122. Paper Prepared in the U.S. Information Agency1

AREAS OF CONFLICT

1. In programming, the principal problem caused by the existence of several U.S. broadcasting stations each with a different mission is that overseas listeners cannot always be certain to which they are listening. There have been many reports in recent years, from our embassies, refugees, and other sources, that many listeners in the USSR and the satellites frequently are unable to distinguish between VOA and RFE-RL. All three are known to be U.S.-supported so it is understandable that these listeners often do not attempt to make a distinction. The credibility—or lack thereof—of one U.S. radio tends to rub off on the others. This is also true, but to a lesser extent, with respect to VOA and VUNC broadcasts to Korea and the Chinese mainland. AFRTS broadcasts also are confused in some countries with VOA English transmissions. It can be argued, of course, that it is desirable to have more than one U.S. radio available to listeners, each designed for a different segment of the audience.

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2. In the case of AFRTS there is a possibility that the relatively large-scale use of frequencies and filling of the airwaves with a foreign language causes people to resent the presence of U.S. troops. Such broadcasting undoubtedly makes the presence of the troops more visible to a larger section of the population. This can be both good and bad. These issues are somewhat similar to those raised by the ostentatiousness of PX’s.

3. Frequency Usage. Frequencies for international broadcasting are becoming an increasingly more difficult resource to obtain. Particularly in the high frequency spectrum, the outlook is very bleak because of the fact that the total amount of useful spectrum space is decreasing considerably while at the same time new broadcasting services are increasing. VOA could use part of the spectrum space now used by RFE and RL. From the standpoint of delivering a U.S. message to the world, their use of these frequencies is inefficient since their targets are limited to only a few countries. Their use of the frequencies makes them unusable by others over a much wider geographical area; in addition since RFE and RL are always jammed even neighboring frequencies are interfered with.

The operation of AFRTS stations overseas also adds to the frequency problem. In Germany for example, AFN uses several powerful 100 KW transmitters on several desirable medium wave frequencies. These frequencies would be very valuable to VOA, for example, which has only one mediumwave frequency for its relay station in Munich. The German stations also would like very much to have use of one or more of these frequencies and may some day demand them back. Possibly we would be better off by arranging for VOA to have one of these frequencies and the Germans the rest . . . before we are forced to give them all back. U.S. willingness to give up one or more of these frequencies now night even be used as the “Quid” for extending or enlarging our VOA agreement with the German government.

The use of frequencies for AFRTS, particularly those with high power, becomes increasingly difficult to justify to international conferences working on frequency availability.

4. Interference. Because of the band crowding which is greatly increased by the large RFE and RL use of frequencies, there is considerably less than desirable separation between stations. Because of this, RFE and RL cause interference to VOA transmissions. VOA could utilize the same number of transmitters and frequencies without this detrimental effect because it has a much wider target area and could therefore plan the frequency usage so as not to cause itself this interference.

5. Jamming. RFE and RL attract a great deal of jamming, much of which spills over and jams VOA programs which are not otherwise jammed. Permanent jammers can be set up efficiently on RFE and RL frequencies to cover their limited target area. VOA usage of a frequency to widely separated areas makes the problem of jamming much more [Page 236] difficult since many more jammers are required to work on a given number of transmitters and frequencies. Every time we bring up the subject of Communist jamming (either at the International Telecommunications Union, the United Nations or directly with the Russians), they counter-challenge by accusing the United States of broadcasting “evil propaganda broadcasts.” While we have always pointed out that the Voice of America broadcasts do not fall into the category they describe, they immediately make reference to the broadcasts of RL and RFE. We claim to have no control over the broadcasts of RFE and RL, but this is not believed by many countries of the world. Up until now, our attempts to condemn Communist jamming have always ended in a stalemate. We attack the Russians for jamming us and they counter-attack by claiming that we are directing broadcasts of an inflammatory nature to them (and the broadcasts they usually refer to are RL and RFE).

In 1950 the UNGA condemned both sides by stating that both jamming and inflammatory propaganda broadcasts should cease. It is very difficult for us to take a strong position against jamming on the one hand and defend the broadcasts of RL and RFE on the other.

6. International Conferences. The existence of RFE and RL are becoming more embarrassing to handle at international conferences concerning broadcasting and telecommunications regulation. It is obvious to a great many of the members of these conferences that these two radio operations are U.S. government supported, and yet explanation of the need for these operations is very difficult for anyone to give. In conferences dealing with the problems of frequency shortage, interference, attempts to find useful spectrum for the new and developing countries, etc., explanation of these operations, which use such big chunks of the bands, is difficult, and results in weakening the U.S. position, since it leaves the impression of something in which the U.S. is deeply involved but is not willing to admit or explain.

7. Host Agreements. Another way in which RFE and RL cause some difficulty to VOA is in the matter of agreements with host governments. RFE and RL are able to make agreements of a type which would not be permitted for VOA, because they do not have the same restrictions on expenditures or other terms. This makes it difficult for VOA to obtain satisfactory agreements wherever the host is familiar with the RFE or RL arrangements.

8. AFRTS Use of VOA Facilities. VOA provides AFRTS with transmission facilities for the broadcast of AFRTS programs from the U.S. to overseas locations and, in one instance, for relay of the programs abroad. The service to AFRTS amounts to 79:45 transmitter hours daily—or 9% of VOA transmitter usage—and is absorbed in the VOA budget with no reimbursement from AFRTS.

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If prorated as a part of the overall VOA network costs, the value of the AFRTS transmissions would be approximately $386,000 annually. However, the savings to VOA if the AFRTS utilization of our facilities should be terminated would be only about $85,000. Obviously separate AFRTS transmitting facilities would be more expensive.

In addition to the daily AFRTS schedule, VOA facilities are furnished to AFRTS on an ad hoc basis for the coverage of special events, mainly sports. We comply with AFRTS requests for facilities on such occasions whenever it is possible to do so without serious harm to our own operations.

Since our facilities do not now provide the flexibility we require for our own purposes, the carrying of AFRTS affects our program decisions, limiting the diversity of our programs.

It should be mentioned that VOA and AFRTS work together to some extent in the program area. The degree of cooperation varies from area to area, depending upon the need and the personnel involved.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, Arthur M. Schlesinger Papers, White House Subject Files, Classified Subject File, USIA, Box 48. Secret; Eyes Only. An attached covering memorandum from Murrow, dated May 8, transmitted this paper to Walt Rostow at the White House. It reads in part: “It seemed to me best to try to outline the magnitude of the problem we face in attempting to coordinate or consolidate United States radio efforts. This is our effort to do so. As you will observe, the paper is stripped of technicalities and I fear the alternatives are none of them satisfactory.”