Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

66. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Ankara, April 28, 1961, 10 a.m.

Secto 11. Eyes Only for Acting Secretary from Secretary. Reference: Tosec 15.¹ Will arrive for 9:30 Department meeting morning April 29. Further comments on Laos:

1. Delicacy our problem is that we may be on verge of (A) cease-fire which could lead to some tolerable peaceful settlement Laotian question safeguarding general security remainder Southeast Asia or (B) military involvements which could escalate into large-scale war in Asia and possibly throughout world. Big question is which. Our intelligence community should thoroughly canvass all information bearing on readiness of Sino-Soviet bloc to press for Communist Laos at whatever cost, most especially movements southward Chinese Army, Air, Naval units.

2. We ourselves have no special national interest in becoming involved in large-scale fighting in Laos. Our national interest is heavy but part of collective interest in security Southeast Asia. On this we must of course play leading role but if collective action not fully backed by our SEATO allies we must think hard about where our responsibilities lie. Asian neutrals in area must also consider how valuable umbrella American power is to them. Time has come for them to decide whether they are to help hold up that umbrella at least through political support on this issue.

3. We must be clear in our action and words that we are not spoiling for a fight but are working to bring about a peaceful settlement. This means to me that we emphasize background efforts present administration to secure genuinely neutral Laos by peaceful processes and convict Sino-Soviet bloc of cynical aggression directly contrary to Khrushchev’s protestations about Austrian Laos. Thus any military step should be limited in its general mission and should be accompanied by United Nations and other efforts to keep peaceful processes busily engaged.

4. If we commit US forces on whatever scale military must have clear mission and we must keep out of their way regarding operations. I cannot emphasize too strongly that we must not try to run a fight half way around the world by all sorts of leading strings from State Department. What the military will need from us is full diplomatic support to carry out assigned mission, however limited that mission might in fact be.

5. President must not be allowed to make decision to employ organized US forces without full presentation possible contingencies involved. Immediate possibilities are renewal fighting in Korea, bombing on bases in Okinawa and Japan, air and possibly other forms attack on off-shore islands and Formosa. Possibilities similar action elsewhere must be part of his decision.

6. Much depends upon attitude of non-Communist Laotians, both leaders and people. In Greece and Korea people themselves gave us something to support. If Laos shows no interest, US arms cannot import freedom into indifferent country. King, Phoumi and other leaders must come clean on their commitments to future their country. If their attitude unsatisfactory we might consider consolidating position on Mekong and in southern Laos designed to secure Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam with determination to react violently against any attempts to dislodge us or push advance southward. I hope Laos will do much better than this and believe our efforts should continue to be to strengthen their resolution.

7. Reluctant to suggest from here what our decisions should be on Saturday morning.² Believe steps taken past three days have been just right. Since I will be in Department early Saturday morning, please have all intelligence and other materials ready before 9:30 meeting. With such thoughts as above in mind, I do believe that we cannot permit Laos to be overrun militarily by Communists without SEATO resistance and maximum political effort to obtain world support for that resistance.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–2861. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Received at 4:59 a.m.
1. In Tosec 15, April 27, Bowles informed Rusk that there was to be an NSC meeting on Laos and Vietnam scheduled for 10:30 a.m. and suggested a preparatory meeting at the Department of State at 9:30 a.m. Bowles also told Rusk that the President concurred in Harriman’s visit to Vientiane, but the general feeling was that a Lemnitzer visit at this time was not desirable. (Ibid., 751J.00/4–2761)
2. April 29.