualties
and without holding objectives long), in the next six months? (e.g.,
an offensive against one or more cities, or against most newly
“pacified” hamlets.) How adequate is the evidence?
- 10.
- What are the main channels for military supplies for the NVA/VC
forces in SVN, (e.g., Cambodia
and/or the Laotion panhandle)? What portion of these supplies come
in through Sihanoukville?
RVNAF
- 10A.
- What differences of opinion exist concerning extent of RVNAF improvement, and what is
evidence underlying different views? (e.g., compare recent CIA memo with MACV views.)3 For
example:
- a.
- Which is the level of effective, mobile, offensive
operations? What results are they achieving?
- b.
- What is the actual level of “genuine” small-unit actions
and night actions in ARVN,
RF and PF: i.e., actions that
would typically be classed as such within the U.S. Army, and
in particular, offensive ambushes and patrols? How much has
this changed?
- c.
- How much has the officer selection and promotion system,
and the quality of leadership, actually changed over the
years (as distinct from changes in paper “programs”)? How
many junior officers hold commissions (in particular,
battlefield commissions from NCO rank) despite lack of a high school
diploma?
- d.
- What known disciplinary action has resulted from ARVN looting of civilians in
the past year (for example, the widespread looting that took
place last spring)?
- e.
- To what extent have past “anti-desertion” decrees and
efforts lessened the rate of desertion; why has the rate
recently been increasing to new highs?
- f.
- What success are the RF and PF having in providing local security and
reducing VC control and
influence in rural populations?
- 11.
- To what extent could RVNAF—as it
is now—handle the VC (Main Force,
local forces, guerrillas), with or without U.S. combat support to
fill RVNAF deficiencies, if all
VNA units were withdrawn:
- a.
- If VC still had Northern
fillers.
- b.
- If all Northerners (but not regroupees) were
withdrawn.
- 12.
- To what extent could RVNAF—as it
is now—also handle a sizeable level of NVA forces:
- a.
- With U.S. air and artillery support.
- b.
- With above and also U.S. ground forces in reserve.
- c.
- Without U.S. direct support, but with increased RVNAF artillery and air
capacity?
- 13.
- What, in various views, are the required changes—in RVNAF command, organization,
equipment, training and incentives, in political environment, in
logistical support, in U.S. modes of influence—for making RVNAF
adequate to the tasks cited in questions 9
and 10 above? How long would this take? What are the practical
obstacles to these changes, and what new U.S. moves would be needed
to overcome these?
Pacification
- 14.
- How much, and where, has the security situation and the balance of
influence between the VC and GVN actually changed in the countryside
over time, contrasting the present to such benchmarks as end-61,
end-63, end-65, end-67? What are the best indicators of such change,
or lack of it? What factors have been mainly responsible for such
change as has occurred? Why has there not been more?
- 15.
- What are the reasons for expecting more change in the countryside
in the next two years than in past intervals? What are the reasons
for not expecting more? What changes in RVNAF, GVN, U.S., and
VC practices and adaptiveness would be needed to increase
favorable change in security and control? How likely are such
changes, individually and together; what are the obstacles?
- 16.
- What proportion of the rural population must be regarded as
“subject to significant VC presence
and influence”? (How should hamlets rated as “C” in the Hamlet
Evaluation System—the largest category—be regarded in this respect?)
In particular, what proportion in the provinces surrounding Saigon?
How much has this changed?
- 17.
- What number or verified numbers of the Communist political
apparatus (i.e., People’s Revolutionary Party members, the hard-core
“infrastructure”) have been arrested or killed in the past year? How
many of these were cadre of higher than village level? What
proportion do these represent of total PRP membership, and how
much—and how long—had the apparatus been disrupted?
- 18.
- What are the reasons for believing that current and future efforts
at “rooting out” hard-core infrastructure will be—or will not
be—more successful than past efforts? For example, for believing
that collaboration among the numerous Vietnamese intelligence
agencies will be markedly more thorough than in the past? What are
the side-effects, e.g., on Vietnamese opinion, of
anti-infrastructure campaigns such as the current “accelerated
effort,” along with their lasting effect on hard-core
apparatus?
- 19.
- How adequate is our information on the overall scale and incidence
of damage to civilians by air and artillery, and looting and
misbehavior by RVNAF?
- 20.
- To what extent do recent changes in command and administration
affecting the country-side represent moves to improve competence, as
distinct from replacement of one clique by another? What is the
basis of judgment? What is the impact of the recent removal of
minority-group province and district officials (Hoa Hao, Cao Dai,
Montagnard) in their respective areas?
Politics
- 21.
-
How adequate is our information, and what is
it based upon, concerning:
- a.
- Attitudes of Vietnamese elites not now closely aligned
with the GVN (e.g.,
religious leaders, professors, youth leaders, professionals,
union leaders, village notables) towards: Participation—if
offered—in the GVN; the
current legitimacy and acceptability of the GVN; likewise (given “peace”)
for the NLF or various
“neutralist” coalitions; towards U.S. intent, as they
interpret it (e.g., U.S. plans for ending the war, perceived
U.S. alignments with particular individuals and forces
within Vietnam, U.S. concern for various Vietnamese
interests).
- b.
- Patterns of existent political alignments within GVN/RVNAF and outside it—reflecting family ties,
corruption, officers’ class, secret organizations and
parties, religious and regional background—as these bear
upon behavior with respect to the war, the NLF, reform and broadening of
the GVN, and responses to
U.S. influence and intervention.
- 22.
- What is the evidence on the prospects—and on what changes in
conditions and U.S. policies would increase or decrease them—for
changes in the GVN toward: (a)
broadening of the government to include participation of all significant non-Communist regional and
religious groupings (at province and district levels, as well as
cabinet); (b) stronger emphasis, in selection and promotion of
officers and officials, on competence and performance (as in the
Communist Vietnamese system) as distinct from considerations of
family, corruption, and social (e.g., educational) background; and
(c) political mobilization of non-Communist
sympathies and energies in support of the GVN, as evidenced, e.g., by reduced desertion, by
willing alignment of religious, provincial and other leaders with
the GVN, by wide cooperation with
anti-corruption and pro-efficiency drives.
- 23.
- How critical, in various views, is each of the changes in question
22 above to prospects of attaining—at current, reduced or increased
levels of U.S. military effort—either “victory,” or a strong
non-Communist political role after a compromise settlement of
hostilities? What are views of the risks attendant to making these
changes, or attempting them; and, to the extent that U.S. influence
is required, on U.S. practical ability to move prudently and
effectively in this direction? What is the evidence?
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U.S. Operations
- 24.
- How do military deployment and tactics today differ from those of
6–12 months ago? What are reasons for changes, and what has this
impact been?
- 25.
- In what different ways (including innovations in organization)
might U.S. force-levels be reduced to various levels, while
minimizing impact on combat capability?
- 26.
- What is the evidence on the scale of effect of B–52 attacks in producing VC/NVA
casualties? In disrupting VC/NVA operations? How valid are estimates
of overall effect?
- 27.
- What effect is the Laotian interdiction bombing having:
- a.
- In reducing the capacity of the enemy logistic
system?
- b.
- In destroying matériel in transit?
- 28.
- With regard to the bombing of North Vietnam:
- a.
- What evidence was there on the significance of the
principal strains imposed on the DRV (e.g., in economic disruption, extra
manpower demands, transportation blockages, population
morale)?
- b.
- What was the level of logistical through-put through the
Southern provinces of NVN
just prior to the November bombing halt? To what extent did
this level reflect the results of the U.S. bombing
campaign?
- c.
- To what extent did Chinese and Soviet aid relieve pressure
on Hanoi?
- d.
- What are current views on the proportion of war-essential
imports that could come into NVN over the rail or road lines from China,
even if all imports by sea were denied and a strong effort
even made to interdict ground transport? What is the
evidence?
- e.
- What action has the DRV
taken to reduce the vulnerability and importance of Hanoi as
a population and economic center (e.g., through population
evacuation and economic dispersal)?
