141. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Federation of Arab Amirates to be Born March 30
Gulf Shaikhs Announce Unity Plan for Persian Gulf. The Federation of Arab Amirates (FAA), consisting of Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, ’Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain, Ras al Khaimah, and Fujairah), is scheduled to come into existence on March 30. The union was proposed at a meeting of the ruling shaikhs in Dubai in late February “to promote regional cooperation, coordinate development and welfare plans, and regulate collective defense measures.” According to a February 27 communique, the FAA will have a Supreme Council consisting of the 9 rulers; this Council will draw up a permanent charter and future legislation as required. Leadership of the Council will rotate annually among its members, any one of whom may veto proposed legislation. A Federal Council will be formed to execute Supreme Council decisions. Persistent rumors suggest that Shaikh ’Isa of Bahrain will be the first to lead the FAA. The next Federation meeting is scheduled to be held in Bahrain in late April, but Qatar has asked for a change of venue because of Iranian sensitivity to the issue of Bahrain sovereignty.
UK Withdrawal Plans Inspire Gulf Unity Efforts. Prime Minister Wilson announced on January 16 that the UK intends to withdraw its military forces and thus terminate its special position in the Persian [Page 287] Gulf by 1971. Fearful of Arab nationalist agitation and possible Soviet inroads, Iran and the Arab littoral states (except Iraq) have been apprehensive about the effects of the UK decision.2 Opportunities for cooperation between the Shah and traditionalist Arab leaders, however, were blighted [by] the Shah’s irritation over Saudi and Kuwaiti statements concerning the “Arabism” of Bahrain, his subsequent cancellation of a state visit to Saudi Arabia, and concurrent exacerbation of the Saudi-Iranian Gulf median line dispute. Basically, the Shah perceives for Iran a major role in Gulf affairs following Britain’s departure, and believes that present Arab attitudes indicate a rejection of Iranian offers of military and economic cooperation. Shortly after the Wilson announcement, the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Qatar offered to finance a continuing British military presence; Shaikh ’Isa of Bahrain quickly joined in the offer. The UK rejected it, indicating that its decision to leave the Gulf was based on more far-reaching policy considerations than troop costs. On February 19, Shaikh Za’id of Abu Dhabi and Shaikh Rashid of Dubai announced the union of their two states. This union probably will continue to exist after inauguration of the FAA. The UK has encouraged continuation of the union because it appears more potentially viable than the loosely knit FAA. Shaikh ’Isa contends that the FAA was proposed by Qatar as a means of scuttling the Abu Dhabi-Dubai Union. Qatar’s relations with Dubai are close because of the intermarriage of the ruling clans and their use of a common currency, but Qatar has a long-standing territorial dispute with Abu Dhabi and is its traditional rival for regional influence. The Saudi role in the formation of the FAA remains obscure, but King Faysal allegedly has backed Qatar’s efforts to form the FAA to protect Bahrain from Iranian irredentism by having it absorbed in a regional Arab entity. In any case, the ambitious Shaikh ’Isa, who is described as unenthusiastic about the FAA, wishes to obtain full independence for Bahrain with UN and Arab League membership. Kuwait thus far has indicated enthusiasm for the FAA.
FAA Faces An Uncertain Future. According to the Lebanese Foreign Minister, “coordinated Arab action” is under way to recognize the FAA, presumably on its March 30 birth date. On the other hand, the Pan-Arab, socialist-leaning Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) sharply attacked the nascent Federation in the Beirut newspaper al Hurriyah on March 18. The ANM position is a fair example of what can be expected from the Arab socialist states, which view the FAA as an artificial, [Page 288] "imperialist” creation. A UK Foreign Office source has indicated that March 30 would be “without significance” as far as Britain’s relations with the Gulf states are concerned; as before, the UK will treat the nine members as separate, British-protected states. The Shah of Iran, however, is angered over the Arab position toward Bahrain and the general attitude toward “Arabism” in the Gulf which the traditionalist Arab regimes have taken. He has indicated that he will react to the Federation with a “formal denunciation of the FAA and British trickery.” The Shah’s attitude reflects his conviction that the FAA was engineered by the UK to protect Bahrain and disputed mid-Gulf islands against Iranian claims. His stance will make Iranian cooperation with such conservative states as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait much more difficult and may even lead to a considerable cooling of Irano-British relations.
Considering that the traditionally quarrelsome and mutually suspicious member states must approve all FAA legislation unanimously, that the Federation will be opposed by Iran as well as the radical Arab regimes, and that the UK appears indifferent, the FAA is unlikely to be a successful venture in Gulf unity. Nevertheless, it represents a realization by the traditionalist leaders of the Arab littoral that the vacuum created by Britain’s withdrawal will attract outside hostile elements that can only be resisted by unified action. Whether the Federation will be a useful stepping stone to more meaningful cooperation or merely another monument to the elusiveness of Arab unity remains to be seen.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files 1967-69, POL 3 TRUCIALST. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Limdis. No drafting information appears on the source text.↩
- For more extensive discussion of Gulf unity problems see: RNA-6, “Persian Gulf Leaders Search for Regional Cooperation as Britain’s Stabilizing Influence Begins to Wane,” February 23, 1968 (Secret/No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem/Limdis). [Footnote in the source text. This document is ibid., DEF 6 UK.]↩