Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

297. Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

Saigon, July 10, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Laos

1. During the briefing on Laos and Cambodia, 8 July 1967,² you asked for my specific recommendations on expanded operations to locate and destroy enemy personnel, supplies and equipment in the Laotian Panhandle. In conjunction with Illinois City, I recommend immediate approval of two additional programs described here:

a. Phase III, Prairie Fire: An expansion of our existing covert operations to provide for organizing a 3,000 man indigenous guerrilla force to operate under US leadership against the enemy LOC in the Southeastern part of the Laos Panhandle.

b. Southpaw. Airmobile raids of 3–7 days duration employing South Vietnamese regular forces up to brigade size against known enemy base areas contiguous to the RVN border.

2. Phase III, Prairie Fire: The plan is to recruit, train, and control indigenous Lao tribesmen within the present Prairie Fire Operational Area, initially. Development of a friendly guerrilla force in the mountains of the Eastern Laotian Panhandle is of critical importance to the ultimate objective of Prairie Fire Operations, i.e., destruction of the NVA/VC infiltration system and denial of the area to the enemy. The area in question is completely under NVA/Pathet Lao/VC control. The Royal Laotian Government exercises no administrative control nor does it maintain a presence in the area. The region is populated by tribal groups collectively called Kha on the Laotian side of the boundary, and Montagnards in South Vietnam. In the Prairie Fire area, it is estimated the indigenous population could support a friendly force of 3,000 organized guerrillas. Such a force, coordinated with other Prairie Fire operations and provided tactical air support already available, could effectively reduce enemy control of the area. Following approval, the guerrilla force will be developed nominally under the flag of the Royal Laotian Government, thus contributing to the extension of Royal Laotian control areas where it never existed before. Although the estimated goal of 3,000 guerrillas will take over a year to develop, it is envisioned that a 1,200 man force would be ready to carry out operational missions in nine months. Specifically, authorization is required to recruit, support and control Lao citizens now residing in the proposed operating area. Authorization is also required to permit employment of US leadership in Laos on a sustained basis with the proposed guerrilla force. Approximately 120 US Special Forces personnel will ultimately be required in Laos for proper control and development of the guerrilla force.

3. Southpaw: a. This plan provides for conducting ground or airmobile operations across the Laos border by regular South Vietnamese units of battalion or brigade strength against close in known enemy base areas. The operations would pit Vietnamese against Vietnamese in areas controlled by Communists for short duration missions of 3 to 7 days. No publicity would be given the operation and appropriate precautions would be based on current intelligence verified by Prairie Fire forces. Targets will be in unpopulated areas not under Royal Lao control. Prairie Fire forces will precede task force operations for validation of targets and landing zones. Prairie Fire forces will operate in conjunction with the ARVN units as reconnaissance and/or maneuver elements. Preparatory air strikes by tactical aircraft and/or B–52s will be employed as required. The task force will execute blocking, search and destroy, or raid operations against selected targets in the Prairie Fire operational area. Blocking actions will entail occupation of defensible terrain astride known major infiltration roads and trails in order to disrupt force reaction by NVN forces. Search and destroy and raid operations will follow established procedures. Command and control of ground operations will be exercised from a provisional CP established at a Forward Operating Base. The task force commander, intelligence and operations staffs will consist of Vietnamese with US Army advisors experienced in cross border operations. It is visualized that approximately 25 US advisors would be required with a three battalion-brigade force in addition to US personnel that normally accompany the Prairie Fire elements which might be committed.

b. Preparatory to the raid operation and as a portion of the cover and deception plan, a CIDG camp with a C 130 capable airfield will be established close to the border of SVN and as close as possible to the planned area of operations in Laos. Materiel necessary for support of the operation will be stockpiled covertly at this camp. Once established, this camp will serve as the launch base for the raid. Close support by US or ARVN artillery units and logistical support for the task force will be provided from this base. The raid task force will depend in the main on tactical air for support and protection.

4. It should be pointed out that while Southpaw and Prairie Fire III are not mutually dependent, they are nevertheless mutually supporting. Taken individually or together, they will enhance the effectiveness of the Illinois City operations.

W. C. Westmoreland ³

General, United States Army

1. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Paul C. Warnke, McNaughton Files, MCNTN XIV, Misc. 1967 (3). Top Secret; Limdis; Noforn. Copies were sent to CJCS and CINCPAC.
2. No other record of the briefing has been found.
3. Printed from a copy that indicates Westmoreland signed the original.