Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

332. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, April 22, 1964, 7:59 p.m.

1971. Jidda’s 981 (326 to Cairo).² Before Faisal comes to Cairo, Department believes Embassy Cairo might profitably make presentation along following lines to someone close to Nasser.

1. Present constellation of factors bearing on Yemen situation offers opportune and appropriate occasion to press toward normalization:

a. We presume Arab states wish preserve momentum of Arab detente, as symbolized by upcoming Faisal-Nasser meeting.

b. UNYOM³ is up for renewal May 4.

c. Now that Spinelli⁴ has been on job for over 4 months, his findings should be ready for examination by parties.

d. Harib raid and Security Council hearings thereon have had sobering effect. We have impression all parties would welcome acceptable formula to reduce tension along Yemen-SAF frontier.

2. USG has over-all interest in reduction Arabian Peninsula tensions, and specific interest in creating circumstances that will facilitate pursuance economic cooperation with UARG. UAR is in final stages concluding stabilization program and new standby agreement with IMF that will meet one of three prerequisites for US commodity loan. As emphasized from beginning, diversion of resources to Yemen operation has been obstacle to commodity loan type assistance. Earlier progress in reducing tensions over Yemen (e.g., restoration Saudi-UAR diplomatic relations) has encouraged us that problem of economic drain being reduced. It is important that progress continue, since difficult Congress believe US resources not being diverted to Yemen campaign when news full of alleged YAR violations of SAF air space, UAR-YAR propaganda campaign against British position in Aden, and indications continued high-level UAR expeditionary force.

3. We would hope that during next few weeks the parties concerned could explore following possibilities:

a. Complete SAG dissociation from Hamid al-Din family.

b. De facto pull-back of SAF and YAR troops from respective sides of frontier.

c. Extension UNYOM patrols to southern frontier.

d. Consolidation of YARG. We would appreciate UAR’s views on advantages of according progressively increasing responsibilities to moderate republican elements, especially those in Political Bureau.

e. Encouragement of dialogue between these elements and northern tribes not irrevocably aligned with Hamid al-Din family.

f. Encouragement of YARG to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia, work for detente with UK, and freeze border dispute with SAF.

g. Immediate public and substantial withdrawal UAR troops to coincide with implementation of one or more of the above points.

4. Last week in separate conversations Talbot and NE officers impressed on Kamel importance of expeditious progress on disengagement, pull-back, and extenstion UN presence beyond May 4. By associating such progress with Nasser-Faisal meeting, UAR might hope to improve relations with SAG, reduce Yemen opposition capabilities, lay groundwork for negotiated solution to Yemen dispute, and begin to transfer some of onerous economic and military burden UARG has borne in Yemen for a year and a half.

5. Collapse of Imamate left vaccum that UAR is currently filling. However, Egyptians can read in historical record unlikelihood of any collapse of northern tribes’ will to resist. UARG may find that, to normalize Yemen situation, it must make some unpleasant concessions such as those floated at Amran. Only early hope of dignified extrication from massive involvement 1500 miles from home seems to lie in melding moderate northern and southern Yemeni elements in viable YARG, under UAR and Saudi sponsorship.

6. If, as we suspect, UARG’s main concern is to prevent restoration of Imamate and SARG’s is to get Egyptians out of Yemen, grounds for negotiated settlement would appear to be taking shape.

7. In short, does UARG share our feeling that failure to make moderate concessions now could bring on costly consequences later? Or does it feel capable of maintaining heavy commitments in Yemen indefinitely against Saudi and royalist opposition without damage to its wider national interests?

8. In any case, we believe UAR should immediately confirm to SYG that it favors extension UNYOM for at least two more months.

FYI: Department increasingly puzzled by UARG’s lack of enthusiasm for broadened YARG or Spinelli initiatives. We would welcome addressees’ estimates whether this attitude merely reflects indecision or whether UARG is playing for time in expectation of change in international circumstances (Labor victory in UK, trouble in Aden, etc.).⁵

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Symmes, Seelye, and Jones on April 21; cleared by Buffum, Sisco, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs Enoch S. Duncan, and Davies and by Officer in Charge of U.K. Affairs Thomas M. Judd in substance; and approved by Jernegan. Sent to Cairo, Jidda, London, Taiz, Dhahran, and USUN and repeated to Aden, CINCSTRIKE, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD.
2. In telegram 981 from Jidda, April 17, Ambassador Hart reported that he had told the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Yemen, Pier P. Spinelli, before the latter met with Crown Prince Faisal on April 14 that he hoped Faisal did not believe the U.S. Government could or would try to force Nasser to withdraw his troops from Yemen if Faisal made no helpful moves at the forthcoming Cairo meeting. Following the meeting Spinelli told Hart that Faisal was being very cagey regarding what he might be prepared to do in Cairo. The Ambassador reported that Spinelli’s approach was to try to obtain withdrawal of the house of Hamid al-Din from Yemen with the simultaneous withdrawal of UAR troops and phasing in of UN troops. Hart commented that he saw no way to extract the members of the house of Hamid al-Din from Yemen. (Ibid., POL 27-14 YEMEN/UN)
3. The UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) was established on July 4, 1963, following a June 11 Security Council Resolution requesting that the Secretary-General establish a mission to observe Saudi and UAR disengagement from the Yemen civil war. (UN doc. S/5326) For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 607. UNYOM’s mandate was renewed each 2 months thereafter with the mutual consent and financial support of the two parties involved, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic.
4. Spinelli was appointed Special Representative for Yemen on November 3, 1963.
5. In telegram 2514 from Cairo, April 27, Ambassador Badeau commented that the instructions in circular telegram 1971 impressed him as a shopping list of items already discussed in his many meetings with Nasser on Yemen, with the only substantive request being for UAR confirmation to the United Nations of its willingness to extend UNYOM. Badeau said he had arranged to meet with Nasser after his return from Yemen on a separate matter. When they met he proposed to inquire about Nasser’s estimate of the Yemen situation based on his recent trip, which would give him an opportunity to raise most of the questions in the instructions in a more useful form than a formal presentation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN)