170. Memorandum From the Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Jenkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (McConaughy)1

SUBJECT

  • Secretary’s Policy Planning Meeting this morning Concerning the United Nations

The Secretary was not present. Mr. Bowles took the chair and requested Harlan Cleveland to kick off. Harlan mentioned some of the lessons we had learned from UN affairs in recent years and expressed the opinion that it was probably a good thing that the originally envisioned [Page 347] “peace force” in being under UN auspices had not materialized. He believed that in conditions as varying as Korea, Lebanon and the Congo no permanent force could be tailored to handle such a broad spectrum of demands on it. At the same time, the conscience of the world community would no longer accept military intervention on the part of individual nations. For the most part the days when the flag could be run up and one’s forces cross borders have passed. The communists found this out ten years ago in Korea. The British and French found it out five years ago at Suez. We found it out a few weeks ago (Cuba), except that we did not run up the flag. He felt that across the spectrum of matters in which the UN was engaged, its greatest service could be at the intervention end of the spectrum and that bilateral arrangements would for the foreseeable future cluster more at the aid end of this spectrum. In between are a great many activities to be handled, partly by the UN and partly through other means.

One of his most interesting points was made in connection with our passing quite rapidly at this time out of the colonial era. He thought that once attention of the underprivileged nations could be directed from major attention to the colonial issue, it was most likely to settle next upon human rights issues. He said that in other areas of UN activity we have to a considerable extent passed beyond the purely forum stage and become operational—with varying degrees of success. He believed that willy nilly the UN was going to have to become operational in the human rights area. He believed that it would be in the United States interest to be in the vanguard of the inevitable on this count and that we should plan forthrightly accordingly. (I hope we can encourage him and perhaps S/P to come forth with some tangible planning on this.) We tend to forget how near we are to the post-colonial period, and we must plan how to lead the Afro-Asians in matters of their next major attention so that trends will be more in accordance with United States interests and traditional beliefs.

He also spoke of the difficult problem of financing operational matters in the UN. He said we had to find a means of avoiding situations whereby every action is dependent upon everyone’s willingness to pay. He pointed out that in instances where the communists do not approve of action they will not support it financially. In the present stage of French disenchantment with the UN they, too, are unlikely to be willing to support many of its activities consonant with their ability to do so. The poorer nations are unable to do so. The combination of all of these is equivalent to more than a blocking third in the UN. He did not offer a solution to this one.

George McGhee said he was struck by the pessimism shown at Oslo with regard to the future of the UN. He said if we should be faced at some point with a choice between our NATO alliance or our support [Page 348] of the UN, it would be an exceedingly difficult choice for us. While not supporting the Portuguese view of their own colonial problem, he said they at least serve to flag some coming dangers. In their words we had for some time been “appeasing” the new nations of the world by handing over colonies. When they are all gone they will surely turn to other matters related to privileges of the “have” nations and the self-appointedly “superior” races. At this time they will use their growing influence in this world body to turn to such problems as Berlin, oil monopolies and military bases.

George said that while the problem of overt aggression may be in general solved now, the problem of indirect aggression certainly was not. Harlan Cleveland said that there was some promise even in this regard, however, in the Congo lesson in recent developments.

Mr. Bowles said that he thought the discussion so far had been overly pessimistic. He said a decade ago the communists had six revolutions going on in Asia and the only one they won was the Indo-China one, where Asians were fighting the white man. The British of course were associated with the suppression of the Malayan rebellion, but the point is that because of their history of preparing their colonies for independence and then in fact granting that independence, they were believed by the Malayans. This was certainly not true with respect to the French. He continued by saying that we have a number of advantages over the Soviets:

1)
We do not want to take over the world, and the world does not want to be taken over.
2)
We can use the tremendous forces associated with nationalism if we have the courage and intelligence to do so.
3)
With all the predicted dangers inherent in the UN of a rapidly changing character, it is still likely to continue to be more in our interest than in that of the communists (Khrushchev can take small comfort from what he got out of the last session of the UN).
4)
We must recognize that both the United States and the Soviets will become less powerful percentage wise in the world which is so rapidly evolving. This will definitely be bad for the Soviets but it need not be so bad for us considering the sort of world we not only can live with but would like to help bring about.
5)
The days when we ran the UN are over, but this is not necessarily bad unless we indicate that we consider it to be so.

He said in general he was optimistic about the UN of the future. For one thing, he had always felt that if you couldn’t solve a certain problem, it was often helpful to attempt to get the problem hopelessly confused. He said we were pretty good at that and the UN could help us in it.

Allan Evans feared that the “have nots” would, as they turn from the colonial issue, enter an era of “soaking the rich” and that we were [Page 349] likely to become more acutely conscious as time went on that we whites were the distinct minority in the world. He wondered whether the UN, in so far as it must lend itself to be a vehicle for the underprivileged and pigmented to get back at the privileged and white, was in our over-all interest after all. Several expressed opinions that it definitely was, provided we acted maturely ourselves. In this part of the discussion it was pointed out that even though the UN acted as a catalyst in the formation of blocs, without the UN powerful forces at work in the contemporary world would doubtless form regional associations which might give even more trouble if they were not part of a global council.

Harlan Cleveland advanced the interesting thesis that regional approach to security, while seeming to make all the sense in the world and did to a limited extent, was not proving to be what we had expected of it. Somehow nations are much readier to contribute forces to the solution of problems far from their boundaries than they are near home. India, for instance, has contributed a brigade in Africa but we would be fortunate indeed to get a couple of companies from India in any action which might eventuate with respect to Laos, even though the fate of Laos is of more immediate concern to India. We, too, in recent years with a notable exception or two have not felt free to engage our forces in Latin America. It seems that today security is best served by considerable cross-breeding.

One member (whom I did not know) expressed the view that while attempting to understand the rather widespread disillusionment with the UN characteristic of our European friends, we must resolutely carry on with our own belief in the UN despite their attempts to deflect us. Time, he felt, would prove that such a course would in the long run be very much in the interest of our European friends as well as in ours and that of the whole world community.

Considerable discussion was held concerning the mechanics of keeping our officers in the field adequately educated with regard to UN matters in other than their immediate areas so that they could in turn educate their hosts and solicit views from them. The opinion was expressed that we would do well to do more soliciting and less arm-twisting.

The meeting ended with the observation that perhaps the best advertisement of the virtues of the UN with regard to our interests lay in the fact that the Soviets did not like the UN and were doing everything in their power to make it ineffective.

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, 310/1–661. Confidential. Copies were sent to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Avery F. Peterson, all Advisers, and Officer Directors.