Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

20. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, February 28, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• H.E. Mikhail A. Menshikov, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
• Mr. Igor Bubnov, Third Secretary, Embassy of the USSR
• The Secretary
• Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. C. Chapman, Officer-in-charge, Laos Affairs

At his request Ambassador Menshikov called on the Secretary on February 28 and read a prepared text setting forth the Soviet answer to the Secretary’s presentation of the United States position on Laos. The Soviet Government, the Ambassador began, notes with satisfaction that the United States Government desires an independent and neutral Laos and a cessation of hostilities there. This position coincides with that of the Soviet Government. However, the Soviet Government also maintains that provisions of the Geneva Agreement remain in force, a position it has made known in a number of previous exchanges. While the Soviet Government does not want to stir up the past, nevertheless, it considers that the existing situation has been caused by US military support to the Boun Oum-Nosavan rebels against the legitimate Government of Souvanna Phouma. If both the United States and Soviet Governments agree that Laos should be independent and neutral, their joint efforts should be aimed at supporting the Souvanna Government. To take another road would be fraught with dangers to peace. While it will be a difficult job to avoid conflict, there is a common basis if we proceed from the Geneva Agreement. The Soviet Government believes that the international conference proposed by Prince Sihanouk to settle the Lao problem is of paramount importance. This conference will consider measures for the normalization of the situation and will issue directives on new terms of reference for the ICC. This Commission could and should make a valuable contribution to the solution of the problem. The Commission can only proceed if it rests on a firm foundation of international law. The terms set forth by the Geneva Agreement on Laos are no longer adequate. If in the past the Commission worked under conditions of peace, the Commission will now have to restore peace. In order to enable the Commission to restore peace, it must obtain additional powers from an international conference. The Soviet Government has already proposed to the United Kingdom and to the Government of India to take steps to convene the ICC in New Delhi and the Government of India has spoken in favor of the reactivation of the ICC. The key now to the solution of the Lao problem is to call an international conference and reactivate the ICC. Of the invited 14 countries, most have accepted the invitation or shown a “positive attitude”; only the United States and the South Vietnamese have not expressed themselves in favor of the conference. Therefore only United States assent is needed to make the conference possible.

The Soviet Government notes the United States Government’s support of the King’s proposal. The United States Government is actually proposing to abandon the Geneva Agreements and replace the ICC with a new commission for which there is no legal ground. Obviously the Soviet Union as one of the co-chairmen cannot take such a road which would lead to the aggravation of the situation in Laos. The proposal is aimed at strengthening the Boun Oum-Nosavan regime and leading it out of its political isolation. Moreover, the question arises whether the proposal for a new commission, which sidesteps and violates the Geneva Agreement, does not aim at removing socialist Poland from the Commission. The cooperation of all countries is required and not the imposition of another group.

Attaching great importance to the taking of immediate measures for settling the Lao problem, the Soviet Government hopes the United States Government will join the common effort and is firmly convinced that the two Governments can find a common approach which will considerably strengthen the faith of the people in the possibility of peaceful solutions of problems.

The Secretary answered that he welcomed the thoughtful and moderate tone of the communication and the indication that the Soviet Government agrees that a neutral and independent Laos is a common objective. The Secretary said we will want to think about the Soviet presentation and that we will present our detailed views at a later date. However, he made a number of observations: 1) The United States Government believes that the Royal Lao Government is the only legitimate government of Laos, though we would be glad to have it include other elements who had experience, and that it should proceed to get on with the central task of reconstruction of the country which has been torn by strife for too many years. The King is the focal point of constitutional authority. He is free to act as he chooses and the Parliament is free to act as it chooses. The present Government of Prime Minister Boun Oum is, under the Lao constitution, the proper constitutional authority of that country. 2) The United States Government thinks that the King’s proposal has real merit because we feel that Laos and other disinterested neighbors might search among themselves to find means of solving the problem to the satisfaction of both of our Governments in a way to reduce future tensions. 3) The Secretary noted the Ambassador’s remark regarding the elimination of the Polish representative and pointed out that the proposal would also eliminate the Canadian as well as Indian representatives. The proposal seemed to offer one way of bringing some distance between the Soviets and ourselves, thereby avoiding a direct confrontation. Thus, the three proposed members of the Commission over whom neither of our two countries had any control would permit neither threat nor anxiety. 4) The United States Government has hoped that we could find in the course of our discussion that our objectives were indeed the same. We believe it is important to work toward common objectives by methods which are conducive to the reduction of tensions and which are likely to produce agreement. 5) The Secretary gathered from the Ambassador’s remarks that the Soviet Government had in mind amendments to the instructions for the ICC. The Secretary observed that if we are to go into an international conference with important issues unresolved, the conference itself could be a source of increased tensions and impede satisfactory settlement.

The Ambassador professed not to understand the Secretary’s last remarks. There are only two approaches to the problem: one, he said, is based on the decisions taken by the Geneva Conference and the other on a one-sided approach. The Ambassador thought that the best and proper thing was for all countries to get together to settle this question. There are two positions, he continued, that of the United States and that of the USSR plus a majority of the other countries. Already in 1954 a solution had been found in the same area. It had taken a long time and attracted attention, but the main thing was for the interested countries to get together.

The Soviets know, the Ambassador said, that the King is a captive of the Boun Oum-Nosavan regime. He declares one thing one day and another thing at a different time. Again in regard to the ICC the Ambassador asked why change its composition only to satisfy one side.

The Secretary again emphasized that we consider the King to be free. The Secretary added that since the new administration took office the United States and Soviet Governments have treated each other civilly and thereby opened the possibility of improving relations. We would be disturbed by any kind of meeting which would lead to a public debate of differences, particularly if there are people around the table interested in stirring up and adding to existing differences. The Soviets and ourselves have important problems, e.g., nuclear tests which we are approaching in a serious way which we hope the Soviets share. Prospects for agreement will turn in part on the success of maintaining a certain correctness and calm toward each other.

The Ambassador answered that since the United States and the USSR would be present at the international conference we could jointly see that such a conference took a proper course and reached decisions agreeable to everybody. All countries, the Ambassador repeated, are interested in reaching a solution.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–2861. Confidential. Drafted by Chapman and approved in S on March 13. The conversation took place at the Department of State.