Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII

346. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Meyer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jones)⁰

Washington, December 23, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Change of Government in Saudi Arabia

Today’s messages on the change of government in Saudi Arabia have been somewhat inconclusive. Hence, the following random reflections may be of use:

Reasons. King Saud has long wanted to reassert his authority. Thrice earlier this year, he seemed on the verge of doing so. Each time, however, he lost his courage. On two of those occasions, Faisal submitted his resignation which was refused. This time, when the King apparently refused to sign the decree promulgating the new budget, Faisal submitted his resignation which was accepted. Moral: Don’t submit your resignation unless you really want to quit.

Procedure and Form. In his efforts to court popularity, King Saud has spoken much of greater public participation in government. To him, this is essentially a question of form rather than substance. That he had these form aspects in mind is evidenced by: (a) when reasserting his authority, the King did so in the context of Article 8 of a 1958 decree which set up a Cabinet system and, rather than abolishing the Prime Minister’s slot, simply vested its powers and responsibilities in his person and (b) whereas eight portfolios in the previous Cabinet (including four held by Faisal himself) were held by members of the royal family and only three commoners were included (two of them without portfolio), the new cabinet allots five portfolios to members of the royal family and six to commoners. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

New Cabinet.

A. Princes. Three of the new Cabinet Ministers are younger brothers of the King. Talal (Finance) and Badr (Communications) have been identified with the so-called “liberal” princes, who have opposed Faisal [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Abdul Muhsin (Interior) is something of a nonentity. Muhammad bin Saud (Defense) is, of course, the King’s third and favorite son and is quite able. At present, he should be somewhere in Europe.

B. Commoners. The six commoners are competent technicians. Four of them, Abdul Aziz bin Hassan (Education), Dr. Hasan Naif (Health), Ahmad Shatta (Commerce) and Abdullah Dabbagh (Agriculture) were former Deputy Ministers and, indeed, did all the work. Ibrahim Suwayyil, the new Foreign Minister, was Ambassador to Iraq, formerly Director General of the Foreign Office [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Tariki gained, at least nominally, in two ways: (1) his office has been elevated from a Directorate General to a Ministry and (2) he, personally, has been raised to Minister.

C. Those Replaced. All but one of the replaced princes were strong Faisal men. Prince Musa’ad bin Abdul Rahman, the King’s uncle and former Minister of Interior, has long been a thorn in the King’s side. He was Acting Prime Minister during Faisal’s absence in late 1959-early 1960 and kept Saud from taking over at that time. Prince Fahad bin Abdul Aziz, a younger brother of the King and former Minister of Education [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has also been bruited as a possible [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] candidate for the Saudi throne if Faisal or Saud were out. Prince Fahad bin Saud (the King’s son and former Minister of Defense) is probably out [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] because he wanted to be out. Fahad [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has never cared for his job. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

D. Those Not Included. Conspicuous by his absence, at least thus far, is Shaikh Muhammad Ali Reza, former Minister of Commerce, [1 line of source text not declassified].

E. Continuing Faisal Influence on Cabinet. Although Faisal’s direct participation in the government is now stopped, he will not be without influence. He is still the Crown Prince and the commoners, in particular, will take care not to offend him since his return to power at some future time is a distinct possibility.

Faisal also retains some indirect influence in the new Cabinet through (a) his daughter who is married to Prince Muhammad bin Saud (Defense) and (b) the new Minister of Education, Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Hassan, who is of the famous Nejdi religious family of Al al-Shaikh, which was Faisal’s mother’s line.

Saudi Policy. Likely Saudi policies in three special spheres require brief mention:

A. Financial. The King may be expected to want more money as will the Princes. Thus, there is a real danger that the sound fiscal policy that Faisal pursued may be eroded. Talal knows little about finances [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Perhaps men like Anwar AH and Zaki Saad can stem the tide. However, if necessary and appropriate, we, too, may want to say a word of caution at some future time in the interest of maintaining continued Saudi solvency.

B. Foreign Policy. Saudi foreign policy is unlikely to change. The King is well disposed toward us, but it is doubtful that he would run the risk of abandoning Faisal’s policy of neutrality. The King may well turn to us quite frequently on other things, including perhaps economic aid.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] nominally at least Saud has made his peace with Nasser. For the moment, therefore, the UAR will probably watch Saudi developments somewhat cautiously and in a noncommittal fashion. In the long run Saudi-UAR rubs may be expected.

The British may have a hard time since the King feels very strongly on Buraimi and on Inner Oman.

C. Petroleum Matters. In petroleum policy, a conflict of will—the King vs. Tariki—is likely to develop. Nominally, Tariki now has new prestige and a higher office from which he may pursue his ideas. In practice, however, he has probably been weakened since: (a) he [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is now directly accountable to the King; (b) the King may be expected to have views of his own, developed from anti-Tariki advisers, and will want his say in oil matters; and (c) Tariki’s doctrinaire approach which has often been pursued at the expense of increased revenue will run squarely into the King’s very practical desire to pursue policies that will derive more money. Thus, Tariki may not have an easy time of it.

General. The King has satisfied his ego by this action. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Moreover, the King is now directly exposed and will have to take the credit or blame for the success or failure of Saudi policy. For the moment, spending will help keep his popularity. Ultimately, however, his policies will have to prove themselves and, if found wanting, will cause public dissatisfaction to focus on his person.

0. Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 63 D 89, Saudi Arabia, Cabinet and Key Personalities, 1960. Confidential. Drafted by Eilts. Jones wrote on the source text: “Excellent paper.”