1. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower0

OTHERS PRESENT

  • Secretaries Herter and Merchant, Douglas, General Lemnitzer, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Hagerty, General Goodpaster

This meeting was held to consider with the President the situation in Laos. The President began by saying he had read the JCS military situation report of that day.1 He thought the big question is to see where our allies stand on this whole matter. He thought, for example, that Australia (Prime Minister Menzies) would be deeply concerned. Mr. Herter said that a SEATO meeting was being held the same day.2 The French position is unclear, but unhelpful. They are not supporting our efforts to get Souvanna Phouma to resign nor are they willing to recognize the Boun Oum-Phoumi government. Mr. Herter said he would like to draft a message to de Gaulle for the President’s consideration.3

Mr. Herter then noted that Mr. Dulles had received a message to the effect that the King of Laos had called a meeting of the assembly in Vientiane.4 The prospect therefore was that the Boun Oum government would be recognized in two or three days. He said it is clear that the British [Page 2] are now trying to come along with us. Mr. Merchant confirmed this, stating that the British are very disturbed over this whole development but are trying to be helpful and stand with us.5

The President said he is very impatient with the French over this matter,6 and that he would definitely like to send something to De Gaulle on it right away. Mr. Herter said the French attitude is very curious. It is sort of a dog in the manger complex with great jealousy of any U.S. activity in Laos. He recalled that our people are there in the technical aid group only as assistants to the French. Mr. Merchant said that he was a little inclined to wait on the message to De Gaulle until the SEATO meeting had been held. The French representative in Washington seemed to be holding back the full extent of the French position, which may be much worse from our standpoint than has been indicated. The President recognized the validity of this, but observed that, if we wait until De Gaulle has once taken a position, it will be impossible to get him to change. This is just not in his make-up.

Mr. Herter said that one problem is the intense French distrust and dislike of Phoumi. Mr. Merchant stated that Phoumi is anti-French, and this may be the reason—he hates them with a bitter passion. The President said that, if it weren’t for the neighboring countries and the effect on them, we ought to let Laos go down the drain. Mr. Douglas commented that it is the poorest place to save that we know of.

Mr. Herter advanced the question as to what should be the political objective of military operations in Laos in case we had to intervene. General Lemnitzer said the plan would be for our forces to hold the two main cities and leave to the Laotians the protection of the countryside. The President said he holds the conviction that if we ever resort to force, the thing to do is to clear up the problem completely. We should not allow a running sore like the British had in Egypt or the U.S. had in Korea. He considered that we were very fortunate to have, as an excuse to get out, the fact that we had cleared the southern area back to the 38th parallel. He said he assumed of course we would wait for a SEATO conference before intervening.

Mr. Herter stated that if the Boun Oum government is ratified by the assembly, the French will find themselves out on a limb. The President [Page 3] recalled the gross French mishandling of Indo-China. De Lattre7 was the only Frenchman who saw the solution there.

Mr. Dulles said that a massive Russian intervention in Laos is taking place in the form of the airlift. So long as this continues, the rebel forces will retain great strength. He noted that the Russians may be using a strip in rebel hands in the Plaine des Jarres. He asked if we could do something about this. General Lemnitzer noted that Loyalist forces are just south of the city of Xieng Khouang. Mr. Dulles reiterated that we must stop the Soviet intervention. Mr. Merchant stated that the Laotian government has now formally protested to the Soviet government, and to the United Nations.8 Mr. Herter noted that Hammarskjold has said he does not want this problem in the United Nations, but feels it should be dealt with in SEATO.

Mr. Dulles said he suggested that a small task force be set up to bring all intelligence reports together and coordinate them.

The President responded sharply stating that he saw no reason why this should not all have been done already, and added that this is what we have an intelligence system for.

Mr. Douglas stated that, if we had some French and British backing, the way to stop the Russian airlift in its tracks would be to send fighters in to stop it.

Mr. Herter said that some of our naval forces are moving in the Western Pacific, and other forces are taking alert measures that will be noticed and be reported publicly. He thought a statement should be made that we have certain obligations with SEATO and are taking preparatory measures to be able to meet them. General Lemnitzer said the Defense Department is planning simply to say that it has assumed higher readiness conditions. The President said that the Defense Department should put out the statement, linking it to SEATO.9

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Mr. Douglas said he saw value in the President’s telling De Gaulle that the intervention of the Russians must be stopped. Mr. Dulles said he wanted to report heavy Viet Minh intervention also. Mr. Herter commented that nothing has been confirmed concerning this. General Lemnitzer said his estimate is that 80–90% of the forces are composed of Pathet Lao, with a hard core of Viet Minh non-coms and technicians.

The President thought that the Western side might gain by pitting the airfield at Plaine des Jarres with medium-size bombers. General Lemnitzer commented that the B–26s could be used for this purpose.

The President noted that attacks on airfields can often be most effective through attacking fuel supplies, but observed that the Russians are probably not bringing in much fuel as yet. If we do not somehow stop this build-up, however, they will in all likelihood soon be bringing in fighter aircraft. Mr. Herter said that the Thais have been asked by the Laotians for a parachute battalion. Before they furnish this, however, they want a commitment from us to support them if they are attacked. The President said this could be given in the form of a confirmation that we stand by the treaty. Mr. Herter said we have assured them of this. General Lemnitzer stated that the parachute battalion is in fact a ranger-type battalion which could be very effective in guerrilla operations.

The President said he did not see much more to do at the moment. He thought we should make clear that we are faithful to the SEATO treaty and expect other signatories to be the same. Mr. Merchant thought that a short message could be prepared for De Gaulle, bringing out that we take seriously the present situation, that it is important that they stand by us in the present situation, in opposing any nation’s military intervention from outside.

Mr. Herter concluded the meeting by saying the British had suggested some new ideas concerning the use of the ICC which seemed to hold a good deal of promise.

G.

Brigadier General, USA
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. The conference took place at the White House. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Appointments, 1960–1961. (Ibid.)
  2. The JCS Situation Report, January 2, indicated that the three-pronged and coordinated plan of the Boun Oum government forces to attack Kong Le in Vang Vieng north from Vientiane, south from Luang Prabang, and west from the Plaine des Jarres was breaking down. The attack from the west was delayed because of Pathet Lao counterattacks on the Plaine des Jarres. (Ibid., White House Office, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, International File, Laos) Published in Declassified Documents, 1980, 50A.
  3. Ambassador Johnson called a special council representatives’ meeting on January 2 and briefed the SEATO representatives on the situation in Laos. (Memorandum of conversation, January 2; Department of State, Central Files, 379.00/1–261)
  4. The letter from Eisenhower to De Gaulle was sent in telegram 2763 to Paris, January 2. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–261) A copy of this letter was also sent to British Prime Minister Macmillan. (Telegram 3415 to London, January 2; ibid.)
  5. Not further identified.
  6. Merchant apparently based this conclusion at least in part on his discussion with British Ambassador Caccia on January 1. (Memorandum of conversation, January 1; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–161)
  7. Merchant drafted notes of this meeting and quoted the President as follows: “The French: The older I get, the more disgusted with them I am—not the French people but their governments. De Gaulle is as bad as any of the previous ones.” (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Meetings with the President, 1961)
  8. General d’Armee Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, French High Commissioner and Commander of French Forces in Indochina, December 1950–November 1951.
  9. On December 31, 1960, the Boun Oum government sent the Soviet Union a note protesting Soviet intervention in Lao internal affairs by the airlift of war materials to pro-Communist forces in rebellion and asked the Soviet Union to cease its illegal action. In telegram 1231 from Vientiane, January 2, the Embassy reported that Khamphan Panya was going to the United Nations to help present the Boun Oum government’s position and to cultivate through personal contact support among U.N. members. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–261)
  10. On January 2, the Department of Defense released a statement that it was taking “normal precautionary actions to increase the readiness of our forces in the Pacific, including measures to increase airlift capability of the Pacific Command.” On a background basis, Defense emphasized that these actions were taken in light of SEATO obligations. (Telegram DEF 538456, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs to the Secretary of the Army et al., January 2; Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Laos)