356. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara0

JCSM–376–62

SUBJECT

  • Military Implications of the Situation in Laos (U)
1.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff note with grave concern the flagrant breach at Nam Tha on 6 May 1962 of the Laos cease-fire agreement. The renewal of hostilities by enemy forces at Nam Tha resulted in the complete disintegration of the military situation in Northern Laos and has placed communist forces on the border of Thailand. An ultimate result could be complete demoralization of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) Armed Forces.
2.
The attack on Nam Tha is a major departure from the earlier communist strategy of limited but constant encroachment against the territories held by the RLG at the time of the 3 May 1961 cease-fire. The enemy may have believed that a crushing defeat of the government’s principal concentration of elite forces would cause wholesale defections [Page 743] and consequent capitulation of RLG forces elsewhere in Laos. There is no doubt that this enemy success has caused serious adverse effect on the morale and capabilities of the RLG Armed Forces. Additionally, the communists can be expected to increase their pressure against the government force in Central and Southern Laos, particularly where the Lao Army is a potential threat to communist control of routes leading through Laos from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. There has been an increase in enemy activity in the Saravane area and communist forces are in a position to attack. The activity around Saravane may be a prelude to enemy campaigns to seize additional territory before the height of the oncoming rainy season (mid-May through September).
3.
The enemy violation of the cease-fire at Nam Tha provides conclusive evidence of the inability of Souvanna Phouma to control the Pathet Lao and the futility of relying on him to provide requisite leadership for a neutral Laos. In a recent message to his representative in Xieng Khouang, Souvanna Phouma indicated that the attack on Nam Tha was contrary to his instructions to employ defensive tactics in case of attack by RLG forces. He further requested that his representative in Xieng Khouang arrange for the withdrawal of Pathet Lao troops to the positions they occupied as of 3 May 1961. The Pathet Lao forces have not acceded to this request from Souvanna Phouma and have, in fact, continued their offensive. Regardless of the reaction of the Pathet Lao, it is believed that a reappraisal of the US policy in Laos is urgently required.
4.
Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following courses of action:
a.
Demand that the International Control Commission go to the scene for investigation of the cease-fire violation around Nam Tha. Also demand that the communist forces withdraw to positions held prior to the attack on Muong Sing.1
b.
Bring diplomatic pressure to bear on the USSR to discontinue aid to the enemy forces.
c.
Institute an information program designed to display to the world flagrant and unprovoked violation of the cease-fire agreement.
d.
Resume financial assistance and increase military assistance to Laos.
e.
Remove current restraints on Phoumi’s freedom of military action.
f.
Provide for appropriate air support to the RLG forces.
g.
Enlist Thai and other Allied support in the increased training effort.2
h.
Deploy the US Army Battle Group (-) now in Thailand, to positions along the Thai-Laos border as a further extension of joint US-Thai training exercises.
i.
Increase the tempo of Meo and Kha operations.
j.
Make it apparent that US forces for deployment to Southeast Asia in support of SEATO Plan 5 or CINCPAC Oplan 32–59, Phase II (Laos), have been alerted.3
k.
Request increased alertness and movements of additional Thai forces towards Laos borders.
l.
Provide aircraft, either covert US, or other, to interdict Communist airlift in Laos.
5.
On 7 September 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in their review of the strategic implications of the situation in Laos that, if an acceptable political solution was not obtained prior to the resumption to overt hostilities, SEATO Plan 5 should be implemented. In the event that the foregoing actions do not result in the restoration of the 3 May 1961 cease-fire line in a reasonable length of time, then the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the only alternative to prevent Communist domination of Laos rests in the implementation in substance of SEATO Plan 5 with such SEATO members as are willing to participate.4
6.
The increased US military effort in Laos herein recommended will not be fully effective unless the FAR has cohesive leadership and is at the same time responsive to US military advice.5 The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it essential that Phoumi, who is the strongest anti-Communist leader known to them, remain as head of the pro-Western Laotian forces. At the same time, Phoumi must be made to understand that he must follow US advice. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur with the proposal in Part 6.C of the Department of State memorandum,6 which was discussed with the President on 10 May 1962, and which recommends that immediate steps be taken designed to undermine Phoumi’s prestige and political influence.7
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
G. H. Decker

Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, 381 Laos. Top Secret. McNamara made notes in the margin of the first page of the source text about numbers of U.S. troops available, the fighter aircraft strength of China within range of Laos and potential fighters from North Korea and Shanghai, and the capabilities of the 13th Air Force and U.S. carriers against South China and North Vietnamese airfields.
  2. It should be noted that, on 8 May 1962, Gromyko turned down Roberts’ proposal that Geneva Co-Chairmen request an early report from the ICC on Nam Tha (Moscow to State 2881 of 8 May 1962). [Footnote in the source text. Telegram 2881 is in Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–862.]
  3. McNamara wrote the following marginal comment at this point: “meaning—by whom—target what?”
  4. At this point, McNamara wrote the following comment in the margin: “No. of US, describe implementation.”
  5. McNamara wrote the following here: “Yes, but [illegible] they rec #5 & how do they appraise ChiCom & NVN capability.”
  6. At this point, McNamara wrote: “Note inadequacy of RLG mil. leadership & unresponsiveness to US leadership.”
  7. See attachment to Document 351.
  8. McNamara wrote here: “It is undermined.”