248. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to Secretary of State Rusk1
Dear Dean,
I appreciated very much your bringing to the attention of your staff my letter of February 5 which concerned our relations with the Secretary-General.2 This is a matter which I continue to think is of central importance for our effectiveness with the Secretary-General. I am afraid we are in a comparable situation now on the Yemen negotiations.
On the Department’s instructions and with considerable difficulty we finally persuaded the Secretary-General to assume the major role in resolving the United Arab Republic-Saudi Arabia disagreement problem. He also accepted our suggestion of using an American (Bunche) to do the job but politely refused to use Bunker, despite our repeated suggestions, because he preferred to have the mediator in the UN family. He and Bunche had just gotten started when—with only a few hours notice to him—we sent Bunker out ourselves. We assured him, however, that Bunker was essentially concerned with our bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia and that we wanted the United Nations to do the main job. However Bunker was in fact instructed to present to Faisal a concrete and detailed disengagement proposal, which he did with his usual skill and effectiveness. After Bunker’s return to the U.S. we dispatched him to Jidda a second time—again with only a few hours notice to the Secretary-General—when difficulties arose over Faisal’s invitation to Bunche. We are moreover now engaged in trying to persuade a reluctant Nasser (who has already conferred with Bunche on this subject) to receive Bunker and in fact would appear to be endeavoring to negotiate a whole disengagement process ourselves under a supposed UN umbrella which U Thant has in fact never offered us.
I realize of course the reasons for the most urgent handling of this problem and also recognize that the UN, in its initial attempt to do so, has not been as brisk or as skillful as we had hoped. Whether it will, because of Nasser’s attitude, prove the better instrument for resolving this problem, remains to be seen. What I wish to bring to your attention is the inappropriateness and indeed impracticality of in effect pulling and pushing the Secretary-General in and out of a problem. Not only will this jeopardize his effectiveness, and perhaps ours as well, in dealing [Page 552] with that particular problem, but he is certain to be sufficiently annoyed so that he will be extremely reluctant and perhaps unwilling when next we seek his intervention on a matter in which we find it most difficult for us to act ourselves. I believe that we should follow the general principle, once we have asked the Secretary-General to take on a role of this kind, of allowing him to carry it out with only discreet advice and assistance on our part, unless and until he and we agree his efforts require a U.S. supplement or substitute.
I realize you are very much aware of this general problem but wish to bring to your attention this latest example which shows once again how easy it is for us, in our zeal to get a job done, to cause serious and perhaps lasting damage in our relations with the Secretary-General.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, United Nations (General), 1/63–4/63, Box 311. Secret. Copies were sent to Cleveland and Schlesinger.↩
- Document 235.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩