Office of the Historian

265. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

Washington, June 18, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • The Korean Military Assistance Program

I was recently briefed on the Cary Report1 on the possible reduction of MAP supported military forces in Korea. I understand it has pleased no one since it does not come up with an easy solution to the problem of reducing force levels. I am also aware that the JCS have reviewed the matter and come out strongly for the maintenance of the present levels.

[Page 577]

I have three observations to make on the matter. The first is that it is highly unlikely that responsible U.S. military authorities will ever recommend a reduction in Korean force levels unless assured of the availability of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in case of the intervention in Korea of ChiCom forces in significant strength. With such an assurance, they would be justified in limiting the mission of South Korean forces to off-setting the North Korean establishment. Without that assurance [1½ lines of source text not declassified]there is no military ground to support a substantial cut in Korean conventional forces.

[1 paragraph (3½ lines of source text) not declassified]

A final comment is to wonder why, with all the pressure on the Department of Defense to support a reduction in the level of Korean forces, has the State Department never been asked to find a political solution to the armistice impasse? The North Koreans and their supporters must be just as tired of the present situation as we are. A minimum political objective would be to secure agreement on both sides to dismantle the fortified front and to maintain a frontier no more heavily defended than the frontier separating, say, Czechoslovakia from West Germany. Why do we not ask our diplomats to ply at their trade of negotiations?

MDT
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, General, 3/62-7/62. Secret.↩
  2. Printed in part as an attachment to Document 258.↩