Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

125. Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State for the National Security Council⁰

Washington, June 28, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Problem of Laos

I. Situation

A. At Geneva Conference

Substantive discussions undertaken but without any give on Communist side. Soviets have tabled draft protocol on Withdrawal of Foreign Troops and Terms of Reference for ICC incorporating double veto; this step backward from powers given ICC at Geneva in 1954.

French have tabled protocol on Terms of Reference for ICC and we have tabled additional ten Articles on Military Provisions.¹ Together these documents give ICC considerable power, scope of action, and means to do effective job.

Cambodians have prepared draft, which in most respects follows that of Soviets. After discussions, they have decided not to table it and state they will support any agreement acceptable to Lao parties.

Indians are also reported to have prepared a draft document which they have decided not to table until after coalition government formed.

Principal issues confronting Conference have been 1) seating Lao representatives, 2) the cease-fire, and 3) giving ICC sufficient means and authority to do its job. RLG have been unwilling sit on equal terms with Pathet Lao but have agreed to fill seat with representative of non-Communist parties. Communists have systematically distorted violations of cease-fire and blocked all proposals to strengthen ICC. Communists apparently playing for time until “three parties” in Laos can reach agreement on coalition government and single delegation to Conference. They are going to see to it that such a government would be weighted in their favor. With cooperative RLG they could then obtain full endorsement of their position from Conference.

Communists have given no evidence they prepared to arrive at compromise with free world on framework within which neutral Laos could exist. They have not budged from position that after ICC had returned to Laos and the Conference convened, cease-fire was matter to be negotiated among Lao factions and resolved by political settlement leading to coalition government.

B. Situation in Zurich

Three Princes on June 22 issued communique² setting forth agreements on 1) internal and external policies of future government, 2) procedure to form a government, and 3) continuing talks to decide who would be Prime Minister and who would compose government. While RLG (Phoumi) has conceded many points, last two questions are crucial. On their resolution will depend implementation of rest of agreement. Phoumi gained important point by agreement that King name new government.

Souvanna and the Pathet Lao are asking that Souvanna be Prime Minister and that they have two-thirds of the portfolios.

C. Situation on Ground

Pathet Lao have continued to consolidate and improve their positions by systematic clean-up of isolated FAL pockets and logistical build-up. At Ban Padong they launched major assault against FAL (Meo) position they considered potentially threatening. Are also notably expanding south from Tchepone toward Saravane parallel to Vietnamese frontier. They are believed able to take any of major cities now held by RLG. RLG are making some effort to improve position, mostly by minor probes and moving into areas where unopposed.

Communists have been able to block the ICC from taking any effective action on the ground.

There have been number of reports of friction between Kong Le and Pathet Lao. Kong Le forces not paid since [December]³ February.

D. Military Planning with UK

Some weeks ago the UK proposed Admiral Felt and Admiral Luce (the US and UK SEATO Military Advisers) work out a contingency plan for military intervention in Laos. In discussing the terms of reference for those talks⁴ the UK seemed to agree that some strictly defensive SEATO military action would be required if there was a major resumption of the Communist offensive.

E. Attitude of Allies

Thais and Vietnamese are extremely concerned and want us to fight in Laos rather than expand fighting in their territory. They consider that: SEATO has failed, principally because of UK and French influence on US; Souvanna government will bring about Communist Laos; Conference cannot save Laos; seating Pathet Lao and undertaking substantive discussions without obtaining effective and verified cease-fire are indications of free world weakness. They now feel exposed to Communist threat and are uncertain how to meet it.

British and French agree with us that ICC should be given adequate means and powers to do job and that we should continue to insist on an effective and verified cease-fire.

They consider Souvanna only man who can be Prime Minister of neutral Laos and believe we should seek to give him enough support to insure he can maintain position vis-a-vis Communists. They have advocated early formation of coalition under Souvanna. We have continued to argue we should have clearer idea of international controls that Conference might produce before agreeing to such a government.

Australians and New Zealanders deeply concerned over course of events and to large degree share views Asian SEATO members re UK and France.

Canadians concentrating on ICC which main subject their speeches at Geneva. Taking stiffer attitude than at beginning, Canadians have told Indians they would have to reconsider their position if they had to assume responsibility without authority.

F. Attitude of Neutrals

Neutrals, notably India (Menon), have not been as helpful as we had hoped. Sihanouk has tried role of intermediary but his primary pressures have been on RLG to make concessions to other side. Burmese, from whom we expected little, have shown firmer attitude than we anticipated.

G. Soviet Attitudes

Soviets and Chinese Communists have shown no disposition to make any compromise whatsoever. Soviet drafts on ICC include “Troika” principle and are designed to make ICC even less effective than under 1954 Geneva Agreement.

They appear determined obtain international recognition of PL’s favorable position on ground. Despite public support for cease-fire they are distorting “effective cease-fire” by a) their justification of rebel violations notably at Pa Dong and b) persistent refusal to provide any means to ICC.

In letter to Gromyko June 7 Secretary said Pa Dong action was not compatible with the discussion he had with Gromyko in Vienna. Gromyko’s reply was arrogant, curt and unresponsive.⁵ He said incident at Pa Dong was a consequence of violation of airspace held by Communist side and of airlifting troops and equipment.

No material dichotomy between USSR and ChiCom-Viet Minh-PL has appeared at Geneva.

II. The Problem

In light of above developments question arises what courses we should now pursue. Broadly speaking, we are facing the choice of two major courses of action:

(a) If we decide that we are not willing to commit US forces to achieve the US objective, we would continue negotiations at Geneva and accept the best political settlement that we can achieve. This would probably mean accepting a Communist-dominated government of national union under Souvanna and ineffective ICC controls. It is also probable that this would result in Communist control of all Laos. It would abet and provide a route for increased Viet Minh operations against South Viet-Nam. It would also provide a route for increased Communist infiltration of Thailand.

(b) If we decide that we are prepared to commit US forces In Laos if necessary to attain our objective and that this would be advantageous in the over-all confrontation with the Communists, we would pursue political negotiations with a firm determination not to make concessions, and would encourage and support the RLG to refuse to capitulate further to opposition pressures. If political negotiations fail, we would undertake military operations in Laos through SEATO or with those SEATO members prepared to participate, or if necessary, unilaterally. This would then furnish us a military backup position for further negotiations. This course of action is further explored in attachment.

Attachment

Alternative “B”

1. Principal Elements

The principal elements in alternative course “B” would include the U.S. making it clear to the Communists, to Souvanna Phouma, and in the Conference that the U.S. intends to stand firm on the principles set forth in paragraphs two and three below, and in encouraging the RLG to stand firm on these same principles in its negotiations with the other two Princes.

If political negotiations to attain U.S. objectives fail, and if the Communists continue to consolidate their military position in Laos, the United States would be prepared quickly to initiate military operations in Laos through SEATO or with those SEATO members prepared to participate, or, if necessary, unilaterally.

2. U.S. Position in the Conference

The U.S. would stand firm in its position that we propose to attain: (a) A legally constituted government of national union which is not Communist dominated; (b) International agreement to respect an independent, neutral government in Laos, tied to no outside power or group of powers, threatened by no one and free from any domination; (c) An effective ICC to maintain the peace; (d) Adequate provision for internal security forces.

We would make it perfectly clear to the other participants in the Conference, and particularly to the Communists, that our position regarding an acceptable solution to the Lao problem is absolutely firm. We would also make the point directly with the Soviet Government.

3. U.S. Advice to Phoumi

In discussions with Phoumi, we would urge the RLG to be firm in their negotiations with the Souvanna-PL group. Specifically we would urge the RLG to hold out for a predominantly non-Communist composition of any government of national union, both with respect to numbers and to importance of positions held. We would urge the RLG to insist on observance of agreements reached at Zurich for nomination of a cabinet by the King, to oppose early elections and insist that these be held only after the situation of the country has become more normal.

We would tell Phoumi that the U.S. intends to make no further concessions at the Conference, that it will stand firm in its objectives, and that we are resolved that our position will be backed up militarily if necessary.

4. U.S. Relations with Souvanna

We would make clear to Souvanna that the United States position on the points noted in paragraph two above is firm, and that we would be prepared to support a Lao government headed by him only if he is prepared to accept and also to support those positions. We would work to bring Souvanna around to these positions directly, as well as through the French, British and Indians. However, it is probably unlikely that Souvanna can quickly or readily be brought to support the foregoing positions or that the Communist bloc countries will accept these positions as a basis for ultimate solution of the Lao problem.

5. Probable Course of Events

(a) We can expect that the negotiations will stall. An inconclusive cease-fire will continue for a while. As the firmness of our position becomes more evident two results are possible: (1) The Communists, convinced of our firmness of intent and purpose, will agree to a negotiated settlement acceptable to us; (2) More likely, no acceptable settlement will be reached at Geneva or in Laos and the Conference could drag on indefinitely. While the inconclusive cease-fire could also continue, it is probable that after a time, the Communists would initiate new violations of the cease-fire, with the purpose of exerting military pressure, further improving the PL military position, and lowering Phoumi’s resolve.

6. Ensuing U.S. Actions

(a) At Geneva the U.S. Delegation would move to suspend Conference sessions if cease-fire violations occur; (b) If this tactic failed to stimulate progress toward our political objective, such violations would form the basis for the implementation of some agreed version of SEATO Plan 5, which would be preceded by an appropriate request from the RLG.

The military intervention would be undertaken to achieve the following objectives: (1) To secure key points along the Mekong River with airfields and river crossings in their vicinity, and the lines of communication between them. (2) To assist the Lao Army in regaining areas lost to the insurgents by furnishing additional materiel and logistic support, by denying other vital areas to the insurgents and by participating in offensive operations such as the provision of air support, communications, psychological warfare and other special operations. (3) To achieve the necessary position to permit successful political negotiation for a unified, independent and neutral Laos.

7. Additional Measures

Long term inconclusive negotiations under the present military conditions in Laos will afford the Communists additional time to mount increasing offensive pressures on South Vietnam. The subversive war in South Vietnam can be expected to increase in intensity. To counter it, coordinated moves by picked South Vietnamese, Thai and Lao troops could be made to push salients westward from Vietnam and eastward from Thailand along Route 9. The Thais would use elements of the Thai PARU units [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The selected FAL elements would have U.S. advisors.

We would continue to supply by air the Meos in northern Laos, as an anti-Communist force behind the enemy lines.

It might be possible to characterize such actions as a military response to Communist cease-fire violations. They might be regarded as counter-actions, undertaken at places of our own choosing, to offset the gains made by the PL in their violations of the cease-fire since 3 May.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/27/61–6/30/61. Top Secret. Prepared in FE and discussed by McConaughy, U. Alexis Johnson, and Rusk on June 25; see Document 120. A covering note indicates that it was circulated to the NSC only as a basis for discussion.
1. See footnote 4, Document 119.
2. See footnote 2, Document 119.
3. Brackets in the source text.
4. A summary account of discussion between Admirals Felt and Luce, at Okinawa, June 20, is in a memorandum from Colonel Francis J. Roberts to Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, June 28. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/A Miscellaneous Sensitive Files: FRC 71 A 6489, Laos 381 (Sensitive), June-Dec 61)
5. See footnotes 2 and 4, Document 111.