Office of the Historian

159. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation1

December 13, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Congo

PARTICIPANTS

  • The President
  • Prime Minister Macmillan

After discussing the Congo with the Secretary in Paris, the President called Prime Minister Macmillan on the secure line. He first informed the Prime Minister that we were going ahead with the Volta Dam and were sending Randall2 to see Nkrumah. The decision would not be announced for a day or so in order that certain steps might be taken here.

The President then called the Prime Minister’s attention to the statement on the Congo issued by Acting Secretary Ball at a press conference [Page 311] today. He said we had sent instructions to Ambassador Gullion to see Ralph Bunche to ask him to get together with Adoula. Bunche was requested to determine if the Belgian-British document3 could form the basis for an agreement with Tshombe. The document failed to mention Adoula; some such reference would have to be included. If Adoula was receptive, Bunche would see Tshombe. We would arrange for a secure meeting place for Tshombe and Adoula.

The President laid great stress on the sharply limited nature of the UN operation in the Congo. He said the UN intended to seize only key points. The Belgian-British document could be used as the basis for an agreement. We were trying to get Bunche to see Adoula today. It would be most helpful if the UK would use all its influence on Tshombe to accept the Belgian-British document as a basis for agreement. Tshombe should be given great autonomy but should not insist on independent status. The Adoula government must be kept from collapsing. The US would use its influence on Adoula to secure his agreement. Only limited time was available. Prime Minister Macmillan agreed.

The President said we had emphasized to the UN that the only military operation we can support is a limited one aimed at securing key points in Elizabethville and free communications. We were not supporting land operations against other communities. It was necessary to try to get Tshombe to accept Adoula as Prime Minister and to agree to a single state. The Prime Minister agreed. The President said that if nothing were done militarily we would not be able to get Tshombe to make this concession. Once he agreed to this the military operation would cease.

The President expressed the view that there was no doubt certain of the UN military wanted to go much further; they were much more ambitious. This was especially true of the Indians. Some wished to crush Tshombe. It was necessary to use our influence to prevent that.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12– 1361. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Burdett and approved by the White House on December 20. The conversation took place after President Kennedy and Ball spoke to Rusk in Paris; see Document 158.↩
  2. Former Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy Clarence Randall.↩
  3. See footnote 3, Document 156.↩