180. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- China Representation and Outer Mongolia
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. George K. C. Yeh, Ambassador, Chinese Embassy
- Mr. Walter P. McConaughy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
- Mr. Woodruff Wallner, Acting Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs
- Miss Louise McNutt, Acting United Nations Adviser
- Mr. Robert W. Rinden, Acting Director for Chinese Affairs
The Ambassador called at Mr. McConaughy’s request.
Mr. McConaughy said that we wished to work closely with the GRC in some “politicking” with the French African states on China representation, but that for this to be successful the GRC would have to abstain on Outer Mongolia. We were hopeful that we could make some headway with the Africans on China representation not only at the forthcoming UNGA session but on other occasions. We would tell them that a concession to Soviet blackmail was involved and that we could not make such a concession every time.
The Ambassador said that he suspected that his government was having difficulty in making up its mind. No one can say how the African countries, especially the former French colonies, will vote on China representation even if the GRC refrained from vetoing Outer Mongolia. If there was a rough estimate on how the African states would vote, it would be helpful. If the GRC gave up something it would want something in return.
Mr. Wallner said that we want to be able to ask the African states: what is it worth to you to have Mauritania get in the United Nations as a result of GRC abstention? However, if we go to them now with this proposition and it turns out later that the GRC is not willing to abstain then the African states will be in an angry mood.
The Ambassador remarked that in his conversation August 22 at the White House with Mr. Bundy, the latter had stressed that President Kennedy’s recent letter to President Chiang represented the President’s views-as well, of course, as those of the State Department and the United States Government.2
[Page 386]Mr. McConaughy said that we didn’t want to take the slightest chance of there being any misunderstanding on this point and added that the President had gone over every word of the letter and had shared in drafting it. It represented the considered judgment of the President.
The Ambassador said that he had wired Taipei an account of his conversation with Mr. Bundy and so there should be no misunderstanding on this point.
The Ambassador said that, with respect to developing support in the United Nations for the important question (Article 18) tactic and also for a committee to study China representation, enlargement of ECOSOC, et cetera, his government had asked for his views on the committee and had inquired if the United States had full confidence regarding the composition of the committee. The committee’s composition was very important, his authorities felt.
Mr. Wallner said that, as the terms of reference of the committee had not yet been determined, it was not possible now to say what the composition of the committee should be. The committee might look at China representation plus United Nations membership qualifications and the composition of the Councils. We were in the stage of testing this idea, for enlargement of Councils was a controversial question. It was appetizing to the Africans and Asians but unappetizing to the Latin Americans, who were over-represented and afraid of losing something.
The Ambassador observed that in 1960 nine African countries pledged, in writing, their support for the GRC but at the last minute they all reneged and only two of them had the courtesy to inform the GRC of their change in position.
Mr. Wallner said that last year the African states were inexperienced in the workings of the United Nations; this year he hoped they would be better organized and better mannered.
In reply to the Ambassador’s query as to how Sierra Leone might be affected, Mr. Wallner said that it depends on what the Russians do. They might say that no one gets into the United Nations until Outer Mongolia does. The French might say that no one gets into the United Nations until Mauritania does. It is not clear what may happen. Mr. Wallner said that the Security Council meeting on membership may be held early next week, possibly on August 28, owing to British pressure on behalf of the Sierra Leone and Kuwait applications.
The Ambassador said that if the GRC should decide not to veto Outer Mongolia, we ought to get the British and the French to put as much pressure as they can on the African countries to go along with us on China representation.
Mr. Wallner said that the French might wish to be helpful but he didn’t know how much influence they had. He noted that the French [Page 387] had used a great deal of whatever influence they might have in seeking support on the Bizerte issue.
On the Outer Mongolia issue, the Ambassador said that the GRC Cabinet had asked Foreign Minister Shen for an estimate of how much support at the United Nations the GRC would get if it did not refrain from a veto on Outer Mongolia.
Mr. Wallner said it was clear that the African votes would be lost if the GRC used its veto. All 14 votes of the Brazzaville group would be lost and, with the loss of the Monrovia group’s votes, as many as 20 votes would be gone.
The Ambassador said that, in view of the unhappy experience of 1960, his Foreign Minister asked if the United States would be able to get a firmer pledge this year from the Africans.
Mr. Wallner thought we might have better luck this year, but there was always the possibility that the Africans might change their views.
Mr. McConaughy said that we must break out of this vicious circle, for we can’t succeed in our efforts vis-a-vis the African states if we work on a hypothetical basis.
Mr. Wallner added that, if we could say to the African states that there is some flexibility in the GRC position, we would be in a horse-trading position.
The Ambassador replied that he and Ambassador T. F. Tsiang had both stressed to Taipei the need for some flexibility so that we could sound out the African states. He hoped within a few days to have a reply from Taipei.
Mr. Wallner said that as early as August 28 there may be a Security Council meeting on membership as the British are being pressed by Sierra Leone and Kuwait. There is not much time for us to probe the Africans’ reaction. Unless we have a favorable reply very soon from Taipei, we may lose the chance to capitalize on the GRC’s restraint on Outer Mongolia.
The Ambassador said that the decision was not being taken by President Chiang alone. There was strong opposition in some quarters in Taiwan to a GRC abstention on Outer Mongolia and the matter had been referred to the Executive Yuan (Cabinet). Other Yuans had also been consulted. In any event, the GRC was fully informed and a substantive reply to President Kennedy’s letter might be expected in the next few days.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, 303/8–2461. Secret. Drafted by Rinden.↩
- Regarding Bundy’s meeting with Yeh, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXII, Document 55. For President Kennedy’s letter, see Document 179.↩